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A Technical N ote about the T ext o f the Essays Follow ing

O ne techn ical aspect o f th is volu m e requ ires a b rie f com m ent, or
m ore o f a technical note, referring to differen ces in the A u stra lia n habits
o f spellin g and punctuation. Separated as is well known, b y the spoken
varian ts o f com m on English usage, A u stralian s and A m erica n s share a
few distinct printed differences. W ith m in or exceptions, involving m inim al
editorial intru sion (m ostly b y w ay o f extending, perhaps excessively,
clarification s o f Au stralian nom enclature), the editors o f this volu m e
present these essays in a linguistic fashion acceptable to A u stralian
readers. Som e p ractices m ay then strike A m erican readers as odd or
even as incorrect. T h e m ost obviou s exam ples are o f the kind w hich find
the use o f “c ” in the A u stralian spellin g o f “defence” , or varian t letter
order as in “cen tre” for “center” , “th eatre” for “theater", and so on.
Punctu ation is the other m ost obvious area w here A m erican usage m ore
happily accepts (and occasionally dem ands) m ore diacritics gen erally
(especially com m as), than som e A u stralian usage alw ays requires.
T h e option to norm alise these essays to US expectation seem ed
to the editors both unnecessary for the relatively few cases w h ere
gen u ine con fu sion m ight eventuate and, m ore im portantly, it seem ed
very u n sou n d as a m atter o f principle. G iven the v o lu m e’s intent to
un cover the A u stralian experience as sim ilar to, though differen t from ,
A m erica’s Vietnam , unusual spellin g and punctu ation effects stand as
signs, m in or perhaps, o f those differences.
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Australia R&R:
Introductory Comments
J e ff D oyle and Jeffrey G rey

“Australia R & R ”— the title o f this introductory essay should, for
m any in the United States, evoke recollections o f pleasant tim es spent
away from the w ar zone, tim es o f rest and recuperation at one o f several
ports-of-call in the Asia Pacific region. Known to some servicem en, one
o f those ports-of-call m ay well have been Australia, chiefly in one or other
o f h er m ajor eastern cities— Sydney, M elbourne or Brisbane— where, by
all accounts, the R& R in whatever form it was taken was very fine indeed.
“R&R” , w hatever its strict definition— rest and recreation, rest and
recuperation, recovery and recreation, or som e other com bination— is
useful then as a title to a volum e devoted to introducing the A u stralian
experience o f Vietnam to a w ider Am erican audience— the term is at once
fam iliar as R & R and unfam iliar to m ost w hen it is re-located to Australia;
as m etaphor for the m ethod o f this volum e it is doubly valuable since it
suggests, severally, notions o f recovery, recuperation, and revaluation
which the analysis o f Vietnam in the US, and now m ore recently
Australia, has been undergoing for som e time.
For that reason R&R is im m ediately useful for those A m erican
readers— "in cou n try” veterans and others— w ho know som ething o f
Australia’s involvem ent in Vietnam ; this volum e will provide variou s
kinds o f recuperation o f their m em ories o f that involvem ent. For other
Am erican readers, who know less o f allied participatants in Vietnam ,
this volum e it is hoped will provide an introduction— a m eans o f
recovering som e o f the representations o f A u stralia’s roles as ally. For all
readers, the volum e is offered as a m eans o f reinterpreting, and hence
revaluing, the roles Australia played during and after the V ietn am W ar.
From the perspective offered by 20-30 years distance, it is not the
prim ary intent o f these essays to m ake inferences about the w ay Am erica
revalues its roles, nor that of its allies, but to som e extent the nature o f
the m ajor pow er-m inor power alliances played out in Vietnam and
subsequently m ake some im plications, if not stronger inferences,
inevitable. Perhaps part o f the “recovery” Australia, or at least num bers
of Australians, need(s) to m ake from the Vietnam W a r is a stronger
revaluing o f the w ay they write, think and function in regard to the
Am erican alliance. T his applies in all fields, social and intellectual, and
not ju s t in the m ore obvious m ilitary and political spheres. If Vietnam as
event and/or cultural subject is the 1960s’ watershed (or even the
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product o f the crises o f 1960s culture) it is often held to be, then
A u stralia’s part in the event o f Vietnam m ay well come to have far m ore
significance than its m any com m entators have recognised so far.
Useful too in the m etaphoric halo o f R & R is the sense conferred o f a
relocation o f A m erican experiences o f Vietnam to another place—
another location. To Am ericans in Vietnam it w as “Nam ”, “in-country” ,
and m ost tellingly “Indian country” (with all its interlayering o f Puritan
m ythology)— all strange locales but, as it has been argued in m any
Am erican critical accounts, all ultim ately accom m odated to an Am erican
vision o f the nation’s place within the world pattern o f events. To m ost
Australians Vietnam has yet to find such a happily resolved m ythic
location as “Indian country” allows; For Australia even w ithin the face of
conflating and com forting drives, Vietnam rem ains inertia-ridden as,
and seem s set to rem ain at least for the foreseeable future, a very
different place— the “funny place” (often expressed in other and less
polite term s)— a topography o f the unfixed or a dis-location.
The essays in this volum e offer then for the specialist and general
reader alike, som e Australian R&R— some recoveries, recuperations,
revaluing and reinterpretations, and finally, an uncertain relocation of
the V ietnam W ar. The essays present versions o f the history o f the
Vietnam W a r as experienced b y one o f its principal allies: “versions o f
history” since one o f the problem s also inherent in recovery and
recreation is the effect that tim e has on the m em ory o f the past as it
“actually happened”— those so-called events o f history; “version s o f
history” too, since the writing o f any kind o f history, social, literary or
m ilitary is no longer a simple m atter (if it ever was) o f collecting and
reporting the concrete “actual” events, docum ents and figures; “versions
o f history” since Vietnam as Am erican history is hardly a straightforward
topic, as Australian history the com plexity is increased with the necessity
o f writing and rew riting in the face o f the m assive US output o f Vietnam
as history, as film, as novel, and as myth.
A n d given that m assive output, this introductory com m entary
takes, w hat m ay be the unusual step, as its starting point the volum e's
last two entries— the Chronology which speaks for itself attem pting to
locate A u stralian involvem ent in the w ider context o f the A sia Pacific
region, and the Select Bibliography. Apart from its obvious function as
a resource for future studies, on the one hand, a reading o f the
bibliography in conjunction with the preceding essays provides some
insight into the range and depth (or lack) o f study Vietnam has received
at Australian hands. For example, for Australia, neither the M IA nor the
racial issues have any significant impact, as they did and continue to do
in the A m erican revaluations o f the war. It is hardly surprising that there
are virtu ally no studies concerned with such m atters. A num ber o f other
areas o f m ajor con cern to A m erican s m ay sim ilarly be revealed
unexpectedly in absentia from Australian concerns. Part o f this volum e
aims to “explain” those gaps; not so m uch fill them in, for they m ark some
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o f the differences between the two country's experiences o f Vietnam . On
the other hand, even a b rief reading o f the bibliography will reveal areas
where considerable discussion o f the w ar w as and is an active concern,
sometimes in areas less central to the United States. Australia’s continu ing
concern with its role, status and future alliances within the im m ediate
southeast A sian region is one such area, and this explains w h y to
Australian sensibilities the Vietnam W a r is intim ately linked with the
politics and history o f the whole region— a region som ewhat larger than
Am erican focus sometimes appears to understand. This regional emphasis
is brought out in a num ber of the essays following, and it explains in part
the breadth o f reference to books and articles which to A m erican eyes
m ay not be at once directly relevant to the Vietnam War.
M oreover the Select B ibliography reveals in m ore than a
quantitative way the presences and lacunae o f Australian studies: first,
it m ay be a surprise to some, especially those in some areas o f the
scholarly com m unity, to see references to quite so m any professional
m agazines, jou rn als and to the kind o f specialist publication devoted to
technical data o f a m ilitary kind, in a bibliography prim arily biased to
academ ic— that is literary and historical— studies. In part these special
references are explained by the editorial desire to be as com prehensive
as possible, and thereby to allow the widest possible access to a general
readership. In part it is linked m ethodologically to the kinds o f study
which as yet rem ain m ostly unwritten. It is m ore than anecdotally
significant to note that the bibliography is larger than the editors
expected it to be when its com pilation w as first begun. Vietnam had long
been an area o f scant attention: and m oreover, the editors believed that
even with the bloom ing o f Australian writing on Vietnam , m ostly in the
1980s, the quantitative product could not hope to m atch, even
proportionately, the extent, o f the US output. There has been an
explosion o f literature devoted to Vietnam in the 1980s, but the
bibliography's size is due also to the inclusion of those specialist
publications. Th ey require further com ment.
Academ ic writing has habitually sectioned off certain areas as
unworthy o f m ore than scant perusal. Some technical and professional
writings, while acknowledged in some m ilila iy histories, have received
little attention by other kinds o f scholarly practice— notably in the social
or literary-cultural histories. Many have noted how the helicopter
dom inates the iconography o f Vietnam , even it m ust be said o f the
Australian imagery, where the helicopter played a slightly less central
role; but while studies based in the hum anities regularly note this, they
have yet to investigate the m aterial connections between the helicopter’s
tactical role and its representations— put simply, between the w ay the
battlefield w as changed by the m achinery available, and the w ay this
com es to m aterially effect the writing o f the battlefield. M ore inferences
such as these m ay be forthcoming; and, Australian rewriting o f Vietnam
offers a good area for such discussion because of the profound m aterial.
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in d eed m a te rie l, d iffe ren c e s b e tw e e n A u s tra lia n and A m e ric a n
expectations of, and practices within, the theatres o f the Vietnam War.
Noting this is not to suggest that the follow ing essays have on the whole
achieved this nexus between technical m ateriel and a “m aterial culture”
reading, though both Terry B urstall’s and Jan B assett’s essays lean in
that direction. R ather the com pilation o f the bibliography and, it is
suggested, its reading as an account o f A u stralia’s Vietnam , highlights
those areas which prom ise m uch for future rewriting.
The second w ay in which the Select Bibliography functions is to
provide a context for the essays. W h ile each essay in this volum e is self
contained, each essay also derives som e o f its m eaning from the
cum ulative effect o f the sequence and also from the effect o f being read
within and to som e extent against the context provided by the bibliography.
These essays present introductions to general readers, and at the same
time re-write and re-value A u stralia’s Vietnam , as it stands so far,
sum m arised in the bibliography and chron ology w hich, perhaps
contrarily, conclude the volume.
From another viewpoint, to begin appropriately for a re-valuing
the volum e begins with the official historian o f the Vietnam W a r Peter
Edwards’ “T h e A ustralian Governm ent and Involvem ent in the Vietnam
W ar”, a ju d iciou s gleaning o f the m ajor political and m ilitary events,
discusses the parallels and differences o f the pathways leading the
Australians and the Am ericans to w ar in Vietnam . Shifting his focus
from the world scale events o f the war, to their social and political
reflections w ithin Australia, Edwards explicates: the A ustralian shift
from United Kingdom to US alliance: the evolution o f the concerns with
Indonesia and A sian com m unism within Australian society: and the
effects these events and concerns had on shaping the large and small
scale political allegiances within Australia and the w ider region. His
essay clarifies the links between the large scale political m anoeuvring
within the southeast Asian-Pacific region with the specific national
concerns o f a small population uncertain o f its role and future in that
wider context.
Jeffrey G rey’s “Vietnam as History: the Australian C ase” traverses
m uch the sam e terrain adding extra docum entation and variant readings
to m any o f the sam e events and political couplings. A significant
difference lies in G rey’s focus on the handling o f the events as translation,
that is, as they are w ritten as history. At its m ost straightforward G rey’s
essay provides a telling series o f critiques o f the several key texts o f
historical, political and social analysis o f A u stralia’s Vietnam — that is,
in part he critically reads substantial sections o f the Select Bibliography.
On the one hand, his essay provides entry to those texts suggesting as
he assesses their strengths and w eaknesses (Grey is forthright in
apportioning the latter), their originating contexts, ideologies and methods.
On the other hand, and more pertinently for this volum e. Grey assesses
the w ider context o f the writing o f history, particularly m ilitary history.
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in Australia. In doing this he places the events o f Vietnam into a broader
nexus o f events, representations and ideologies which constitute a m ajor
aspect o f Australian national identity— the network o f military m yth and
cultural accretion known as the Anzac legend. Importantly Grey points
to the w ay in which the Australian national identity has been, and it
seems continues to be, partially moulded by the way the country accepts
or rejects its m ilitary history. This he argues is dependent on the w ay its
historians, specialist and popular alike, choose to write that history. By
com parison with the pattern o f writing about Vietnam in the United
States, where Grey contends that the “historiographical battle lines . . .
m atch those draw n politically during the w ar” , the A u s tra lia n
historiography is both more com plex and less well advanced in practice.
More complex, since there are more groups com peting for the rights of
controlling the publicly accepted representations o f the war, and less
well advanced in the depth of analysis obtained from that writing, as his
critiques display. This lack of depth he sees as due less to the restricted
access to data (a reference to the 30 year closure o f official docum ents
operating in Australia, which prevents all but selected personnel access
to the governm ental and institutional archives), than to the fundam ental
failure o f m uch Australian historical writing to interrogate its own
ideological biasses.
A s a first move in the kind o f rewriting o f Vietnam which Grey
calls for, Terry Burstall's “Policy Contradictions o f the Australian Task
Force, Vietnam , 1966” marks a strong re-assessment o f the practices, at
the m aterial level, o f the Australian Forces in 1966 in operations with its
US allies in Phu ocTu y province. His essay is a salutory revaluation o f the
Anzac m yth o f the Australian as the “natural fighting m an”, as he
juxtaposes the pattern of Australian operational decisions against the
expectations, disappointments and frustrations o f the US com mander.
General Westm oreland. This assessment will be the m ore shocking to
Australian sensibilities since not only does it weaken the image of
Australian prowess, but it flies in the face o f the popular image of
Am erican m ilitary incompetence in Vietnam, com monly held and voiced
by Australian troops— who saw them selves as the professional and
combat superiors o f the indisciplined and careless Am erican troops.
Burstall adds more since he argues that the combat weakness o f the
Australians (to be sure a quantitative weakness, not a quantitative one)
was structural, deriving from failures as much o f m ilitary as political
inexperience.
W here Burstall’s essay looks at the way that the revision o f Anzac
will reflect the m aterial conditions o f the field, Jane Ross’ “Veterans in
Australia: the Search for Integration”, continues her substantial analyses
of the reception o f the returned servicemen. In a wide ranging and
densely docum ented essay Ross details the com peting im ages o f the
veteran (noted briefly in Grey's essay as one o f the problem areas),
forwarded variously by the Vietnam Veterans’ Association o f Australia,
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the Returned Service’s League, and several governm ent departm ents,
chiefly the repatriation system. Nor she notes has this struggle been
confined to the relatively narrow concerns o f the veteran com m unities
and their “service” associations and agencies. Focussing on the popular
m edia and the governm ent system s, Ross dem onstrates the w ay each in
its w ay has from tim e to time deployed one or other image o f the veteran
as the “exclusive” im age to achieve their political ends. She contends that
the m edia in particular have treated the w ar and its veterans with “glib
and often inaccurate analysis” using im ages based on the “sick” veteran
borrowed unthinkingly from the US media, when other inform ation
contended that this applied only to a m inority, albeit a politically vocal
m inority o f veterans. Her essay delves into the political and m oral
im plications o f such com petition, closing with a series o f strongly worded
questions about the cultural impact o f these implications.
“W h o Cares for the Caregiver?” by Jan Bassett advances another
area all too often neglected in Australian writing on Vietnam , the
participation o f wom en, in this case nurses o f the Royal Australian A rm y
Nursing Corps (RAANC). Bassett’s essay is based on the results o f a
questionnaire surveying a large proportion o f the nurses on active duty
in Vietnam . Not the least interest in this analysis is the w ay that the
nurses them selves have felt the neglect o f their participation; it is clear
that for som e their responses to the questionnaire provided an outlet for
previously w ithheld emotions; for others it w as a m eans o f m aking
trenchant criticism s o f both the necessarily expeditious treatm ent they
were able to give to their patients (and, often implicitly, the nurses
lam ent the attenuation o f the treatm ent effected by early evacuation o f
the patient to Australia), and the, at times, traumatic effect the pattern
o f instant and short-cut treatment had upon the caregiver herself.
Care for victim s in Bassett’s essay is widened to include those too
easily taken for granted in war. Together with Ross’ case o f the struggle
for the veteran image, the two essays suggest some significant gaps
within the study o f Australia’s Vietnam experiences— immediately obvious
as victim s are the wives and fam ilies o f the veterans, be they com batants
or caregivers. T h is has been the issue m otivating some aspects o f the
veterans’ com m unity groups, and the governm ent studies o f the effects
o f Agent Orange are focussed on fam ilial effects, particularly on offspring,
and not exclusively upon the soldier. There are a num ber o f film ic and
fictional accounts, and it is certain that care for the fam ilies is built into
the repatriation system and the practices o f the veterans associations
them selves, but there are not yet enough substantial studies o f the
effects o f the psychological traum as o f Vietnam upon the im m ediate
relatives o f Australian soldiers and nurses.
O ther victim s and apparent victim s o f Vietnam are the subject o f
Jam es E. C oughlan’s “International Factors Influencing Australian
G overnm ents’ R esponses To The Indochinese Refugee Problem ” , which
charts, in a sim ilar fashion to Edwards’ essay, the political as well as
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hum anitarian evolution o f the refugee problem and how A u stralia’s
response continues to reflect its sense o f its role and future in the
southeast Asian-Pacific region. A s in Edwards’ chronicle o f the events
leading up to and through Vietnam, Coughlan details the anticipations
and reactions o f the various Australian political parties as the world
political spectrum engages with Indochinese refugees. His analysis o f
the policy form ation o f successive Australian governm ents explains the
political intentions o f Australia’s desires to cem ent alliances within the
larger national and m ulti-national groupings. At the same time he shows
how Australia attem pted to m aintain in its im migrant populations,
which included the refugees, an ethnic m ix acceptable to the w ider
Australian electorate— an electorate at tim es m ore or less sym pathetic
to its newest, and som etim es it was felt forcibly introduced, citizens. The
refugee problem , as well as the contentions surrounding the status o f the
veteran, are related in Australia to the level o f econom ic tolerance the
nation can “afford’’ lo extend to such claim ants upon its welfare system.
And in the case o f the refugees this clim ate is confused by the nation’s
desires to preserve if not enhance their standing within the southeast
Asian-Pacific com m unity. These desires are com plicated by the need to
fend off the longstanding damage to the national im age o f a racist
Australia, rem aining from its once touted W hite Australia Policy. A s
such the dem ocratic self-presentation o f the Anzac as the “natural
fighting m an ” and egalitarian advocate o f the “fair g o ” for all, Australians
and would-be Australians alike, has been and is likely in the future to
be sorely tested by the racist undertones o f Australian national reactions
to both form er allies and enemies alike.
The last two essays in this volum e turn from m ore directly
“historic” events to their representations in the literary and som e o f the
electronic media. W here the historical and political writing has focussed
indirectly on the way Vietnam has highlighted the precarious or m arginal
“place” o f Australia, Peter Pierce’s “T h e Funny Place’: Australian Literature
and the W a r in Vietnam " engages with the dislocation o f the national
identity evident in the literary experience o f Vietnam. The Australian
soldier’s term for Vietnam, “the funny place” , becom es a revivified
m etaphor for an Australian sense o f the uncertainty o f self and nation,
characteristic o f much Australian writing, as well as that o f the soldierw riters’ narratives of Vietnam. Considering aspects of the soldier as the
“occidental tourist" o f Asia. Pierce details the curious variations and
surrogacies o f the Australian literature of Vietnam and ju xtap oses them
with both the well known US fictions o f the war and with earlier
Australian narratives o f warfare. Placement alongside the Am erican
fiction displays the difference in handling between Vietnam as “Indian
country" and Vietnam as "funny place” . For Australians the “funny
place" eventually became the no-place, as the soldier failed to relocate
his experience within the specific m yths o f Anzac. A s Pierce w rites there
was no “clear cut ideological victory”, nor a clear cut enemy to com plem ent
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either the national sense o f m ilita iy prowess (either the Vietcong w ere
too good or not present as enem ies), or at its m ost extrem e the race
hatred characteristic o f earlier anti-Asian feeling. Th e latter gives w ay to
a vague but often strident anti-Am ericanism , vague because the target
is so unfocussed, yet strident because it picks up threads o f generalised
anti-im perialist and post-colonialist feelings which had also been
substantial underpinnings of the A n zac tradition. Much o fth eA u slra lia n
literature o f the Vietnam war is infused with a general spirit that the
soldiers were fighting on the w rong side. Unfocussed too. since the
feelings o f contradiction are enhanced by a ram pant distrust o f the Asian
“other".
Relocation takes also the form o f w riting not about the Vietnam
W ar but the great occasions of Anzac legend. Pierce concentrates lastly
on the evasion-relocation evident in the literature o f the 1970s and
1980s which consciously or otherw ise seem ed to have re-w ritten the
foundation events o f the Anzac legend in the First W orld W a r as if they
were pre-visions o f Vietnam . Far from providing a sturdy m oral foundation
from w hich the nation might progress. Australian Vietnam literature
accom m odates a parade o f abiding national anxieties, enhancing the
uncertainty entailed in the Vietnam war, not recuperating from it.
T elevision and cinem a in Australia have developed relatively few
“texts” in com parison with the m assive output o f the US media. There
are a few distinctive Australian products however, providing islands
within the ocean o f Am erican m aterial which otherwise regularly gets
broadcast on the Australian airwaves. J e ff D oyle's “D ism em bering the
Digger: A u stralian Popular Culture and the Vietnam W a r” assess three
maj or exam ples, two from the television m iniseries genre, Vietnam (1987)
and Sword ofHonour (1987), and one feature film. Tom J effrey’s The Odd
Angry Shot (1979). Accepting the notion that the products o f popular
culture, particularly television m iniseries, tend on the whole to m ake
com fortable, to am eliorate the events o f history and the vagaries and
inconsistencies o f character by presenting the most average and
acceptable (the m ost ideologically neutral) im ages or representations,
Doyle argues that each o f these three texts rehearse A u stralia’s inability
to find a satisfactory resolution to its response to the Vietnam W ar. In
spite o f th eir careful plotting, setting and handling o f narrative closure,
a m easure o f each text’s desires to m ake their im ages conform , and
hence com fortable, to a resolution, each o f the texts dism em bers or
dislocates the events o f Vietnam away from that resolution, into a
televised version o f Pierce’s “funny place” . Togeth er these last two essays
profer a wide-angled re-assessm ent o f the preceding essays’ focus on
their “version s o f history”— on Vietnam as a series o f events, with a series
o f com peting explanat ions. In denying the possibility o f any neat closure,
the last two essays relocate the whole volum e as a necessary rem inder
o f the difficulties inherent in evaluating the effect o f Vietnam within
Australian culture.
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Until recently, almost specifically the tim e o f the A u stralian
W elcom e M arch in October 1987, Vietnam had been nearly forgotten in
the widest popular areas of Australian society. The exigencies o f the
nation, as in m any other western nations at the time, lay m ostly in the
problem s o f national econom ic m anagem ent, operating on the m argins
o f a volatile world econom ic system. Intim ately allied to the sw ings and
sweeps o f the balances o f m ilitary power. In its place on w hat the west
would take as the far rim of the Asia-Pacific region, Australia continued
along a path o f supporting those powers whose view s m ost nearly
reflected its own desired consensus o f econom ic, political and cultural
outlooks. C rudely pul, in the period since the Second W orld W ar,
allegiances switched from Eurocentric, and specifically British orientation,
toan A m erican dom inated though significantly Asian-Pacific orientation.
Such shifts— often rapid, som etim es expedient, som etim es principled—
tested m any o f the established traditions o f a fundam entally postcolonial but still European-leaning nation. Hardly in isolation, but
alm ost certainly as one o f the m ajor events since Second W orld W ar, the
Vietnam W a r m arks the watershed o f change, both chosen and enforced,
within Australian society; it is arguably, and despite the earlier evasion
of its effects, a watershed o f change that im pacts in a m ann er m ore
profound and far reaching upon A ustralian society than the changes
which the w ar has wrought in the United States. This sm all volum e is in
its w ay one aspect o f that impact, traversing most o f the terrain, and
rem aining as yet unresolved.

T he A u stra lia n G o v ern m en t a n d In v o lv em en t in th e V ietn am W a r
Peter Edwards

W h en I say to an A m erican that I am w orking on a m a jo r h istory
o f A u stra lia 's involvem ent in the p o s t-1945 southeast A sia n conflicts,
cu lm in atin g in the V ietn am w ar, I usu ally m eet one o f tw o reactions. T h e
first is ob viou s surprise that A u stralia w as involved in Vietnam . W h en
A m erica n s refer to V ietn am , th ey gen erally m ean “the U nited States in
V ietn a m ” . A m erican histories o f the w ar, w h eth er intended for a p op u lar
o ra sch ola rly readership, usually have little to say about the involvem ent
o f allies. T h e proverb ial visitor from ou ter space could read b ooks
totalling hu ndreds, even thousands, o f pages on how the U nited States
becam e involved and, w ith on ly the briefest lapses in con cen tration , not
becom e aw are that A m erican allies w ere present at all. T h e second
reaction is usu ally encou ntered from A m erican s w ho th em selves served
in V ietn am . T h ey often have no difficu lty in recalling that A u stralian s
were p resent in V ietn am , a recollection gen erally accom panied b y a sm ile
and som eth in g sim ilar to the words: “Boy, could those g u ys put aw ay
b eer!”
T h e ab ility o f A m erican s to recall w h eth er A u stralian s fought
with th em in V ietn a m is m ore im portant than it m ay seem . One o f the
fu ndam ental m otives for A u stralian involvem ent w as to produ ce a sense
o f gratitu d e on the part o f A m ericans, both in official circles and in the
gen eral public. It was, to use a phrase m uch used at the tim e, an
insurance policy, a prem ium paid in V ietn am tow ards an assu ran ce o f
support for A u stralia against problem s w hich already existed or w hich
m ight arise in the future, possibly even closer to A u stralia’s shores. But
it w a s m ore than ju s t an insuran ce policy. A u stralia had its ow n
con cern s about com m u nism in southeast Asia, con cern s that ran
parallel to those o f the United States. Policy-m akers in A u stra lia ’s
capital, C anberra, supported the dom ino theory as vigo ro u sly as their
cou n terp arts in W ash ington . Indeed, the con cern w a s p rob ab ly even
greater b ecau se in its m ore extrem e version s (including President
D w ight D. E isen h ow er’s celebrated statem ent o f A p ril 1954) A u stralia
itself w as seen as one o f the last dom inoes in the sequence that b egan
in Indochin a.
A t the sam e tim e, a sm all to m iddle p ow er located on the frin ges
o f sou th east A sia in evitably had different priorities from those o f a
su perp ow er an ocean aw ay from Indochina. T h ere w ere th erefore both
sim ilarities and d ifferen ces b etw een the paths taken b y th e U nited
States and A u stra lia tow ards involvem ent in Vietnam . T h is p ap er is
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intended to give an overview, for an Am erican readership, o f som e of
those parallels and differences.'
To set out the m ajor steps in the development of Australian policy
will indicate m any o f the parallels. Australia recognized the state o f
Vietnam, established with French sponsorship under the form er em peror
Bao Dai, on 8 February 1950, the day after the United Kingdom and the
United States had done so. Australian officials were well aware o f the
fragility o f the Stale o f Vietnam, and o f the strong popular support for the
rival Dem ocratic Republic o f Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh; but in the
interests o f the worldwide struggle against communism, the Australian
Government felt it had no choice but to support the Bao Dai gamble. In
1953 it invited Jean Letoum eau, the French m inister in charge o f
relations with the Associated States (as Vietnam , Laos and Cambodia
were then known), to visit Australia. Letoum eau was offered arm s and
equipm ent for the French w ar in Indochina. The m ateriel that was
eventually sent in 1953 and 1954 largely com prised obsolescent
equipment, and was in any case a token gesture by com parison with the
enorm ous economic and military assistance being given by the United
States. Nevertheless, Australia was clearly signalling that it regarded the
war in Indochina, not as m erely a colonial rearguard action by France,
but as a struggle between com m unism and democracy (or, at least,
potential democracy).
In 1954 Australia had only observer status at the Geneva
Conference, where its main diplom acy was sorely tested by the attem pt
sim ultaneously to maintain close and cordial relations with both the
United Kingdom and the United Stales. Immediately after the Geneva
accords, Canberra shared the widespread pessimism over the future of
the non-com m unist regimes in Indochina, and unhesitatingly becam e a
founder m em ber o f the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO)
at Manila. In the late 1950s, Australia shared the growing optim ism over
Ngo Dinh Diem ’s apparent success in sustaining the Republic of
Vietnam (RVN). In 1957, soon after visiting the United States to be hailed
as a “m iracle m an” by Eisenhower, Diem becam e the first foreign head
of state to visit Australia, where his welcom e was alm ost equally
enthusiastic.
A s the com munist-led insurgency grew in the early 1960s,
Australian m ilitary involvement ran parallel to that of the United States,
albeit on a far sm aller scale. A team o f advisers, initially com prising 30
officers and non-commissioned officers, was committed in 1962, growing
to 8 3 in 1964 and 100 in 1965. In A pril 1965 the first battalion o f infantry
was com m itted to Vietnam. In 1966 the com mitment was increased to
a two-battalion Task Force, and in 1967 the Task Force was further
augmented by a third battalion. Units of the Royal Australian Navy and
the Royal Australian A ir Force were also committed. A t the height o f the
war Australia had about 8000 service personnel in Vietnam at any one
time. In 1971 the withdrawal o f the Task Force began and by the end o f
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1972 virtually all Australian m ilitary personnel had been withdrawn,
apart from an em bassy guard. In all, about 50,000 service personnel
served in Vietnam and 500 lost their lives.2
All o f this will sound fam iliar, suggesting perhaps a m icrocosm ic
im itation o f the Am erican com m itm ent. But there were significant
differences betw een A u stralia’s and A m erica’s paths to Vietnam . The
first concerns the role o f the Australian-Am erican relationship itself, a
topic obviously o f m uch greater concern to Canberra than to W ashington.
W hile A ustralian policy-m akers shared m uch o f the Am erican perception
o f a threat o f com m unist expansionism in southeast Asia, they were as
conscious o f A u stralia’s weakness as the United States w as o f its m ilitary
might. If critics o f Am erican policy referred to “the arrogance o f pow er”,
critics o f A u stralian attitudes referred to the “frightened country", the
nation that had an alm ost pathological fear o f being “the last dom ino”.3
Curiously, given the longstanding fears in the Australian com m u nity o f
threats from the north, much o f the weakness was self-induced. In the
early 1950s, during the Korean W ar, serious efforts were m ade to
im prove A u stralia’s defence capacity but thereafter, for the rem ainder o f
the decade, defence expenditure was kept artificially low. The Governm ent
argued that its m ost useful contribution to the struggle against
com m unism w as to develop the country’s econom ic base: investm ent
was therefore directed towards “national developm ent” rather than to
defence.
T h is kind o f thinking lay behind the frequent references by
Robert G ordon (from 1963 Sir Robert) M enzies, Prime M inister from
1949 to 1966, to the im portance o f A u stralia’s “great and powerful
friends”, by which he m eant principally the United States and the United
Kingdom. T h e M enzies Governm ent took the view that Australia, with its
vast territory and sm all population, could not defend itself, but relied on
its alliances, principally SEATO, AN ZU S (the Australian-N ew ZealandUnited States security treaty signed in 1951) and to a lesser extent
A N Z A M (an A u s tr a lia n -N e w Z e a la n d -U n ite d K in g d o m d e fe n c e
arrangem ent for the M alayan area). This reliance on allies, however, led
to another fear, that the great and powerful friends m ight withdraw from
the region, leaving Australia isolated and defenceless as the dom inoes
fell. T h e United States and the United Kingdom could never leave the
north Atlantic, but they could leave southeast Asia. SEATO w as
therefore seen from the outset as a less reliable shield than NATO. From
the negotiation o f the Manila treaty, Australians expressed concern over
w hether SE ATO had sufficient “teeth” , by which they m eant principally
w hether it w as a sufficiently strong guarantee o f United States m ilitary
support in tim es o f need.
M uch o f A u stralia’s effort in defence and foreign policy was aim ed
therefore at trying to ensure that the United States w ould retain its
presence in southeast Asia. These efforts were further encouraged in the
late 1950s and early 1960s by signs that the United Kingdom was likely
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to w ithdraw its forces from east o f Suez, in order to concentrate on
developing its relations with the European continent. A t the sam e time,
both the United Kingdom and France were becom ing increasingly
reluctant to support western m ilitary intervention in Indochina, m aking
SEATO look even m ore “toothless”. Strange as it m ay now seem , the
underlying concern o f the Australian G overnm ent in the early 1960s w as
that the new D em ocratic adm inistration o f Joh n F. K ennedy m ight not
share the determ ination o f its Republican predecessor to resist com m unist
expansionism in southeast Asia. Despite the obvious signs that K enn edy
and his successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, w ere steadily raising the stakes
in Vietnam , this fear persisted.
T h e congressional resolution secured b y Johnson after the G u lf
o f Ton kin incident in August 1964 w as w elcom ed by M enzies in the
Australian federal governm ent’s lower house, the House ofRepresentatives,
with an alm ost tangible sense o f relief, as a sign that the U nited States
was irrevocably com m itted to m aintaining the security o f southeast
A sia.4E ven so, traces o f the fear o f A m erican w ithdraw al persisted. In the
diplom atic exchanges o f late 1964 and early 1965 the A u stralian
G overnm ent offered a battalion o f com bat troops when the United States
had not even asked specifically for assistance in that form . It w as as
m uch an encouragem ent to the United States to stay the course as it w as
a response to years o f pressure from W ash in gton to show that V ietn am
w as a cause for the w hole “free w orld” , not ju s t for the U nited Slates.
Indeed, one Australian historian has argued that Joh n son m ight
not have m ade the m ajor Am erican troop com m itm ents in 1965 had he
not received such strong and consistent encouragem ent from A u stralia.5
T his seem s rather unlikely. In all the thousands o f words that have been
w ritten on United States intervention in Vietnam , based on incalculable
am ounts o f research on official and private records, no-one has seriously
suggested that Australia had such a crucial influence on United States
policy. T h at is not to deny that Johnson undoubtedly w elcom ed the
strong support he received from Australia, w hen so m uch o f the rest o f
the w orld w as turning against him. There w as clearly a gen uine personal
as w ell as political rapport betw een Joh n son and M enzies’ successor,
Harold Holt, which was m ade m anifest in 1966 w hen Joh n son becam e
the first incum bent United States president to visit Australia. T h e visit
becam e a trium phal procession, paving the w ay for Holt's huge election
victory later in the year. W hen Holt drowned, in an apparent accident,
at the end o f 1967, Johnson again visited Australia, this tim e to attend
the funeral. His personal attendance was a notable m ark o f respect and
friendship, but there is little evidence to suggest that Au stralia had any
significant effect on the course o f A m erican policy, other than to confirm
Johnson on a course he had already chosen.
W h ile m uch has been written about the cordiality o f A u stralian A m erican relations in the Vietnam period, and about the degree to w hich
either party w as pushed or pulled into com m itm ent by the other, another
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aspect has b een less noticed. W h ile A u stralia had been afraid th at the
U nited S tates m igh t w ith draw from the region, it also had a recurring
fear that W a sh in gton had not alw ays thought through the im plication s
o f its policies, ru n n in g the risk o f precipitatin g a w id er war. D u rin g the
Indochin a crisis o f 1954, A u stralia w as clearly con cern ed b y the
possibility th at the “united action ” w hich S ecretary o f State J oh n Foster
D ulles w a s en cou ragin g m ight lead to a larger war, p ossib ly including
China, and also p ossib ly lead in g to the use o f n u clear w eapons.
Sim ilarly, du rin g the Laos crisis o f 1961, A u stralian m in isters feared
that w estern in tervention m ight provoke a m assive response from North
V ietn am and C hina, in turn leading to pressure b y the w estern m ilitary
com m an d ers for the use o f nu clear w eapons. T h is fear w as a recu rring
them e in A u stra lia n consideration o f p olicy tow ards sou theast A sia in
the late 1950s and early 1960s, although it w as gen erally suppressed
beneath the greater fear o f the spread o f com m unism .
But the A u stralian fear o f the expansion o f com m u nism through
southeast A sia w as not confined to the possible fall of the “d om in oes” on
the m ainland, ru n n in g from V ietn am through Laos, C am bodia, Burm a,
and T h a ila n d to M alaya. A u stralian s w ere usually at least as con cerned
with In don esia as w ith Indochina. T h is h igh ly populated country,
geograp h ically so close to A u stralia, w as not seen as sim ply an oth er
dom ino. A u stra lia n policy-m akers alw ays recognized that the struggle
betw een com m u n ists and an ti-com m u n ists in Indonesia w as largely
separate from that on the m ainland, and o f m uch greater im portance to
Australia. D evelop m en ts there took on added urgency in the late 1950s,
as President Su karn o raised the pressure in his cam paign to incorporate
w estern N ew G uinea, which had rem ained in D utch hands after the rest
o f the N eth erlan d s East Indies had gain ed independence as the R epu blic
o f Indonesia. Su ccess in this cam paign w ould m ean that A u stralia in a
sen se sh a red a lan d b o rd er w ith In d on esia, b eca u se A u s tra lia
adm inistered the eastern h alf o f the island o f N ew Guinea u n d er a United
N a tio n s m a n d a te . I f th e In d o n e s ia n C o m m u n is t P a r ty (P K I)
su b sequ en tly cam e to power, A u stralia could thus find itself ch eek -b y
jo w l w ith a p op u lou s country under com m unist control, w ith ou t the
com fortable insu lation o f the m iles o f land and sea b etw een m ainland
A u stralia and m ain lan d southeast Asia.
T h e m ajor difficulty for A u stralia w as that, on this issue, Canberra
and W a sh in gton did not see eye-to-eye. T h e United States did not
support D utch and A u stralian opposition to the Indonesian claim to
w estern N ew Guinea. On the contrary, it saw acquiescence in this
expansion as the best w ay to keep Indonesia in the n on -com m u n ist
cam p. P articu larly after the end o f 1961, the United States facilitated the
transfer o f p ow er in w estern N ew G uinea, nom inally u n d er the aegis o f
the U nited N ations, from the D utch to the Indonesians. A u stralia could
do nothin g but accept the inevitable with as m u ch grace as possible.
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These events underlined the extent to which Australia, by
restricting its defence expenditure in favour o f economic developm ent,
had m ade itself dependent on the goodwill o f the United States.
Consequently in the early 1960s the Australian Governm ent took every
step it could to try to win that goodwill. It inform ed W ashington that it
would do everything possible to m eet any Am erican requests for base
facilities on Australian soil. Several such agreem ents were reached,
providing for co-operation between defence and civilian agencies in
com m unications, space research and meteorology. The m ost im portant
was the approval in 1962 for a Very Low Frequency (VLF) naval
com m unications station at North-W est Cape in W estern Australia, to
facilitate com m unications to United States subm arines operating in the
Indian O cean. The Australian Governm ent took a very com pliant attitude
to this request, determ ined to allow no obstacle to the creation o f a facility
which would further commit the United Stales to the defence o f Australia
and its region.
It was in this context that Australia considered Am erican requests
in the early 1960s for advisers and other form s o f civilian and m ilitary
assistance in South Vietnam. At the same time, it was receiving sim ilar
requests for support for the new nation o f Malaysia, formed in 1963 by
join in g Malaya, Singapore and form er British territories on the island o f
Borneo. The Indonesians had declared a policy of “Confrontation"
towards Malaysia, involving diplom atic opposition and sm all-scale
m ilitary harassm ent. Britain, Australia and New Zealand were supporting
Malaysia, but once again the Am ericans were reluctant to take steps that
would antagonize the Indonesians. The linkage between Vietnam and
Indonesia in Australian m inds was m ost clearly dem onstrated in M ay
1964, w hen the Johnson adm inistration m ade a concerted eiTort to have
“more flags” in Vietnam. The Charge d A ffa ires at the Australian Em bassy
in W ashington, Alan Renouf, reported to Canberra that United States
policy on the Indonesian-M alaysian Confrontation was not as “firm ”
(that is, supportive o f Malaysia) as Australia would wish. Vietnam , he
therefore suggested, was an area where Australia could pick up credit in
Washington. Australia should seek “to achieve such an habitual closeness
o f relations with the United States and sense o f m utual alliance that in
our time o f need . . . the United Slates would have little option but to
respond as we would w ant”.6
The relationship between Australian policy towards Indochina,
especially Vietnam , and that towards Indonesia was complex, especially
in late 1964 and early 1965. Australian policy m akers had to balance
pressure from the United Kingdom, to give greater m ilitary support to
M alaysia against Indonesia, against pressure from the United States, to
support its effort in South Vietnam. The com m itm ent o f an Australian
battalion o f combat troops to Vietnam in April 1965 is widely remembered,
having been seen at the time and ever since as a significant step in
A ustralian defence and foreign policies. B y contrast, the sim ilar
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com mitment o f another battalion only a few weeks earlier, to support the
British and Malaysian effort in Borneo, has generally been forgotten. The
crucial decisions on Vietnam by Australian policy-makers were taken in
an atm osphere o f conflicting pressures from two “great and powerful
friends" over two different conflicts in sou theast A sia . Indeed, uppermost
in their m inds at some crucial times was the possibility o f a third conflict,
which they thought might be precipitated by Indonesian subversion and
infiltration into the Australian-administered territories in eastern New
Guinea. W e now know that this never came to pass, just as we know that
the Indonesian-M alaysian Confrontation eased in late 1965 and formally
ended in 1966: but that could not be foreseen by the policy-m akers in
late 1964 and early 1965.
Another element marks a m ajor difference in the paths by which
the United States and Australia came to be in Vietnam. Unlike the United
States, Australia had been involved in the campaign against com munist
insurgents in Malaya in the 1950s, generally known as the Malayan
Emergency. W hen the state o f emergency was declared in 1948 the
Australian Government, under Labor Prime Minister, J.B. (Ben) Chifley,
had resisted pressure from London to give m ilitary support to the battle
against the insurgency, but in 1950 the newly elected Liberal Government,
under Prime M inister Menzies, sent bombers and transport aircraft of
the Royal A u stralian Air Force.7 In 1955 the com m itm ent was
significantly increased when Australia sent troops and other elements
from all three armed services to Malaya, to jo in British and New Zealand
elements in forming the Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve.
These forces helped the British and Malayan forces fighting the insurgents,
both before and after Malaya gained its independence in 1957, and until
the Em ergency was declared over in 1960.
In several respects the commitment was comparable with that in
Vietnam in the 1960s. Australia was responding to a request from one
of its great and powerful friends to intervene in a campaign to put down
a com m unist insurgency in the ju n gles o f southeast Asia, in a country
which was, or had been, a European colony. It saw the conflict as a
theatre o f the Cold War, not as the suppression o f Asian nationalism.
Australia had reservations about the wisdom o f some o f the tactics used
by its m ajor ally, but having taken the decision to intervene it remained
a firm and loyal ally.
During the early years o f the commitment in Malaya there were
critics who argued that Australia was placing itself on the wrong side of
Asian nationalism. This western military intervention, they claimed,
would make Australia highly unpopular as soon as British colonial rule
was replaced by an independent government. This claim was disproved
when Malaya gained its independence in 1957 and its freely elected
government asked the Australian and other Commonwealth forces to
stay. They did so, and in 1960 the Australian Government could claim
part o f the credit for a success. The com munist insurgency had been
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defeated and M alaya had an independent, pro-western govern m ent w ith
which A u stralia had excellent relations. On the basis of this experience,
it was understandable that a few years later the Australian G overnm ent
w as inclined to believe that intervention in Vietnam need not necessarily
lead to disaster; w hile the critics w ho rightly pointed to the dangers o f
involvem ent in Vietnam had had their credibility weakened, like the boy
who cried “W o lf”.
T h is is not to say that A ustralians saw the com m itm ent in
Vietnam as sim ply a repetition o f the successful venture in M alaya. Th e
ethnic, geographic, religious, political, m ilitary and other differences,
which m ade the position in Vietnam so m uch m ore difficult for the west,
were w ell understood before the principal Australian com m itm ent w as
m ade.8 Nevertheless there is evidence that the com parison w as very
m uch in Australian minds. W hen considering precedents for the position
in Vietnam , A m ericans generally thought o f Korea, w hile Au stralian s
rem em bered Malaya.
Th is raises the question o f public attitudes. T h is paper is
concerned essentially with governmental decisions, but in a parliam entary
dem ocracy these decisions m ust take note o f the attitudes o f both the
O pposition in Parliam ent and extra-parliam entary groups. For the
Australian Labor Party (ALP) these were the years in the wilderness, as
it rem ained out o f office at the federal level from 1949 to 1972. T h e length
of A L P exclusion was caused largely by a m ajor split in 1955, w hen a
section o f the party broke away and subsequently form ed the D em ocratic
Labor Party (DLP). The DLP, predom inantly Catholic in m em bership,
was vehem ently anti-com m unist in both dom estic and foreign policy,
accusing the A LP of being too sym pathetic to com m unists. Although the
num ber o f seats won by the DLP in federal and state parliam ents w as
small, their influence on the outcom e o f elections w as considerable
because o f the preferential nature o f Australian electoral system s. The
existence o f the DLP was therefore an additional reason for the
governm ent to m aintain a resoutely anti-com m unist stance in foreign
affairs.
T h e A LP w as weakened in the late 1950s and early 1960s not only
by this split, but by divisions w ithin its own ranks. Although factions
w ithin the party were not then as institutionalized as they later becam e,
there w as a clear division betw een a left and a right wing, m ade
particularly obvious by the issue o f the VLF station at North-W est Cape.
The left was suspicious o f the United States and reluctant to be
associated in any w ay with nuclear weapons; the right em phasized its
loyalty to the A m erican alliance and was not far from holding the sam e
view s as the governm ent in m ost aspects o f foreign policy. A s policy
towards southeast Asia came towards the top o f the political agenda in
the 1960s, this division vitiated the A L P ’s criticism s o f the govern m en t’s
policies. Not until after the governm ent had com m itted the first battalion
o f com bat troops did the ALP unite behind a firm policy of opposition to
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the com m itm ent. Its leader. A rth u r A. Calwcll, gave a powerful, and in
some respects prescient, speech foreshadowing m any o f the problem s
that were to becom e evident in later years;9 but by this tim e it was m uch
too late to have any effect on governm ent policy.
Outside Parliam ent there w ere several groups w ho could together
be categorized as an anti-war m ovem ent, but they rem ained on the
m argins o f politics in the 1950s and early 1960s. In 1949 an Australian
Peace Council w as formed, effectively a branch of the W orld Peace
Council, bringing together com munists, Christians and intellectuals. In
the 1950s this council organized a m ajor congress, at which the principal
guest speaker w as the Dean o f Canterbury, England, D r Hewlett
Johnson, widely known as “the Red D ean“ for his adm iration for Stalin
and the Soviet Union. In a highly publicized and controversial tour of
Australia, Johnson described com m unism as “a Christian m ovem ent
that is surging upward in every part o f the world” and he advised
Australia not to becom e involved in an “im perialistic” war, “a w ar against
the people” in M alaya.10Not surprisingly, Menzies and other conservatives
cam e to regard the clergym en and other non-com m unists in the anti-war
groups as naive dupes o f the com m unists, used to provide a respectable
front for a m ovem ent which existed essentially to support Soviet policies
and oppose those o f the west. Thus, when a group of Anglican bishops
wrote to M enzies in early 1965 to urge him to support a negotiated rather
than a m ilitary solution in Vietnam , they were given little cred ib ility."
Their argum ents had decidedly m ore substance than those o f Dr
Johnson and the clergym en known as “the peace parsons” in the 1950s,
but the Governm ent and the public had become accustomed to dism issing
views from this quarter as naive and ill-founded.
In fact the anti-war m ovem ent by the m id-1960s w as becom ing
much less the exclusive property o f those who adopted a basically proSoviet line. The Com munist Party o f Australia was much w eaker than it
had been in the years im m ediately after the 1939-1945 war, and m iddleclass liberals were beginning to draw attention to issues in and around
the Pacific, such as Chinese and French nuclear tests, rather than more
remote concerns like Algeria and Cuba. Congresses in 1959 and 1964
helped to give the movement a stronger adm inistrative structure, but
this w as not to becom e evident until later. As late as October 1964, ju s t
before the introduction of conscription and six m onths before the
principal com m itm ent to Vietnam , an anti-war congress seem ed as
ineffectual and m arginal as ever. It was only after the first conscripts
were sent to Vietnam in 1966 that a significant protest m ovem ent
emerged. Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, the Governm ent could
claim broad public support for its policy o f close alliance with the United
States and the United Kingdom in opposition, by m ilitary m eans if
necessary, to the expansion o f com m unist influence in southeast Asia.
Australia, therefore, cam e to be involved in Vietnam by a path
that w as sim ilar, but by no m eans identical, to that of the United States.
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Australian policy w as not m erely a clone or an echo o f that o f its
superpower ally. Australian policy-m akers had their ow n concerns and
took their own decisions. They deserve the credit for those decisions that
proved wise, and they cannot escape the blam e for those that proved
unwise.

1 The evidence on which this paper is based will be found in the writer’s
forthcoming volume, provisionally entitled Crises and Commitments: Australian
Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948-1965, which will form part of the
Official History of Australia’s involvement in the Malayan Emergency, the
Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation and the Vietnam War.
2 The precise number of participants, and the breakdown of types o f casualty
figures is contained in the table given in footnote 5 in Jane Ross. “Veterans in
Australia: the Search for Integration", in this volume,: 50-73..
3 Alan Renouf. The Frightened Country, Macmillan, Melbourne, 1979: Malcolm
Booker. The Last Domino, Aspects o f Australia’s Foreign Relations, Collins,
Sydney, 1976.
4 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, vol. H[ouse]of Representatives] 43, 13
August 1964, pp. 184-5.
5 Glen St. J. Barclay. A Very Small Insurance Policy: The Politics o f Australian
Involvement in Vietnam, 19541967, University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia,
1988.
6 The cable is quoted extensively in Michael Sexton. War fo r the Asking:
Australia’s Vietnam Secrets, Penguin, Ringwood, pp. 44-45.
7 See Peter Edwards. “The Australian commitment to the Malayan emergency,
1948-1950", Historical Studies, 22, (No.89), October 1987, pp. 604-16.
8 See, for example, the comments by Liberal (that is, conservative) Member of
Parliament, sometime Minister of Defence, and Prime Minister from 1975-1983,
Malcolm Fraser in Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, vol. H of R 43, 13
August 1964, p. 194.
9 A.A. Calwell in Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, vol. H of R 46, 4 May
1965, pp. 1102-07.
10 Sydney Morning Herald, 17, 20, 21, 24 and 26 April 1950.
11 The exchange of letters was published as Vietnam: Exchange o f Letters
between the Prime Minister, theRt. Hon. Sir Robert Menzies, K.T., C.H., M.P., and
the Rt. Rev. J.S. Moyes, C.M.G., and certain Archbishops and Bishops, Prime
Minister’s Department, Canberra, 20 April 1965.

V ietn am as H is to ry : th e A u stra lia n C ase
J effrey G rey

W a r has p layed a large part in the sh apin g o f A u stra lia n society
and n ation al identity, but occu pies a m uch less prom inent part in the
w ritin g o f the n a tion ’s history. A n d in con trast to the situ ation in the
United States, w h ere the flood o f published m aterial o f all types
th reatens to overw h elm the student o f the subject, A u stralian historical
w ritin g on the V ietn a m W a r is still in the early and ten tative stages o f
d evelo p m en t.1 Equally, because A u stra lia ’s involvem ent w as sm a ller in
relative term s th an A m erica ’s, and because th at involvem ent did not
pose such fu n d am en tal questions for A u stralian s, there is less to be said
about it.
P a rtic ip a tio n in the tw o w o rld w a rs w as fo llo w e d b y the
com m ission in g o f large, m u lti-au thored official histories w hich, fo r th eir
time, w ere rem ark ab ly sophisticated and thorough. Indeed the history
o f A u stralian efforts in the First W orld W ar, and m ore especially its editor
and p rin cip al au th or C.E.W. Bean, has had a lon g-lastin g influence
upon the shape o f historical w ritin g on w ar in this cou n try.2 In contrast
to the official h istories elsew here, w ritten often to defend as w ell as
explain the con du ct o f the war. B ean ’s h istory con cerned its e lf w ith the
extraord in ary deeds o f ordinary m en, the sold iers them selves, and had
less to say abou t strategy and virtu ally nothin g on generalship, logistics
or adm in istration . T h e history w ritten after the Second W orld W ar,
edited by G avin Long, took its cue from B ean and again con cen trated on
a trench level view o f the fighting, although because o f the va stly greater
m ob ilisation o f nation al resources involved betw een 1939-45 this series
devoted m uch m ore attention to activities in the dom estic econ om y and
society.
In both w orld w ars A u stralian correspon den ts w ere attached to
the forces to report on their activities, and in both cases a d ecision w as
m ade to com m ission an official history before the conflict had ended. In
the n u m erou s sm aller w ars and w arlike actions in w hich A u stra lia found
itself engaged after 1945— in J ap an on occupation du ty and in the
Korean W ar, M alayan Em ergency, Indonesian Confrontation and Vietnam
— histories w ere com m ission ed lon g after the events th ey w ere to
analyse, and the au th ors appointed had no first hand exp erien ce o f these
conflicts. T h e h istory o f the K orean W a r w as com pleted on ly in 1985,3
and an official historian for the p ostw ar southeast A sia n conflicts, o f
which V ietn a m is the centrepiece so to speak, w as appoin ted only in
1983. T h e restriction s o f the relevant archival legislation w hich, as in

Vietnam as H is to ry : The A u stra lia n Case

27

Britain, precludes public access to governm ent records until they are
thirty years old, together with the absence, as yet, o f any official history
as w as published for earlier conflicts, m eans that A ustralian w riting on
the Vietnam W a r lacks an authoritative official w ork which establishes
the record and against which others m ay react or from which they m ay
take a lead.
A num ber o f jou rn alists in Australia wrote about Australian
involvem ent during the Vietnam W ar, and o f course there w as a large and
active anti-w ar publishing effort. By its nature little o f the latter has
survived, w hile the form er often belonged to a tradition o f A u stralian w ar
writing which w ent back to Chester W ilm ot and Kenneth Slessor in the
Second W orld W ar, if not indeed to B ean him self— factual w riting about
the experiences and conditions o f the troops in the field o f a kind
com m on to w ar correspondents everywhere.4 A fter a new Australian
governm ent w ithdrew the last o f its forces in 1972, Vietnam disappeared
quickly from the national agenda. W ith one or two exceptions it w as not
to receive serious attention again as a subject for nearly a decade.
The contem porary debate over A ustralian participation in the
war continues to be reflected in m ost o f the history written in the last
decade. The universities were a focal point for anti-war activism at the
height o f the war, and some academ ics took a leading role in opposition
"teach-ins" and street protests. Others, o f course, supported governm ent
policy, bu t they have been much m ore reticent subsequently. Indeed, it
is alm ost im possible now to find anyone w ho defends seriously the stated
aims for which Australia went to war in Vietnam .
In response to the fall o f Saigon in 1975, the Labor Prim e
Minister, E.G. (Gough) W hitlam , directed the Departm ent o f Foreign
Affairs to prepare a paper on the Australian com m itm ent, and this w as
tabled in the Parliam ent on 13 M ay.5 Much o f the paper w as taken up
with an exam ination o f the process by which Australian forces had been
com m itted, with further attention given to the several increases in
Australian troop strength undertaken betw een 1966-67. A rgu in g that
“the decision in April 1965 to send a battalion for active service in South
Vietnam w as the crucial issue in A u stralia’s com m itm ent”, the paper
devoted m ost space to the events surrounding the “request” for direct
m ilitary support from the South Vietnam ese Government. In announcing
the decision to send troops the then Prim e M inister o f the Liberal
Governm ent, Sir Robert Menzies, had stated that his G overnm ent acted
upon such a request, although it w as never in fact produced. A s it
transpired, there had been no such request. Rather, the G overnm ent of
Dr Phan Huy Q uat had agreed to the despatch o f Australian troops after
this had b een arran ged b etw een the A u s tra lia n and A m e ric a n
G overnm ents and he him self had been pressured into acceptance. T h e
M enzies Governm ent saw a request as necessary in order that A ustralian
action could be explained under the term s of the SEATO Treaty— which
precluded action by m em ber countries like Australia on the territory of
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protocol states such as South Vietnam except at the specific request o f
their governm ents— although in this instance SEATO w as never actually
invoked.
Critics then and subsequently were quick to seize on the issue o f
the “requ est”, and to use the circum stances under w hich it w as
produced as p ro of that the Australian Governm ent acted contrary to the
wishes o f the South Vietnam ese and at the behest o f the United States.6
W hile there can be little doubt about the contrived nature o f the request
in 1965, this attitude ignored the fact that a succession o f South
Vietnam ese G overnm ent officials had called upon Australia for various
forms o f non-specific m ilitary assistance in the years since 1961. A m ore
com plex interpretation o f the steps leading to Australian involvem ent
has gradually appeared, and this em phasises both that Vietnam w as not
the central issue in Australian thinking at this time, and that the
Australian Governm ent acted with greater concern for Australian interests
than earlier critics had allowed.
A u stralian defence and foreign policy has been characterised by
a search for secu rity lied to the guarantees o f a great and powerful friend.
Until the fall o f Singapore this was provided by Britain, but the afterm ath
o f the Second W orld W a r served to em phasise Britain’s failing im perial
might, and w hile Australia never switched allegiance to the United States
in the unthinking m anner som etim es portrayed, increasingly in the
1950s and early 1960s the Australian Governm ent saw the preponderant
W estern role in southeast Asia as an Am erican one. The AN ZU S Treaty,
signed in 1951, had provided non-specific assurances but in the
changing strategic environm ent o f the early 1960s this was felt to be
insufficient should Australian interests be threatened directly. Th is
threat w as perceived as com ing not from China, despite M enzies’ public
statem ents about “the downward thrust o f Asian com m unism ”, but from
Indonesia.
A u stralia had viewed with concern the Indonesian incorporation
o f the form er Dutch possession o f W est New Guinea in 1961, and
Sukarno's policy o f “confrontation” with M alaysia, in which Australian
troops were involved from 1964 b y virtue o f existing defence ties with the
British and M alaysian Governm ents, heightened alarm in Canberra. In
a m ajor study o f A u stralian foreign policy at this time, historian G regory
Pem berton has show n the param ount im portance o f the relationship
with Indonesia for any understanding o f Australian Vietnam policy;7
Australian efforts to ensure that the United States increased and
m aintained its com m itm ent in southeast Asia were directed to containing
Sukarno as m uch as they were to preventing the further expansion o f
com m u n ist p o w e r in In d och in a. O th er w rite rs h ave ta k en th e
interpretation o f this activist policy stance further, however, in arguing
that the A m erican Governm ent would not have expanded its own
involvem ent in Vietnam in 1965 but for the persistent and continuous
badgering o f the Australian Governm ent, which sought to provide the
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diplom atic p recon dition s w hich w ou ld m ake an A m erica n com b at
com m itm ent possible.8 O f course, it m ay be objected at once th at this
explan atory tail w ags the historical dog, and th at such a v ie w ignores
entirely the nu m erou s dom estic pressures w ith in the U nited States itself
w hich led President Johnson to increase substan tially the A m erican
com bat presence.
Perhaps the m ost interesting th in g abou t this
argu m ent is that it flies in the face o f a tradition o f A u stralian h istorical
w riting, especially on the left, w h ich sees A u stralian foreign p olicy as
reactive and entirely at the disposal o f one or oth er great power.
In th e context o f the w a r as a w hole, the actual A u stra lia n
com m itm ent w as o f m arginal significance. A t its height, the A u stralian
T a s k Force in Phuoc T u y province nu m bered 8300 men. A p p ro xim ately
50.000 served in total, o f whom 500 w ere killed and over 2000 w ou n d ed .9
A gain st the p eak troop presence o f the K oreans (50,000) or T h a is
(11,500), m uch less the ARVN or the US, it w as a tiny effort. B ut there
are other w ays o f assessing the A u stralian m ilitary contribution. N ot
only w ere A u stralian s the first o f the Free W orld M ilitary A ssistan ce
Forces to jo in the US in the field, but unlike the Koreans an d T h ais, th ey
and the N ew Z ealanders bore the costs o f the deploym ent them selves. A s
a force from a stable w estern liberal d em ocracy in A sia th eir p resence
lent cred ib ility to J oh n so n ’s call fo r “m ore flags” in V ietnam , w h ile th eir
un doubted m ilitary effectiveness reinforced further the valu e o f the
con trib u tion .10
A u stralia’s m ilitary effort has been looked at from tw o perspectives:
in term s o f the com bat experience and, less frequently, from a strategic
and institu tion al view point. Person al experien ce is a stron g suit in
A u stralian m ilitary writing, the tradition descending in an u n broken line
from D r B ea n and the First W orld W ar, and the bulk o f th e w o rk in this
category has recounted the w ar from a unit or individual perspective. A
nu m ber o f arm y units produced illustrated accounts o f th eir tou rs o f
duty, b u t on ly one w as published com m ercially.11 The passage o f tim e
has neutralised m ost o f the con troversy gen erated by an un popu lar war,
and V ietn a m is now being incorporated into the m ain stream o f the
A u stralian m ilitary tradition in a n u m ber o f accou n ts.12T h is attitu de is
reflected in som e, although by no m eans all, o f the m em oirs and person al
recollections. T h ose w ritten b y regulars have tended to dw ell on the
positive featu res o f m ilitary service and have reserved criticism fo r the
perceived lack o f support for th eir efforts in A u stra lia .13 O th er accoun ts
are m uch m ore critical o f the arm y itself, or are bitter at the ingratitude
o f the civilian popu lation back hom e, an attitude w hich m an y nation al
servicem en [conscripts] first encou ntered only after th eir retu rn from
active serv ic e .14 T h e sense o f h ostility and even despair w h ich these
accounts portray is m uch m ore resonant w ith in the sm all n u m b er o f
com bat novels w ritten by A u stralian authors, although m ost o f th e latter
were not w ritten b y com bat v etera n s.15
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There are a num ber of more sophisticated treatments o f Australia’s
operational involvem ent, at both the unit and higher levels. T h e first
Australian com bat troops were com m itted in 1962 as part o f a training
and advisory m ission which later worked through the US Special Forces
network and. later still, had some part in the Phoenix program m e. T his
unit’s diverse and difficult tasks have been treated at great len gth ,16 in
a m anner which com bines successfully the em phasis on individual
experience which is so im portant in the Australian m ilitary tradition
with som e pertinent analysis o f the policy which governed the Training
Team ’s deploym ent. The first Australian battalion to see action in 19651966, as part o f the US 173rd Airborne Brigade in B ien H oa province, has
also been treated at len g th .17 Th e circu m stan ces o f this u n it’s
deploym ent, and the undoubted difficulties which ensued from attaching
the battalion to a larger force which operated on different doctrinal and
adm inistrative assum ptions, allows the author to contrast unfavourably
Am erican tactical shortcom ings with Australian professionalism , thus
reinforcing one o f the central tenets o f the Australian m ilitary myth. The
same process is at w ork in the official account o f the Special A ir Service
Regim ent, a book which fulfills the additional function o f dem onstrating,
at least to the author’s satisfaction, the continuing utility o f special
forces in the Australian arm y.18
A w ider perspective is rare, and there has been alm ost no
institutional or system ic analysis o f the arm y in this period. The arm y
went to V ietn am im m ediately follow ing a period o f considerable
o rg a n is a tio n a l u p h ea va l res u ltin g from the ad op tion and th en
abandonm ent o f the Peniropic division,19 and with a com m and and
control system which, at least initially, was not as w ell suited to the
political-m ilitary dem ands placed upon it as arguably it needed to be.20
There is only one analysis o f the Australian T ask Force’s operations
overall in Vietnam betw een 1966-72, and this is at times highly critical
o f the perceived absence o f “a coherent and effective m ilitary role on the
ground”.21 The author’s overall contention that because the war in
Vietnam was lost A u stralia’s role in Phuoc T u y province was a failure
im plies a m isunderstanding o f the relationship between the operational
and strategic levels o f war, but other criticism s concerning, for example,
the construction o f the Dat Do-Phuoc Hai m inefield or the failure o f the
Australians to take over the province advisory role from the Am ericans
are well sustained. Th e tone overall is too critical, but the absence to date
o f a countervailing view is striking.22
The sociology o f the forces at this tim e is likewise a neglected
field, although it should be added that this is true for all o f A u stralia’s
wars. The difference, however, is that only in this war were conscripts
sent on active service outside Australian territory,23 and it is the
conscript elem ent o f the army, about one-third only of those w ho served
in Vietnam , which has attracted scholarly attention, most notably in the
work o f Jan e Ross.24 The specific weakness o f this w ork is that it
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relegates the regu lar arm y m ajority to th e peripheries, w h ile th e absence
o f any w id er study o f the national service schem e as a w h ole robs it o f
necessary con text and com parison.
C onscription itself was reintroduced in April 1964, b efore any
decision had been m ade about deploying com bat units to V ietn a m and
in the context again o f fears about an intensified Indonesian insu rgen cy
in Borneo. Indeed, it is not w idely know n that both the arm y and the
D epartm ent o f Labou r and National Service opposed the rein trodu ction
o f the schem e, citing the experience in the 1950s w h en national
servicem en had b een required to perform only six m onths com pu lsory
training and had had no overseas service obligation. T h e deploym ent o f
conscripts on active service in Vietnam , begin ning in m id -1966, sparked
grow ing opposition w ith in Australia at a level not seen since th e b itterly
fought con scription referenda during the First W orld W ar. C uriously,
this aspect o f Au stralia’s Vietnam W a r has b een least frequ en tly and
least s a tis fa c to rily d ealt w ith in th e h is to ric a l lite ra tu re .25 T h e
M oratorium m ovem ent, as anti-conscription, an ti-w ar activism cam e to
be called, still aw aits its historian, although the docum entary legacy o f
the variou s oppositional groupings is rich and varied and a n u m ber o f
postgraduate theses have been w ritten on aspects o f the subject.
Published w ork rem ains thin. M uch o f it is w ritten by form er activists
and has a defensive to n e, while other authors are at pains to dem onstrate
a tradition o f an ti-w ar dissent and the existence o f a peace m ovem ent
throughout ou r history, as if this som ehow validates the m ovem ent in
the 1960s.26 T h ere are im portant legal, constitutional, p olitical and
m oral issues involved in the im position o f national service fo r V ietnam ,
but only a handful o f w riters seem concerned to follow them th rough .27
O verview s o f the Australian w ar have been few, and gen erally
m ixed in quality. T h e earliest contribution in this area, a series o f essays
published in the early 1980s,28 suffered from the usual problem s o f
edited w ork s and provided an uneasy m ix o f academ ic w o rk w ith
personal recollection. A sim ilar effort produced at the end o f the decade
suffered from m any o f the sam e faults.29 Both books brin g togeth er a
variety o f perspectives critical o f A u stralian involvem ent, but the quality
o f the scholarship is uneven and the strident authorial voice em ployed
sits ill w ith attem pts to provide a detached— which is not to say
disengaged— perspective on events which occurred before a sizeable
section o f the A u stralian population w as b om .
T h e legacy o f the Vietnam W ar, in Australia as in the U nited
States, is dem onstrated m ost clearly by the large influx o f Indochinese
m igrants and refugees since 1975, and b y the con tinu in g figh t for
recognition by Vietnam veterans. A sian im m igration has lon g b een a
political issue in Australia, a nation w hich until the 1960s excluded n o n 
white m igrants through the provisions o f the Im m igration A ct in the
interests o f a w hite Australia policy. D espite the best attem pts o f the
racist fringe, and the occasional unwise sally b y m ore establishm en t
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figures, A u stralian society has absorbed Indochinese m igrants, as it has
the earlier w aves o f European and M iddle Eastern m igrants w h o have
arrived since the Second W orld W ar, w ithout significant social upheaval.30
The problem s o f V ietn am veterans are both m ore public and m ore vexed.
The V ietn am V eteran s Association o f A u stralia w as form ed in 1980 as a
result o f dissatisfaction with existing veteran s’ groups, prin cipally the
Returned Services League, and w ith the bureaucracy o f the D epartm ent
o f V etera n s’ Affairs. It represents no m ore than 5,000 m em bers, about
one-tenth o f those eligible, but has played a prom inent role as a gin ger
group in veterans’ politics, especially overthe cluster of issues surrounding
Agent O range and Post-Traum atic Stress Disorder, which is claim ed by
som e to be m ore prevalent in this group o f veterans than in any other.31
As in the U nited States, there is a clear perception that this gen eration
has not b een accorded the recognition and level o f public esteem enjoyed,
in particular, b y soldiers o f the Second W orld W ar. In the A u stralian case
at least th is is to assum e that the latter was typical o f the public response
to returning service personnel throughout the twentieth century, a
proposition w h ich m ust be qualified fairly heavily. In the United States,
the historiographical battle lines in m ost cases m atch those drawn
politically during the war; the argum ents o f the 1980s in m an y cases
have not advanced m uch beyond those o f the 1960s. In Australia, on the
other hand, the m oral argum ent to som e extent has shifted from the
political arena o f the 1960s and 1970s to the field ofvelera n s’ entitlem ents
in the 1980s and 1990s. W h atever advance it m ay represent otherwise,
it has not helped in the clear analysis o f veteran s’ issues.
A s the archives begin to open in the next decade we can expect
an increase in the nu m ber of w orks dealing with A ustralian participation
in the war, and can hope for an im provem ent in the scholarly and
evidential base o f research in som e o f the areas noted above. G iven the
lines along w hich the w riting o f Au stralian m ilitary history has developed
in the 75 yea rs since the First W orld W ar, it is b y no m eans obvious that
this will result in a broadening o f the focus o f the work w hich results. 1

1 This article will concern itself with writing on Australian involvement in
Vietnam, and will not deal with the important work on the wider war by scholars
such as David G. Marr and Carlyle Thayer, both Americans long resident in
Australia, or of Australians such as David Chandler and Ben Kieman.
2 See Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey. “Australian and New Zealand Writing on
the First World War”, in Jurgen Rohwer (ed). Neue Forschungen zum Ersten
Weltkrieg, Koblenz, 1985.
3 Robert O'Neill. Australia in the Korean War 1950-53. Volume I Strategy and
Diplomacy, Canberra, 1983; Volume II Combat Operations, Canberra, 1985.
4 Vietnam examples are Gerald L. Stone. War without Honour, Jacaranda Press,
Melbourne, 1966 and Ian Mackay. Australians in Vietnam, Rigby, Adelaide, 1968.
5 [R.G. Neale], “Australia's Military Commitment to Vietnam”, Commonwealth
Parliamentaiy Paper, 13 May 1975.
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6 For a good example see Greg Lockhart. “Fear and Dependence: Australia’s
Vietnam Policy, 1965-1985", in Kenneth Maddock & Barry Wright (eds). War:
Australia and Vietnam, Harper & Row, Sydney, 1987, pp. 11-36.
7 Gregory Pemberton. All the Way. Australia's Road to Vietnam, Allen & Unwin,
Sydney, 1987.
8 Glen St.J. Barclay. A Very Small Insurance Policy. The Politics o f Australian
Involvement in Vietnam, 1954-1967, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia,
1988. A milder statement of the thesis is contained in Michael Sexton. War fo r
the Asking. Australia's Vietnam Secrets, Penguin, Ringwood, 1981.
9 See the table given in footnote 5 of Jane Ross. “Veterans in Australia: the Search
for Integration”, in this volume, pp. 50-73.
10 Small air and naval units were attached to US forces also. See Denis Fairfax.
Royal Australian Navy in Vietnam Australian Government Publishing Services,
Canberra, 1980, and George Odgers. Mission Vietnam. Royal Australian Air
Force Operations, 1964-1972, Australian Government Publishing Services,
Canberra, 1974.
11 Robert O’Neill. Vietnam Task. The 5th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment,
1966-67, Cassell, Australia Ltd., Melbourne, 1968. The author was later official
historian for the Korean War, Director of the International Institute for Strategic
Studies, London, and is now Chichele Professor of the History of War at Oxford
University.
12 Especially in the work of Lex MeAu lay. See The Battle o f Long Tan. The Legend
ofAnzac Upheld, Hutchinson, Melbourne, 1986; The Battle o f Coral. Fire Support
Bases Coral and Balmoral May 1968, Hutchinson, Melbourne, 1988; and his
heavily illustrated Contact. Australians in Vietnam Hutchinson Melbourne, 1989.
13 Gary McKay. In Good Company. One Man's War in Vietnam Allen & Unwin,
Sydney, 1986; Barry Petersen, Tiger Men. An Australian Soldier's Secret War in
Vietnam Macmillan, Melbourne, 1988.
14 Terry Burstall. The Soldier's Story. The Battle o f Xa Long Tan, University of
Queensland Press, St. Lucia, 1986; Martin Cameron. Australia's Longest War,
author, 1987.
15 An exception is a collection of short stories, poems and recollections, John
J. Coe (ed). Desperate Praise. The Australians in Vietnam, Artlook, Perth, 1982.
For an analysis of Australian fiction from the war, see Robin Gerster. “Occidental
tourists: the ugly Australian in Vietnam War narrative", and Peter Pierce.
“Australian and American literature of the Vietnam War", both in Peter Pierce,
JeffreyGrey&Jeff Doyle (eds). Vietnam Days, Penguin, Ringwood, 1991; see also
Peter Pierce. “The Funny Place’: Australian literature and the War in Vietnam",
in this volume, pp. 98-108.
16 Ian McNeill. The Team. Australian Army Advisers in Vietnam, 1962-1972,
Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1984.
17 Bob Breen. First to Fight-Australian Diggers, NZ Kiwis and US Paratroopers
inVietnam 1965-66, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1988.
18 D.M. Homer. SAS. Phantoms ofthe Jungle. A history o f the Special Air Service,
Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1990.
19 J.C. Blaxland. Organising an A rm y : T h e A u s tra lia n E x p e rie n c e 1 9 5 7 -1 9 6 5 ,
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 1989.
20 D.M. Homer. Australian Higher Command in the Vietnam War, Canberra
Papers on Strategy and Defence 40, The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre,
Australian National University, Canberra, 1986.
21 Frank Frost. Australia's War in Vietnam, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1987.
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Australian Army and the Vietnam War", in Peter Pierce, etal(e ds). VietnamDays,
Penguin, Ringwood, 1991.
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servicemen, or conscripts. See Jane Ross. “The Australian Army—Some Views
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Politics and History, 28:3, 1982, pp. 367-79; Hugh Smith. “Conscience, Law and
the State: Australia’s Approach to Conscien tious Objection since 1901", Australian
Journal o f Politics and History, 35:1, 1989, pp. 13-28; and “Conscientious
Objection to Particular Wars: Australia’s Experience during the Vietnam War,
1965-1972”, War&Society, 8:1, May 1990; Kim Beazley. “Federal Labor and the
Vietnam Commitment", in Peter King (ed). Australia's Vietnam, 1983, pp. 36-55.
28 Peter King (ed). Australia's Vietnam, 1983.
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31 The literature on veterans is scattered and patchy. For some o f the arguments,
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P o lic y Contradictions o f the Australian Task Force, Vietnam, 1966
T e rry Burstall

Introduction
T h e d isp atch o f a tw o b a tta lio n T a s k F orce to Phu oc T u y P rovin ce
S ou th V ie tn a m in 1966 w as a p ro gressio n fro m the 1962 c o m m itm en t
to South V ie tn a m o f a sm all team o f m ilita ry advisers. A s th e in tern a l
m ilita ry an d p olitical situ ation o f th e G overn m en t o f S ou th V ie tn a m
d eterio rated fro m 1960, so U n ited States m ilita ry su pport in creased . A s
A m e ric a n su p p ort g re w it b eca m e in crea sin gly im p ortan t fo r oth er
cou n tries to b e seen to b e in a greem en t w ith U n ited S ta tes a ctio n s and
o b je c t iv e s in V ie t n a m n o t o n ly v e r b a lly b u t a ls o p h y s ic a lly .
C o rresp o n d in gly th e size o f th e sm all team o f A u s tra lia n a d visers w a s
in creased to 83 b y th e end o f 1964, an d in A p ril 1965 A u s tra lia
resp on d ed w illin g ly to U n ited S tates req u ests for m ore su p p ort b y
a n n o u n cin g th e com m itm en t o f a com b at b a tta lio n to S ou th V ietn a m . In
1966, in lin e w ith fu rth e r U n ited S tates troop level in creases, the
A u s tra lia n force w a s in creased to a s e lf con ta in ed tw o b a tta lio n T a s k
Force to be b a sed in Ph u oc T u y P rovin ce, 60 m ile east o f Saigon.
A lth o u g h th e A u stra lia n G overn m en t su pported the U n ited
S tates’ a ctio n s in V ietn am , it w as ap p aren t from 1962 th at active
su p p ort w o u ld b e cu rtailed b y d om estic political and o rga n iza tion a l
rea lities in A u stra lia . P olitical rea lity lay in the fact th at the in vo lvem en t
w a s n o t b a sed u p on a b i-p artisa n decision o f the A u stra lia n P arliam en t,
and th at it did n ot d ep en d on tested electora l su p p ort fro m A u s tra lia n
v o te r s .1T h e orga n iza tion a l reality w a s th e size and qu ality o f th e forces
th at cou ld be sen t to V ietn am . A s the A u s tra lia n A rm y in 1965 on ly
con sisted o f fo u r b atta lion s it req u ired a m a jo r re-o rga n iza tio n and u p 
g ra d in g to p rep a re fo r a com m itm en t to V ietn am . B y n e cessity th e
A u s tra lia n force had to rem ain extrem ely sm all in relation to th e rap id ly
in creasin g U n ited S tates effort.
T h e d isp a rity o f size o f th e tw o c o u n tries ’ com m itm en ts m ea n t
th at i f A u s tra lia n forces rem ain ed closely tied to U n ited S tates fo rces
th ey cou ld on ly be m in o r p layers in a m u ch la rger effort an d w o u ld o f
n ecessity h a ve to b e u n d er d irect U n ited S la te s com m an d. T o ach ieve
som e a u to n o m y o f com m a n d it w as th erefore con sid ered d esira b le in
1966 to m o v e the T a s k Force to an area w h ere it cou ld esta b lish an
A u s tra lia n n a tion al presence. T h e A u s tra lia n com m a n d cou ld th en
m ake its ow n p o licy decisions, m a in ta in its ow n unit in teg rity and ap p ly
its ow n ta c tic s w h ile still b eing in corp orated , and able to w o rk w ith in ,
overall U n ited S tates com m and.
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T h is article will examine two policy decisions m ade by the
Australian Task Force in 1966 which locked it into postures that were
im possible to m ove away from in the following years of the involvement.
The two areas to be exam ined are: the policies toward sections o f the
civilian population o f the province; and the creation of a large defended
base camp. This article will argue that these decisions seriously affected:
1) Australian and United States capacity to win the population to the side
o f the G overnm ent o f Vietnam; and 2) the capacity of the Australians to
work w ithin United States operational concepts and strategies.
Background
Australian involvem ent in Vietnam was prim arily an attem pt to
secure an insurance policy with the United States o f Am erica should
Australian interests be challenged in southeast Asia. The surge o f
nationalism sweeping the world during the 1950s and 1960s, the
im pending w ithdrawal o f British troops from “East o f Suez” and the
perceived spectre o f a com m unist and antagonistic Indonesia aligned
with China, m eant the Australian Governm ent willingly em braced the
policies o f the United States in southeast Asia as a m eans o f securing
m ilitary aid in its own time o f need.
A s the United States involvem ent in Vietnam increased from
1960, Australia responded to requests for visible moral support. In 1962
a small A rm y Training Team com ponent o f 30 men flew to Vietnam and
was placed under United States com mand, officially to be used in a
training role only. By 1964. in response to United States pressure, this
com ponent w as increased to 83 and their role had been expanded to
include participation in combat situations.
Due to the run down o f the Australian Arm y at that time and the
extra pressures placed on Australia’s expanding training base because
o f the introduction o f National Service (the draft), it was im possible to
increase the num bers o f Training Team personnel to meet United Stales
demands. The decision was m ade therefore in Decem ber 1964 to offer
instead a battalion o f combat troops. At the time, this offer was
inappropriate because the United States had no com bat units in
Vietnam and a battalion could not have been incorporated into their
m ilitary structure. However, with the landing o f the Marines at Da Nang
in M arch 1965, and the subsequent arrival of other United States units,
the Australian offer o f a battalion becam e a viable proposition.
The First Battalion
The First Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment was sent to
Vietnam in M ay/June 1965 and becam e part o f the United States 173rd
Airborne Brigade based at Bien Hoa airbase. However, placing the
battalion with the 173rd created problem s for both the United States and
Australian com m anders in Vietnam . The concept and role o f the
battalion laid down by the Australian Arm y and the Governm ent in
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C an berra w a s restricted originally to secu rin g m ilitary in sta lla tion s and
su pportin g South V ietn am ese or U nited States forces u n d er attack. T h is
role w a s not flexib le enough fo r G eneral W estm orelan d (C om m an der,
U nited S tates M ilitary A ssistan ce C om m an d Vietnam ). D ifficu lties arose
in J u ly w h en the A u stra lia n b attalion w as prohibited from p a rticip a tin g
in a 173rd B rigade operation b y the A u stra lia n C h ief o f S taff.2 T h e role
o f the force w a s la ter expanded and by the end o f 1965 the A u s tra lia n s
w ere p erm itted to engage in offensive op eration s in the w h ole o f III (Three)
C orps area.
T en sion still rem ained, how ever, as th e A u stra lia n s w ere not
im pressed w ith the U n ited S tates style o f com b at operations, n eith er
w ith resp ect to th eir m ethods o f con tin u ou s resu pply n or w ith th e
apparen t d isregard by United States officers o f th eir ow n level o f
casualties. B y th e end o f 1965 it w as apparen t that the circu m stan ces
facin g the F irst B attalion w ere not the best possible for the A u stra lia n
forces, n o t o n ly fro m the A u s tra lia n p e rs p e ctive b u t a ls o fro m
W estm o rela n d ’s.
W estm orela n d used the 173rd B rigade as his m ob ile reserve,
w hich m ean t th at th ey had to be able to m ove to an y part o f South
V ietn a m as required. In Ju n e 1966 he w as con sid erin g sen d in g the
173rd to D arlac Province in 11 (Two) C orps on the C am bodian border, and
recorded: “T h ese troop s w ill be m ovin g con stan tly and th eir op eration s
w ill be in su pport o f A R V N [Arm y o f the R epu blic o f V ietn am ], R F/ PF
[R egional F orce and Popu lar Force] and CID G [Civil Irregu la r D efen ce
Group] u n its."3 T o be left short o f a b attalion because o f A u stralian
refusal to allow th eir forces to m ove to a certain area w as u n accep table
to the U n ited States. T h a t there w ere also tensions arisin g from the
A u stra lia n p ersp ective was m ade clear w h en the A u stra lia n A rm y
D epartm ent S ecretary w as reported to h ave said: “W e foun d ou rselves in
B ien H oa w ith the U n ited States forces on one side and the V ietn a m ese
on th e oth er and w e quickly decided th at the best place to be w as
som ew h ere else.”4
B y M arch 1966 it had b een decided that A u stralia w ou ld in crease
the size o f its com m itm en t and send to V ietn a m a self-con tain ed T a s k
Force o f tw o b atta lion s to replace the First B attalion w h ich w a s due to
return hom e in Ju n e 1966. T h is w as a calcu lated gam ble b ecau se a two
battalion T a s k F orce w a s not a balan ced force according to con tem p orary
m ilitary doctrine, w h ich held that a T a s k Force should be at least three
battalions, givin g it the ability to have two b atta lion s in the field and one
operatin g as base defence. H aving only two b attalions m eant th at o f the
4500 A u s tra lia n troops in V ietn am at any one tim e, less than h a lf w ere
com bat troops— in fan try and su pportin g arm s— and op eration s w ou ld
b e lim ited to one b attalion strength.
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Planning the move to Phuoc Tuy
Lieutenant General Joh n W ilton, the C hief of the General Staff,
and a party o f service personnel flew from Australia to Saigon for
discussions with General W estm oreland on the role and placem ent o f the
Task Force in M arch 1966. D iscussions on the placement had already
taken place between General W estm oreland and the Com m ander o f
Australian A rm y Force Vietnam (COMAAFV), Brigadier O.D. Jackson,
and agreem en t w as reached on Phuoc T u y P ro vin ce.5 Jack son
com m ented that, “we were to be used som ewhere where we could do the
job and it would suit our ability. Th is area o f the north [Demilitarized
Zone] was to be left as I understood it to the the Am ericans and the
Vietnam ese.”6 He went on to say:
They [the United States] had some difficulty with foreign troops
and they weren't too sure how things would work out. I think
Westmoreland was happy to have us in a place where we could
do things our way and not be exposed in the early days to heavy
casualties, which was made pretty clear to me [from Australia]
just wasn't on.7
General W ilton had already decided tentatively upon Phuoc Tuy
before he arrived in Vietnam in March 1966, m ainly because o f the deep
water port at Vu n g Tau and the fact that the Australian force would be
well away from the northern dem ilitarized zone.8W estm oreland was by
then in agreem ent with the m ove to Phuoc Tuy and wanted the
Australians to work in the eastern portion o f the Rung Sat and provide
protection for H ighway 15, running from the port of Vung Tau to Saigon.
The Australian force was tob e part o f the US II (Two) Field Force Vietnam
which w as headquartered at Long Binh in the adjoining Bien Hoa
Province, and whose responsibility was the whole of the Vietnam ese III
(Three) Corps.9
Preparing for the Australian Arrival
In April 1966 W estm oreland sent elem ents o f the 1st Infantry
Division, accom panied by the Australian First Battalion, into Phuoc Tuy
on O peration ABILENE. It was not a resounding success as only light
contacts were m ade for most o f the operation. The main force units o f the
Viet Cong (VC) 9 and 5 Divisions were out o f the province when the
operation was launched and only started m oving back as it finished. The
only m ajor action o f the operation was the attack on a United States unit
on the night o f 11-12 April. The VC 800 Battalion of the 274 Regim ent
launched three attacks on a United States position in an attem pt to over
run the perim eter, but were repulsed each time with the help o f heavy
artillery barrages that pounded 1086 rounds into the area during the
night. The casualty figures are indicative o f the overall tem po of
ABILENE. During the 16 day operation United Slates casualties were 39
killed, 97 wounded, none missing. The action during the night o f 11-12
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April resulted in 34 killed and 72 wounded, leaving casualties for the rest
o f the force and the operation at five killed and 25 wounded. VC
casualties for the operation were 67 KLA and five captured.10
In M ay W estm oreland sent the 173rd to P h u ocT u y on Operation
HARDIHOOD to clear the area prior to the Australian arrival. W h en the
Australian Fifth Battalion arrived in the area the 173rd then went south
on Operation HOLLANDLA, into the paddy area o f Long My, and carried
out their first night airborne landing. HOLLANDLA w as not a good
operation for the 173rd, for although they encountered v e iy little
opposition their casualties were relatively high: nine killed and 68
wounded, m ainly from booby traps, against fourVC killed, by body count,
four possible and four captured.11 Sum m ing up, the “C om m ander’s
A nalysis” noted: “It is unlikely that the VC elem ents in the area
constitute a single force o f greater than com pany strength”.12
The Australians at Nui Dat, Phuoc Tuy Province
By 14 June 1966 the Fifth and Sixth Battalions o f the Royal
Australian Regiment, plus supporting units and Task Force Headquarters,
had arrived at the Nui Dat base. The base was to cover a large area o f over
two square kilom etres o f mainly rubber plantation and included the
small hill, Nui Dat. Highway 2 on the western edge o f the base was closed
to the local people except at designated periods. The layout o f the area
created m any defensive problems, chiefly because o f the large unm anned
gap along the western side. Brigadier Jackson, the new T ask Force
com m ander, thought he could fill this gap with a third battalion, but it
was to be another 18 months before a third battalion arrived. Jack son ’s
rationale for taking such a large area was that it provided the units with
room to fight should the base ever be attacked. Although it gave room to
fight, the large area created enorm ous problem s from its inception
because o f the num ber o f troops required to secure the perim eter,
effectively cutting down on operational capability.
W ith the perim eters established the Task Force w as then faced
with the form idable jo b o f trying to build the area into a defensive
position, as well as attem pting to m ount operations. One o f the key
elem ents o f the Australian strategy was to create a buffer zone or “cordon
sanitaire" around the base out to 4000 m etres (just over tw o-and-a-half
miles) , except for the southern end where the large village o f Hoa Long
was located at a distance o f less than 1000 m etres (about two-thirds of
a mile) from the perimeter. This buffer zone was to be kept clear o f
civilians and to be dominated by saturation patrolling, hoping thereby
to deny enem y forces intelligence and form ing-up areas from which to
launch an attack on the base. The rubber plantation was kept intact with
a m inim um o f clearing, and no lights were allowed at night. The open
area on the western side was covered by fire from both the high ground
o f Nui D at and the armoured personnel carriers (APCs) area which
straddled both sides o f the road on the southern section. Artillery was
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situated at the southern entrance and could brin g fire to b ear on m ost
o f the perim eter. T h e base was declared off lim its to all civilians in the
area. Local leave close to the base w as prohibited; any leave w as to be
taken in the port city o f V u n gT au , 30 kilom etres (18 miles) to the south,
where a large A u stralian logistic base w as set up and from which
supplies for Nui Dat were transported by road, with a con tingency plan
for aerial resupply if required.
F rom the m ilita ry p ersp ective the plan w as quite sound.
U nfortunately in the Vietnam ese context it was full o f contradictions,
and placed the Australian force not only in conflict with the local
population but also with General W estm oreland.
The Australians and the Local People
C ontrary to w hat the A ustralian m ilitary historian and then
In telligen ce O ffic e r w ith 5RAR, R obert O ’N eill, has w ritten , the
positioning o f the Australian base did not take into consideration the
needs o f the local p opu lation.13 There w as considerable dislocation o f
both the econom ic and social structure o f the province because o f the
establishm ent o f the base, which in turn created considerable anim osity
toward the Au stralian s from the beginning.
T h e United States and Au stralian forces’ m ajor problem during
their V ietn am intervention was the calibre o f the governm ent they were
there to assist. A u stralian Arm y publications had m ade the point in a
study o f counter-revolutionary w arfare that the first requirem ent for
success w as a com petent civilian govern m en t.14 It would be im possible,
under any criteria, to call the governm ents o f South Vietnam since 1954
com petent, especially that o f m id -1966 w hen the “Struggle M ovem ent”
had President Ky m ore concerned with fighting his own generals than the
VC. Because the central government w as largely corrupt and incompetent,
the governm ental support required to consolidate m ilitary actions was
not in place. Th erefore the policies o f creating clear areas and resettling
population that w orked for Robert Thom pson in Malaya, w here the
British w ere the governm ent and the army, had no validity in Vietnam .
T h om pson ’s m ethods o f clear areas and resettlem ent were not viable
options for the Au stralian and United States forces in Vietnam , as
neither the governm ental backup required for relief of hardship follow ing
resettlem ent, nor the political will to show that the m ilitary policies had
som e legitim ate rationale existed.
W h en the A ustralians arrived in Phuoc T u y they established the
base cam p at N ui Dat adjacent to a densely populated area. T o achieve
the aim o f the 4000 m etre buffer zone required the m ovem ent o f 8000
people, alm ost ten per cent o f the province population. Inside the 4000
m etre bu ffer zone (excluding Hoa Long) were two villages. Long Phuoc
and Long Tan, with a population together o f approxim ately 4000 people.
In addition to this there were the m any people living on sm all plots o f land
inside the area. A ll o f these sm all landholders w ere forcibly m oved from

P o licy C ontrad ictions o f the A u s tra lia n Task Force

41

their hom es and told to relocate in the nearby towns. T h is m ovem en t o f
the popu lation has b een described b y all m ilitary w riters o f th e period so
far as a “resettlem en t” , a highly am biguous usage since it im plies that
the people w ere helped. This w as not the case in Phuoc T u y in 1966.
The village o f Hoa Long, although inside the 4000 m etre area, w as
allowed to remain, but the villages o f Lon gTan (approxim ately 1000 people)
and Long Phuoc (approxim ately 3000 people) were evacuated and
subsequently destroyed. The people from Long T an had been forced from
their village by AR V N forces, assisted by United States troops, during
ABILENE in April, and the people o f Long Phuoc by the 173rd Brigade in
May. T h e people o f Lon gT an were forced into the towns o f Dat D o and Long
Dien, while those from Long Phuoc were m oved to Hoa Long, Long Dien, and
some to D at Do. This relocation, it w as presumed, m ade the task o f
population control easier since the people were concentrated in villages
under som e sem blance o f ARVN control. Once m oved these people were
then forgotten by the Australian forces and received no help in the re 
establishm ent o f their homes or m odes o f life.15
It w ould be naive to suggest that these people w ere not an
A u stralian respon sibility on the grounds that it w as not the A u stralian s
who actually forced them from th eir areas. T h e plan for the A u stralian
base w as w ell in place before A B ILE N E and the displacem ent o f the
population o f L o n g T a n . W hen the United States forces left, the people
tried to retu rn to th eir hom es but w ere forbidden by the im plem entation
o f A u stralian policy. T h eir village w as then destroyed b y a com bination
o f artillery and neglect. W ith th eir on ly source o f incom e denied them
they becam e beggars, exploited labour, or at best poor relation s for those
lucky enough to have relatives in Dat Do or Lon g Dien. T h e inh abitan ts
o f Long Phuoc received w orse treatm ent. W h ere the Long T a n villagers
had tim e to take m an y o f their possessions, the Long Phuoc villagers had
been shifted from their village during the 173rd B rigade’s operation in
M ay 1966, but only so that the brigade could operate through the village.
Th ey w ere not evacuated to becom e refugees. T h e 173rd “A fter A c tio n ”
report from H AR D IH O O D states: “R efugees 0 ”. W hen the A u stralian s
continued H AR D IH O O D they first closed the area and then in late Ju n e
proceeded to destroy the village. T h is w as a house-by-house destruction
o f substan tial structures m ade o f brick, dressed tim ber and tiles.
A u stralian records state that 537 dw ellings w ere destroyed. D w ellings
were p hysically pulled down and all the villagers’ possessions burnt.
These included cooking and eating utensils, bedding, clothing, school
books, photographs, fam ily ornam ents and farm ing im plem ents. T h e
fields, fruit trees and gardens w ere defoliated, rem aining off-lim its until
Septem ber w hen the people w ere allowed back to work th eir grou nd for
only tw o days a w eek under strict curfew conditions. T h ere is no record
o f how these people survived the initial m ove, but the T a s k Force Civil
A ffairs officer states that he knew that som e o f the people from Long
Phuoc w en t into Hoa Long, and that: “There w as no w ork fo r them and
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they w ere ju s t hanging around H oa Long. Th ey w eren’t starving but they
were pretty bloody h u n giy and they were dirt poor . . . I cried tears for
them, believe you m e.” 16
A s the T ask Force was short o f infantry, drastic m easu res were
initiated in order to keep the civilians away from the closed areas. One
of these m easu res w as the deliberate firing o f artillery onto local people
who w ere seen going into the areas. M essages from the T ask Force signal
log (Table 1) show that there w as a disregard for the safety o f the civilian
population in order to enforce policy. Although the m essages cited below
are for Septem ber 1966, there are m any sim ilar instances throughout
the records for 1966 and 1967.
It w ould be possible to excuse this policy if there had been no
need for the people to go back to their old areas, but the people had no
option; they had to return in order to survive because no help w as given
to them. If cattle strayed they w ould naturally have gone back to their old
areas. Therefore the people had to retrieve them. If they did, they ran the
Table 1 17
Serial
48

| Date | Time
12
0730

| From
AVN

111

13

1105

ALO

113

13

1120

AI JO

114

13

1132

ALO

789

25

1242

ALO

923

28

1209

ALO

| Messaqe
Two buildings under
construction in Long Tan
488659.489657. Arty
[artillery] to fire some rounds.
3 people at Long Phuoc
heading north on trail 50
metres from road. They are
carrying baskets on poles.
G[round] Reference] 452651.
Arty engaged. Smoke
followed by H[igh]E[xplosive].
3 cattle 461659 North of
road, west of river between
Long Tan and Long Phuoc.
470654 people (2) working
fields. Engaged by artillery.
Herd of cattle at 465653.
Engaged by artillery.
Numerous people in Long
Phuoc on main road travelling
both east and west. Engaged
by artillery.
People walking east into L o n g
Phuoc YS 438639. 15 cattle
and one man at 469654. 8
people/cattle south of Long
Tan 485652 moving north.
Remarks. Arty engaged.

[ALO stands for Air Liaison Officer, which was the small army spotter plane that
flew over the area reporting movements.]
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risk o f being killed; if they did not then it was alm ost certain that their
cattle w ould be killed, and their last rem aining possessions lost.
Although the forced relocation o f civilians and the creation of
“free fire” zones becam e an accepted procedure for all Free W orld Forces
in Vietnam , it w as in direct contravention o f policies laid down by the
Australian Arm y in 1965 . The Division In Battle pam phlet states:
The principles of humanity prohibit the use of any degree of
violence not actually necessary for the purpose of the war. War
is not an excuse for ignoring established humanitarian principles.
To a large extent these principles have been given concrete form
in the law of war; but because all of these principles have not
become legal rules, a military commander should consider
whether a proposed course of action would be inhumane even
though not prohibited by international law.18
“Principles o f hum anity" were ignored with respect to the 8000 people
who had once resided and earned their living in the area taken over by
the Australians, and a “degree o f violence not actually necessary for the
purpose o f the w ar” , was inflicted on them. The relocation and the
subsequent abandonm ent o f responsibility for the 8000 people alTected
by the positioning o f the Task Force, in addition to the policy o f dum ping
VC bodies in town m arket squares or dragging them behind APC s in sight
of the village children, both m ethods supposedly meant to draw out
further VC sym pathisers, did nothing to help the Australian, United
States or South Vietnam ese cause in Phuoc Tuy. Attem pts at civic
action, such as building school rooms, a Boy Scout hall, or a new market,
none o f which the people wanted, were not enough to overcom e the
anim osity caused by the destruction o f hom es and livelihoods. Further,
with the im plem entation o f later policies o f arresting AR VN draft
dodgers, the continual “cordon-and-search” o f villages, the arrest and
handing over to South Vietnam ese authorities ofV C “suspects” , who were
then badly treated and confined som etim es for months, it is easy to
understand w hy Hoa Long, situated less than 1000 m etres from the front
gate o f the Australian base, was never considered pacified. Hoa Long
rem ained a village o f women, children and old m en and offered resistance
for the whole period o f the Australian presence. In 1971, five years after
the Australians m oved to Phuoc Tuy in May 1966, it was recorded that
in Hoa Long:
Security is only a little better [than 1966) and far from satisfactory,
due to the still predominant anti-GVN [Government of Vietnam)
feeling . . . Agent reports from Hoa long indicate that there is
some form of VC activity inside the hamlet every night.19
The policies adopted by the Australians in 1966 alienated them
from the very people from whom they needed support if the war was ever
to be brought to the conclusion which the United States and Australia
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desired. The VC could not survive without the help o f the people, and yet
through their first actions in Phuoc Tuy the Australian Task Force had
alienated alm ost ten per cent o f the population. It is certain that those
who m ay have been neutral before the Australians arrived did not rem ain
so after the treatm ent alTorded them.
Australian M ilitary Policies
According to Brigadier Jackson, the first Task Force com m ander,
W estm oreland’s orders to him were to, “take over Phuoc Tuy. Those were
the only tactical orders I had from anyone.”20From the evidence available
it would seem that the General W estm oreland’s idea of “take over Phuoc
T u y” was very different from Brigadier Jackson’s. The latter's plan was
to m ove into the area o f Nui Dat, establish a large fortified cam p adjacent
to the m ain population centres and show the local population and the VC
that the Australians w ere there to stay. T h e original intention w as to
establish the base and slowly expand the area o f control, disrupting VC
bases and lines o f com m unications and eventually cutting o ff the VC
from the population in short “pacification".
The problem with this concept was that it was not United States
policy at that time. It is not an aim o f this article to attempt to analyze
which policy would have been the m ore appropriate or successful in
relation to the Vietnam conflict. Rather, since the Australians w ere part
o f an Am erican Field Force the wishes o f the senior Am erican com m ander
in the theatre would have to have been taken into account. General
W estm oreland’s policy in 1966 was for United Stales and Free W orld
Forces to be “m anoeuvre battalions” , which were to engage and kill
enem y “m ain force” units while the ARVN together with United States
advisors carried out the pacification and nation-building roles. He did
not envisage that Free W orld Forces would be involved in pacification:
“C O M U SM ACVs [General Westmoreland] instructions to his commanders
were to ‘undertake operations which will find, fix and destroy Viet Cong
(VC) forces by sustained and aggressive actions'.”21
T his difference in interpretation o f role is apparent when one
considers, first, that the Australians established their base adjacent to
the populated centres, but had no authority in those areas, since they
were the responsibility o f the Vietnam ese province ch ief and his United
Slates advisers, and second, that Australian forces could not m ount
operations which penetrated the populated areas without the perm ission
o f the province chief.
W hatever W estm oreland’s interpretation o f the role, it is doubtful
that the A ustralian Governm ent would have been prepared to accept the
political costs w hich a more offensive strategy and possibly higher
casualties would have entailed. Consideration m ust also be given to the
operational reality that the Australians did not have the capacity to work
to W estm oreland’s concept because of the lack o f both front line troops
and available equipm ent. Because the perim eter of the base covered
such a large area, a full battalion was required to man it, but even this
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was not really adequate at that tim e because there was little barbed wire
available and no w eapon pits had been dug. Spare parts tor APC s and
personal w eapons for troops were at a m inim um , and w hen som e patrols
went out there w ere not enough m achine guns rem aining w ithin the
perim eter for adequate base defence. In addition relations betw een the
Royal A u stralian A ir Force and the A rm y w ere strained and com m and
problem s took several m onths to be resolved, all o f which added to base
defence inadequacies.
R ather than being used to m ount extensive offensive operations
against m ain force VC units, the first four m onths o f the A u stralian
force’s tim e were taken up by a continual battle against the elem ents
during the w et season, a battle aggravated by supply shortages and
inter-service rivalries. Despite this, the patrols and close operations were
alm ost continuous with one battalion out while the other m anned the
base. Th e battalion m anning the base w as not confined to a static role
but had fighting patrols and am bushes constantly on the move. T h e
building o f the base progressed virtually by hand labour, m eaning that
troops received no rest between operations. Brigadier Jackson, the Task
Force Com m ander, wrote in August that “the pace o f operations is
beginning to tell and there are indications that the infantry are becom ing
very fatigued both physically and m entally . .. Recreational facilities are
inadequate".22
The continual patrolling, the “cordon-and-search” o f villages,
and the operations into suspected enem y base areas continued for the
rest o f the year. However, this was only local activity, as the Australians
went no further than 30 kilom etres (18 miles) from the base. Although
VC base areas and lines of com m unications were disrupted, only small
groups o f enem y were encountered, except for two clashes that were
enem y initiated. During Decem ber the Task Force was called upon by II
Field Force Vietnam to participate in Operation DUCK as security for
part o f H ighw ay 15, while the 9th In fan tiy Division m oved from the port
of V u n gT a u to Long Thanh (Bear Cat). In view o f the fact that the security
of H ighw ay 15 w as one o f the specific roles W estm oreland had envisaged
for the A ustralians it seems strange that Brigadier Jackson should
describe operations to secure it as “flashes in the pan”.23 He recorded
later that “our ability to conduct offensive operations against the VC in
D ecem ber was severely lim ited by road security operations.”2'1
There were only two m ajor actions involving the A ustralian force
during 1966, and both were enem y initiated. The first was in Ju ly during
O peration HOBART, when the Australian Sixth Battalion encountered
elem ents o f the local force D445 Battalion, which attacked and alm ost
over-ran one o f the Australian com panies, “hugging" to avoid the artillery
fire. T h e VC unit engaged the Australian com pany for over an hour
despite the heavy artillery barrage brought down am ongst them. VC
losses for the action were six killed by body count, while the Australians
lost two dead and 12 wounded. Several other small clashes occurred
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during the five day operation and the final casualties w ere nine VC by
body count, with Australian casualties at three dead and 19 wounded.
T h e other m ajor action occurred in August w hen a com pany
patrol o f Sixth B attalion walked into a m ajor VC ambush in a rubber
plantation near the deserted village o fL o n g T a n , only 2,500 m etres (less
than two m iles) from the Task Force base. Nui Dat base had been
m ortared in the early hours o f 17 August and B Com pany, Sixth
Battalion, had been sent out at first light to investigate. D C om pany was
sent to relieve them on the follow ing day. On m eeting and relieving B
com pany. D com pany m oved into the Long Tan rubber plantation and 30
m inutes later, as they m oved toward the eastern side o f the plantation,
the am bush w as initiated. One Australian platoon (30 m en) w as cut off,
but the ensuing constant m ovem ent o f the rest o f the com pany over a
wide area o f the plantation while trying to relieve this platoon proved one
o f the factors that saved the Australians. Others m ay have been the
w eather and sustained supporting fire; visibility was cut to 100 m etres
by fierce rain storm s and artillery pounded into the enem y positions. D
com pany w as finally relieved after a tense four hour battle, when an
Australian relief force o f APC m ounted infantry firing heavy m achine
guns m oved into the plantation in the dark.
A n official body count o f 245 VC has been recorded, but Socialist
Republic o f Vietnam authorities refute this count and say around 150
were killed, and those m ainly due to artillery.25 The A ustralian losses
were 18 killed and 26 wounded. Vietnam ese sources say that the action
was initiated both to stop the Australian policy o f destruction in the
province and to show support for the people o f the displaced villages o f
Long Phuoc and Long Tan.26
The battle brought hom e to the Australians that the w ar was
more than a counter-insurgency conflict. M ajor re-organization was
initiated, from senior com m and down to re-assessing the am m unition
“states" for infantry riflemen. Am m unition “states” had previously been
60 rounds o f rifle am m unition per riflem an and 200 rounds per m achine
gun, inadequate levels o f supply in circum stances such as the extensive
contact at Long Tan; this fact alone gives an indication o f the Australian
knowledge and perception of the situation in Vietnam . T h e m ajor im pact
o f Long T an w as the realization that battalion operations would, from
then on, have to function in tighter form ations, m eaning that operations
o f battalion size would cover even sm aller areas than previously and
cou Id m oreover never m ove ou tside art illery range. Comma nd o f APC s was
given “u n equivocally” to the in fan tiy com m ander and a “ready reaction
com pany” w as always to be on hand in the Task Force a rea , tying u p even
more troops in static situations. For the rest o f the year the A ustralians
continued to w ork slowly outwards from the base at Nui Dat, but did not
m ake contact with other than sm all local force units.
The year 1966 ended w ith the Australians com m itting them selves
to the developm ent o f a larger base cam p which required a greater
num ber o f troops to m an, so cutting down on operational efficiency. Not
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surprisingly the operations undertaken by the Australians following this
expansionary move were not o f the kind W estm oreland had envisaged;
Australians were not confronting m ain force units in their base areas
and sanctuaries, but conducting pacification operations within their
own T a c tic a l A rea o f R esp o n sib ilty (TAOR). In F eb ru a ry 1967
W estm oreland visited the Australian Task Force in Phuoc T u y and
confronted the Australian commanders about what he considered the
poor results achieved by the force:
I then departed for the Australian Task Force where I called on
Brigadier Graham, the new commander, for the first time. The
Australians are very inactive and I learned they are about to
rotate their two battalions which means they will be virtually
ineffective for over a month. Out of a 4,600 man force they are
able to put only six companies into the field. They have a large
base to defend which requires two companies [at least]. I
expressed to Brigadier Graham my disappointment and
subsequently in talking to the Australian Ambassador, to General
Mackay upon his departure, and to General Vincent upon his
arrival, I expressed my concern that very little combat power was
being generated by the 4,600 man force. Furthermore, I suggested
that they might want to change their unit rotation policy which
I thought would allow them to increase their combat power with
the same total number of troops and at the same time have them
in a fighting posture for twelve months. The Australians were a
little shocked at my comments but I explained in all fairness to
the command and to their reputation, this observation should be
known.27
Several m onths later this difference in interpretation o f role between the
Am erican and Australian commands was noted again.
Military operations are not evaluated though it should be noted
that the Australians have been extremely effective in securing an
area through intensive day and night operations within their
TAOR [Tactical Area Of Responsibility] . . . However, the primary
mission of the Australian Force is to carry out offensive operations
against the enemy, rather than engage in territorial pacification
missions.28
Despite these criticisms from the senior command o f which they
were a part, the Australians remained within the confines o f Phuoc Tuy
until January 1968. There were only two m ajor actions in 1967, and
again these were enem y initiated.
Conclusions
W hen Australia committed forces to South Vietnam in 1962 the
m ilitary aim w as motivated by the self-interested political hope o f
securing a United States presence in southeast Asia. During the period
of the involvem ent the rationale remained the same. South Vietnam and
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its people w ere on ly im portant to A u stralia as appendages o f the United
States. P olicy decision s o f the A u stralian A rm y were tied m ore to national
political need th an overall strategic thought and were ad hoc in nature.
The A u stra lia n s had to m ake d ecisions in haste in order to keep pace
with the rapid A m erican escalation. Th e true nature of the w ar could not
be addressed becau se th is was con trary to the supposed rationale for
being involved. A u stralian soldiers and the public w ere told that the
people o f South V ietn a m w anted to be protected from the forces o f the
revolu tion ary m ovem ent; this in fact w as far from the case. M any fam ilies
in the south had m em b ers figh ting with, or supporting, the Viet Cong,
especially in the countryside w h ere there w as little loyalty to the
govern m ent in Saigon. Therefore the p olicy decisions which reflected the
b e lief that the people w anted and appreciated the allied presence w ere
doom ed to failure because in practice they w ere not based upon a
realistic an alysis o f the situation.
T h e decisions taken on the location and size o f the base at Nui Dat
are exam ples o f th is faulty analysis. T h e Nui D al base locked the
A u stralian force into a position from which it w as im possible to m ove in
the follow in g yea rs o f involvem ent. T h e support o f a large proportion o f
the p rovin ce’s popu lation w as lost in 1966 and w as never w on back. Th e
forced m ovem en t o f 8000 people and the d estru ction o f th eir h om es and
livelihoods w ith ou t any attem pt at com pen sation b y the A u stralian s or
the G overn m en t o f South V ietn am perm anently alienated a large
proportion o f the province population. Th e support o f the people for their
own govern m en t and its allies w as essential if the conflict w as ever to
achieve the con clu sion desired by that governm ent, the United States
and A u stralia alike, yet the first actions o f the A u stralian s in Phuoc T u y
had the opposite effect. Later actions, such as the dum ping o f bodies in
the m ark et squares, the prohibitions on land use and the arrestin g and
handing over to the South V ietnam ese o f AR VN draft dodgers, increased
the an im osity tow ard the A u stralian presence.
T h e size and com plexity o f the base and the w aste o f m an p ow er
its defence entailed w ere given s that later T a sk Force com m an d ers had
no option but to accept. T h e base restricted the m obility o f com bat forces
and the overall com bat ability o f the A u stralian effort by tying up m en
and equ ip m en t in static defence roles. T h e cost o f the A u stralian effort
could have b een cut in h a lf and b etter results achieved in line with
C O M U S M A C V s policies by placing the b attalions and su pportin g arm s
in the base com p lex o f the Logistic Support Base at V u n g Tau. T h e
b attalions w ou ld th en have been free to m ove on operat ions into any part
o f the eastern section o f III Corps w ithout having to be con cerned for the
secu rity o f an exposed rear area. T h ey would have been able to fit m ore
easily into G eneral W estm orelan d ’s concept o f “m anoeu vre b a tta lion s”
and p erh ap s have played a distinctive role in II Field Force com bat
operations th at w ere m oun ting in inten sity during 1966.
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Veterans in Australia: the Search for Integration
Jane Ross

Australia and the war
V ietn a m w a s not w h at its veteran s w an ted it to have been. It w as
u n su ccessfu l— m ore so than m ost o f th em seem to adm it— and it w as
u n p op u lar— though not so un p op u lar in A u stra lia as m ost o f th em now
believe after vie w in g the w ar through A m erican m ass m edia.
T h e V ietn am w ar continued the them e o f dependency in A u stralia’s
foreign p o lic y ,1 b u t w ith a differen t cu ltu ral outcom e. A fte r the First
W orld W a r, w h ich im pacted so h u gely on A u stralian s at a p erson al level2
(because o f the n u m b er o f m en w h o fou gh t in Europe and the M iddle
East), th e m ilita ry exp erien ces w ere used to form the b asis o f an
independent, n ation al identity m yth, know n variou sly as the m yth or
tradition o f A n za c or the m yth o f the diggers.3 T h e Second W o rld W a r saw
the c o u n try ’s depen d en ce shift from B ritain to the United States, b u t still
the n ation al id en tity rem ain ed rob u stly intact.
A fte r V ietn am , how ever, different cultu ral processes w ere at
work. B ecau se V ietn a m w as not com p arable to ou r earlier w ars it did not
fit im m ed iately into the m ilitary tradition;
m ore im portantly, the
en orm ou s im pact on ou r culture o f A m erican m edia and th e rapid
ad ap tation o f A m erica n ideas b y ou r veteran s m eant that A u stralian
rep resen tation s o f the w a r w ere largely based on A m erican m em ories
and in terp reta tion s.4 W e can see this m ost clearly in th e tw o issues
w hich h ave played a central role in defin ing “th e” A u stralian veteran:
A gen t O range, and the problem o f h om ecom in g and the need for a
w elcom e h om e m arch.
T h e 50.000 or so veteran s deal w ith th eir m em ories o f the w ar in
m any differen t w a ys.5 F or som e, the fu ll-tim e veterans, it is the d efin in g
elem ent o f th eir identity.
Som e are dam aged beyond cu re eith er
p h ysically o r m en tally, w hile others lead productive lives untrou bled b y
their experien ces. F or some, the w a r is w ith them con stantly, w h ile
others left it b eh in d w h en they board ed the plane or ship for th eir return
to Australia.
It is d ifficu lt to say to w h at extent “the veteran s” do indeed form
any sort o f coh eren t group; and it is also difficult even as late as the end
o f 1990 to see w h eth er th e experien ces o f V ietn am have stab ilised into
coh erent cu ltu ral form s. It does seem , how ever, that both the V ietn am
veteran s as a w h ole and th eir m em ories are b eing absorbed p rogressively
into the m ain stream com m u n ity o f returned servicem en and into its
official ideology, th e A n za c tradition. In this sense, the w a r is at last b eing
A u stralian ised .
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The Vietnam war has proven difficult to integrate because the
war impinged very little on so m any Australians, and never made very
much sense. It is hard to remember why we, as a nation, did so casually,
thoughtlessly and irresponsibly condemn so m any young m en to the
possibility o f death or irretrievable damage. There was opposition to the
war in Australia, but the experience o f serving in the Australian forces
was not a radicalising one. There was never any organised opposition
w ith in the arm y, and the sold iers prided th em selves on th eir
professionalism which meant that they consciously did not concern
themselves with the politics or morality o f their country’s com m itm ent
to the Am erican cause. There were no organised “veterans against the
war” either, and even the Vietnam Veterans’ Association o f Australia
(W A A ), which is oppositional on m any matters, is rousingly conservative
when it com es to the big questions about the war.® The soldiers were, in
fact, v e iy much representatives o f m ainstream Australia.
The opposition to the war— and it did grow over the course o f the
war— had two strands. The more radical branch was opposed to the war
itself, or to Australia’s part in it. The other branch had deep historical
antecedents; Australia was acutely divided during the First W orld W ar
over the question o f conscription (which was finally rejected, leaving the
Australians in that war the only wholly volunteer force), and this aspect
of the com m itm ent to Vietnam was the one which raised the most doubts
in the general community.
However, despite opposition from some sections of the community,
m any were in favour o f compulsory m ilila iy service and m any o f those
conscripted were not particularly opposed to doing their two years. Once
they were in, and had been trained, then a tour o f Vietnam seemed the
obvious next step. The army claimed at various times that only those
conscripts who volunteered for service in Vietnam were actually posted
there, and it does seem as though there would have been no shortage of
those willing to go.
The Agent Orange issue in Australia 7
The stoiy o f Agent Orange will be fam iliar to readers in the United
States who have followed the course of the dispute in their country.
Indeed, without the actions o f Am erican veterans it seem s doubtful
whether it would ever have become an issue in Australia, and the
Australian case has been very derivative o f the American one. Until it
became an issue in the United States, no Australian claim s for chemical
damage had been filed: even since then, there have been only a handful.
The chem ical issue only came to the fore in Australia in the late
1970s. The Australian Government at first stupidly denied that any
Australian soldiers had ever been exposed. The claim was speedily
retracted, being patently false, but the Government then insisted that
established veterans’ channels could handle the problem, if indeed there
was one. But the W A A refused to accept this, continued to lobby, and
instead of using the established channels such as the lobbying power of
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the Returned Services League (RSL), relied on media pressure and its
own direct contacts with politicians and bureaucrats.
The W A A ’s efforts met with mixed success. W hen it dem anded
a ju dicial rather than scientific enquiry the Governm ent referred the
matter to the Senate Standing Committee on Science and the Environment
which produced Pesticides and the Health o f Australian Vietnam Veterans,
1982, and prom ised a com prehensive study into the health o f veterans
and their offspring. This study— the so-called m orbidity survey—
unfortunately never eventuated. The other studies which were com pleted
were not accepted as valid by the W A A (presum ably because they all
used sam ple survey techniques rather than investigating the entire
population o f veterans) and it continued to push for a Royal Com m ission,
the only body felt to have sufficiently wide powers of enquiry and criteria
of assessm ent, and which would rem ain independent o f governm ent
opinion and/or policy.
The Royal Com m ission w as established under Justice Philip
Evatt in 1983; the report in nine volum es was finally presented in July
1985, after hearing evidence from m any veterans and experts. The
release o f the report did little, at least immediately, to defuse the issue.
The Com m ission functioned, in effect, as a trial o f Agent Orange. The
counsel T or" the chem icals was briefed by various chem ical com panies
such as M onsanto; the case “against", and therefore “lor" the veterans,
was argued by the W A A . The case against Agent Orange was found to
be not proven; that is, the chem icals were presumed innocent unless
proven guilty, and the Royal Com m issioner announced his verdict in
extravagant language:
So Agent Orange is Not Guilty and the chemical agents used to
defoliate battle zones in Vietnam and to protect Australians from
malaria are not to blame.
No one lost.
This is not a matter for regret but for rejoicing. Veterans and their
wives are no more at risk of having abnormal offspring than
anyone else. Veterans have not been poisoned. The number with
general health problems is small, probably much smaller than
amongst their peers in the community. The few that have
psychological stress disorders can seek help freely and without
shame and above all with hope of early relief and in the sure
knowledge that no poisoning of their minds has occurred.
This is good news and it is the Commission’s fervent hope that
it will be shouted from the roof-tops.8
The Com m issioner’s hopes that this would be the end o f the m atter were
short-lived. M any veterans—and other observers— were concerned with
certain aspects o f the Commission, even if they did not necessarily
dispute the overall tenor o f the findings. The W A A was angry with the
Commission. Th ey had urged that it be formed, and had been confident
that the findings would confirm their worst fears. Instead, they found
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themselves In the position of being the prosecutors, with the onus o f proof
lying on them to show three things and thus prove Agent Orange guilty.
They needed to show: first, that there were in fact health
problems; second, that those suffering from these problems had been
exposed in som e w ay to herbicides; and third, that it was this exposure
which had caused the individual’s problems. The Com m ission found
that w hile the first, the existence o f health problem s, had been
demonstrated, it denied both sufficient exposure to and connection
between herbicides and ill-health. Rather it attributed health problem s
to widespread Post Traum atic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and to increased
alcohol and cigarette use, and it hinted at a possible carcinogenic effect
of the anti-m alarial drug Daosone: "Any Vietnam veteran suffering from
cancer who m ay have taken daosone should have his claim treated as
showing that a reasonable hypothesis exists connecting his incapacity
with his w ar service.”9
It did allow also that some cancers could be attributed to
chemical exposure, with the following cautious statement:
(The Commission) regards the suggestion of Soft Tissue Sarcoma
and Lymphoma (non-Hodgkins) induction by exposure loTCDD
in 2,4,5-T (in Agent Orange) as unlikely but not fanciful. A
Determining Authority might well be reasonably satisfied that a
reasonable hypothesis linking incapacity following such
inductions with service in Vietnam exists.10
The W A A ’s case was weak in m any respects, and certainly not
equal to the task o f proving beyond reasonable doubt that the chem icals
were guilty. This is at present an impossible task, given that scientists
them selves are in dispute. And it is not to say that the chem icals were
guilty, nor that the chem icals are innocent— because this is not proven
either—but m erely that an open finding would have been the more
correct one. The Com missioner has continued to defend his approach,
emphasising that his findings have enabled m any veterans to think
positive and “get on with their lives”, free from concerns about their
future health and that o f their children.
The failure o f the W A A 's case reinforced their view that they
could never be allowed to succeed because o f the social, econom ic and
political ram ifications o f any findings against widely-used chemicals.
W e can question why some veterans seem to be intent on proving the
guilt o f Agent Orange almost to the point o f obsession, when the
Com m ission’s findings mean that m ost claim s will be allowed by the
repatriation system on grounds other than the toxicity o f chem icals. The
answer would seem to be that being able to blam e a chem ical, or some
specific agent rather than "just the w ar” is im portant to their self-esteem,
and the diagnosis o f PTSD seems to bear with it a stigma o f personal
inadequacy.
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Reports in the Australian press in March-M ay o f 1990 claim that
recent events in the US have given “fresh hope” to veterans in Australia.
This refers both to the 1987 ju dgem ent in Illinois which awarded
dam ages against Monsanto, and cast doubt on one o f the pro-Agent
Orange experts, Dr. Suskind, and also to favourable reports prepared by
the Independent Agent Orange Task Force which link Agent Orange to
various cancers and other diseases. Justice Evatt for his part is
described as being “firm on Agent Orange”,11 even though the press seem
to consider that the Com m ission’s findings have been thrown into doubt.
Similarly, a case heard on appeal in the Repatriation System in 1990 was
hailed by the W A A as a “landm ark” because it awarded a w idow ’s
pension on the basis that a soft-tissue sarcom a (schwannoma) could
reasonably be linked to chem ical exposure in V ietnam .12 As workers in
the area are quick to point out, however, this is only one case which may
itself be appealed to a higher level; and soft-tissue sarcom as (a very rare
form o f cancer) were mentioned by the Royal Com mission as being a
reasonable claim anyway.
Even findings which do not provide overall support for the
W A A ’s case are reported in a m isleading way, for exam ple, in the
treatm ent o f reports by the CDC claim ing that US troops who served in
Vietnam have not developed physical problem s different from those o f
veterans w ho served elsewhere in the world at the same time, except that
they were at increased risk o f non-Hodgkins lymphoma. Under the
heading “Com po [compensation] hopes for Vietnam veterans”, an article
in the Sydney Morning Herald opens by claim ing that:
Compensation amounting to millions of dollars could flow to a
number of Vietnam veterans and widows of veterans following
publication in America of findings into the effects of exposure lo
the defoliant Agent Orange.13
Like m any o f the argum ents about Vietnam, the Agent Orange
controversy was initiated in the US but then prosecuted with considerable
vigour and sincerity by the veterans who formed the W A A , and yet even
ten years later we still await a definitive answer. The Com m ission may
have achieved its objective o f reassuring veterans about their health, at
least partially, but there is no guarantee that this will be an enduring
achievement. The final verdict on Agent Orange is still to come.
The Health o f Veterans I —Physical Health
The Agent Orange cam paign was based on the assum ption that
veterans o f the Vietnam war, and their children, suffered ill-health as a
result o f exposure to chem icals during their Vietnam service. But as the
Royal Com m ission concluded, there is, so far, no evidence o f large-scale
health problem s am ong Vietnam veterans. One can conclude from this,
optim istically, as did the Royal Com m ission that there are, in fact, no
special health problem s; or, one can leave it as an open question.
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Large n u m bers o f vetera n s have tak en advan tage o f the
Repatriation system o f pensions for disabilities. But m ost o f these are,
so far, for m inor disabilities and the am ount o f pension involved is very
small (see Table 1). A s the veterans age, however, one would expect them
to m ove to higher pension levels.
The W A A and other believers in the chem ical issue have supplied
anecdotal evidence o f both physical and m ental ill-heallh am ong veterans,
and o f a high incidence o f birth abnorm alities am ong their children
conceived after service in Vietnam. The sorts o f sym ptom s w hich have
been reported by those believing they have suffered from chem ical
dam age cover a wide range. The W A A published what they called an
“Agent Orange Questionnaire o f possible allergic sym ptom s" in their
jou rn al Debrief o f October 1982, providing a ready made check-list o f
symptoms. W ithout attributing specific agency it seem s m ore than
coincidental that follow ing the publication o f this list there was an
increase in the num ber of patients presenting to the Repatriation
Hospitals with ju s t these symptoms. Every system in the body was
represented in the list, under headings o f skin, ENT, eyes, respiratory,
cardiovascular, gastrointestinal, gastro-urinary, m uscular, and nervous
system. T h e list is so com prehensive it covers almost every “sym ptom "
that any person, sick or well, could possibly exhibit.
None o f these claim s about widespread and unusual ill-health
has been substantiated in any large-scale studies.

Table 1
Rated o f D isability Pensions fo r Vietnam Veterans a t June 1989

Number of veterans
2564
1762
1075
803
574
498
281
333
122
448
8460
36
678
9174

% of general rate
pension received
10
15-20
25-30
35-40
45-50
60
65-70
75-80
85-90
100

Cumulative %
of total
30
51
64
73
80
86
89
93
95
100

intermediate rate
TPI (totally & permanently)

$ per week
7.46
14.92
22.38
29.84
37.30
44.76
52.22
59.68
67.14
74.60

136.25
197.90
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N evertheless the W A A persuaded the Governm ent to undertake
a series o f studies o f veteran s’ health, and as a result the A u stralian
V eterans H ealth Studies (AVHS) group w as set up. It carried out the Case
Control Study o f Congenital Anomalies and Vietnam Service'4 (popularly
known as the “Birth Defects Study”), com pleted in 1983, w hich found
that “there is no evidence that A rm y service in Vietnam relates to the risk
o f fath ering a child with an anom aly". No subsequent research has
invalidated this conclusion, and as the Royal Com m ission observed, the
sad fact is that a norm al incidence o f birth defects am ong the children
o f Vietnam veteran s w ould lead us to expect between three per cent and
ten p er cent o f them to suffer som e m alform ation.
One stu dy undertaken since the Royal Com m ission has claim ed
to show a high incidence of various birth defects, as well as o f m arital
instability. However, the sam ple used was very unrepresentative o f the
Arm y, selecting atypical patterns o f engagem ent (whether regular or
conscript) and rank; additionally each respondent was asked to choose
his own control. T h e figu res on m arital breakdow n in fact showed a low er
than expected rate. Overall the results o f the study are at best qualitative
rather than qu a n tita tive.15
T h e second study carried out by the AV H S was a pilot m orbidity
study, designed to be the precursor to a m ajor study o f the health o f
veterans. Th e pilot stu dy showed, basically that there w as no discernible
pattern o f ill-health am ong veterans. In spite o f the Royal C om m ission ’s
strong support for its im plem entation, the G overnm ent refused to give
funding for the larger project, and it was finally abandoned.
T h e third study was, however, com pleted.
K now n as The
Mortality Report,'6 it com pared the death-rates o f veteran and n on 
veteran National Servicem en until 1982. The report is a m ine o f
inform ation on the career o f the conscript, on both the selection
processes which carried him to Vietnam and the structure and function
o f units in Vietnam . T h e overall conclusions on m ortality (as opposed to
m orbidity, i.e. ill-health) were: first, that veteran s ofV ietn am had slightly
higher death rates than did non-veterans, m ainly because o f increased
alcohol-related sickness; but that both groups o f National Servicem en
had low er m ortality rates than civilians o f the sam e age group. T h is was
not a new finding. A m erican studies had dem onstrated that both Second
W orld W a r and Korean veterans exhibited the “Healthy Soldier Syndrom e”.
Given the very good health and fitness o f the National Servicem en who
were selected into the Arm y, and the m ore m arked fitness o f those who
were sent to V ietnam , w e would expect them to be h ealthier than the
average citizen years later, and therefore to have lower m ortality rates—
unless o f course their service in Vietnam had caused som e w idespread
deterioration in their health. T h e study did not conclude that Vietnam
service had produced no effects on the health o f soldiers. But it did
conclude that these effects seem ed to be related to easy access to, and
increased consu m ption of, those two w idely used and harm ful drugs o f
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addiction, nicotine and alcohol. B eer w as cheap, available and b y far the
m ost com m on relaxant am ong Australian forces in Vietnam ; cigarettes
were supplied in both army ration packs and in RSL and Red Cross
“com fort parcels” . These two drugs have been accepted by the Repatriation
system as being im plicated in m any pensionable disabilities now suffered
by veterans o f all wars.
The Health o f Veterans I I — Mental Health
A s with physical health, there has been almost no research in
Australia on the m ental health o f veterans, though there have been
studies- o f veterans undergoing psychiatric treatm ent.
T h e Royal
Com m ission seem ed to find it acceptable to use figures from the U SA to
estim ate the p rob ab le levels o f stress-in d u ced m en tal ill-h ealth
(sum m arised as Post Traum atic Stress Disorder, known earlier as
Vietnam V eterans Syndrome). Yet, one could argue against this on the
grounds that both the war and the home front w ere different for
Australian soldiers com pared to the US forces. According to evidence
accepted by the Royal Commission: 23.5 per cent o f veterans would be
expected to be com plaining o f sym ptom s (m ostly o f an xiety and
depression); 12.2 p ercen t would have sufficient sym ptom s to warrant a
diagnosis; 5.9 per cent would have chronic conditions; and 3.2 per cent
would be incapacitated. Most o f these m en would, however, be suffering
from these sym ptom s even without having had Vietnam service, as the
base male population percentages were respectively 20 p ercen t, 9.9 per
cent, 4.9 per cent, and 2.4 per cent. (These figures given by the Royal
Com m ission are based on a m ental health survey carried out on a
random sam ple o f adults in a suburb o f Sydney— which perhaps would
not be com pletely representative o f the general population.)
The C om m issioner concluded:
There is a Vietnam veterans' syndrome, broadly corresponding
to PTSD. At this time about 25% of Vietnam veterans will have
psychological symptoms requiring treatment, and this number
may be expected to peak in 1988-89 and then gradually but
steadily decline.17
These figures are in line with the Vietnam V eterans’ Counselling Service
(W C S ) estim ates that perhaps 20 per cent o f all veterans are in need of
some form o f counselling. T h e confusion over the possible levels of
m ental ill-health am ong veterans is understandable. First, m easures o f
m ental health in the general population are not noted for their reliability.
There is little agreem ent on how to define m enial health or how to
m easure it. Lay people, for instance, would probably be rather sceptical
about the figures cited above showing 20 per cent o f the m ale population
to be suffering from “sym ptom s”; but we should rem em ber that only a
much sm aller num ber seek treatm ent, or find these sym ptom s disabling.
Second, m ost o f the studies specifically on veterans’ m ental ill-health are
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qualitative rather than quantitative. Certainly veterans m ay show high
levels o f rage and violence, o f guilt and distress because o f com bat
experiences, but this is only evident am ong the population o f those
seeking counselling, or o f those who are already psychiatric in-patients.
These studies do not tell us anything about the other veterans, those who
have not sought help. It is assumed that they, like most people, are more
or less adjusted: or m ore or less m aladjusted, depending on w hether one
sees the glass as half-full or half-empty.
A ll groups if examined would present patterns o f physical and
mental illness; the question is: do Vietnam veterans have a unique
pattern which would lead us to believe that the problems were caused by
their w ar service?To disentangle this, we need well-constructed, relatively
large-scale research with adequate controls. Australia has been backward
in funding research o f this type, com pared at least to the United States,
and there is currently very little data on which to make judgem ents.
T his has not inhibited organisations such as the W A A , but it is
hard to see them m aking headway against the findings o f the Royal
Com m ission unless som e new and high quality research appears which
incontrovertibly relates chem icals and veterans’ ill health to their
experiences as soldiers in Vietnam . A research group at Sydney
University has begun a survey study o f veterans' physical and mental
health using a large sample and control group, but the results o f this will
not be known for some time, and the ultimate answers to questions about
the health and m ortality o f Vietnam veterans lie somewhere in the future.
Veterans' Services— the Repat system 18
The Repatriation system w as established in Australia during the
First W orld War. In fact the com m only used term “Repat” is misleading,
as the series o f legislative acts are m ore concerned with social security
than with the return o f soldiers to their home country. “R epat” includes
disability and service pensions, health services, home loans, workforce
retraining, etc. The system has undergone changes over the years, and
was m ost recently revamped in 1986 when the various acts were
con solid ated into the V eteran s E ntitlem en t Act. T h e system is
adm inistered by the Department o f Veterans Affairs (DVA). At tim es the
DVA has been accused of being unsym pathetic and obstructionist
towards veterans, which is not surprising given that the Department and
veterans are frequently in an adversarial situation, with the veterans
trying to show cause for the Department to release funds, and the
Department guarding the public m onies against what it sees as unfounded
claims.
The D VA has been particularly criticised by the W A A for
allegedly having a bad attitude towards Vietnam veterans. The W A A
sees the Departm ent as being som ewhat like the RSL— dom inated by an
older generation who regard veterans o f the two W orld W ars as being the
real returned servicem en, and who see the younger Vietnam veterans as
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having suffered insufficiently in their “con flict” to merit the fu 11gen erosity
o f “the rep at”.
For som e veterans, their contact with the repat system is the
m ost salient aspect o f being a veteran. U nfortunately the system is a
legalistic m aze, with determ ination o f the veteran’s eligibility and
en titlem en ts som etim es takin g yea rs o f com p letin g ap p lication s,
assessm ents, and enduring appeals. T o qualify for a disability pension
applicants or their dependants need to show that injury, or disease, or
death has been, in general terms, “w ar cau sed” . The exact definition o f
what “w ar cau sed” m eans has been subject to change in recent years.
Once entitlem ent to a disability pension has been accepted, the degree
o f incapacity is then assessed as b eing som ew here betw een a m inim um
10 per cent and 100 per cent, and a com pensatory pension is paid
accordingly. A large num ber o f Vietnam veterans— m ore than 10,000—
receive som e disability pensions; m ost o f them only receive a sm all
am ount, indicating that their disability has been assessed, at least for
the present, as being only m inor (See Table 1).
For an individual, having his disability accepted as bein g warcaused is not a final step. The level o f pension can be varied over his
lifetim e and the determ ining process is very far from static, even w hen
the legislation rem ains the same. T h is is because o f the system o f appeals
through w h ich the veteran and the D V A can proceed before a final
ju d gem en t is given.
The Determining Process
The veteran m ust first approach the R epatriation C om m ission
with a claim , and m ay be im m ediately successful in having it recognised
at an acceptable level. I f not, he can then appeal, sequentially, to the
V eteran s’ Review Board, the A dm inistrative Appeals Tribun al, the
Federal Court, and, finally, the High Court. Som etim es the success or
otherw ise o f the veteran ’s claim w ill depend on w h o is sitting on a Board
on a particular day. Changes o f interpretation m ake their w ay slow ly
through the w hole system , and can have an im pact eventually on a large
num ber o f claim ants. Legal and m edical fashions also change. W h at is
considered one year to be a reasonable claim can be disallowed the next;
what the veteran has to do is present a case which, in the light o f current
m edical and legal opinion, is based on a “reasonable hypoth esis” . Prior
to legislative changes in 1985, the D VA had to disprove the veteran ’s
hypothesis that his disability w as w ar-caused, and so alm ost all
veteran s’ claim s w ere successful: but since a Federal Court ru ling o f
1987 argued that veterans m ust present a “reasonable hypoth esis” , the
veterans now need to m ake stronger cases. In the words o f the Court:
To be reasonable, a hypothesis must possess some degree of
acceptability or credibility— it must not be obviously fanciful,
impossible, incredible or not tenable or too remote or too
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tenuous... At the same time, however, a hypothesis may be
reasonable without having been proved . . . to be correct as a
matter of fact.19
T his need not be the end o f the story, for in a typical contested case the
experts from both sides can produce what to them are “plausible
hypotheses” on w hich the determ ining authority m ust rule. Som e
hypotheses are rejected as not bein g reasonable and others are accepted,
even though th ey m ay be dealing w ith con tending argum ents in an area
which is far from bein g scientifically or m edically settled.
T h at th is need fo r a “plausible hypothesis” is relevant to A gent
O range claim s is obvious; but the actual rulings have been som ew hat
unexpected. In practice the repat system has followed the findings o f the
Evatt R oyal C om m ission and disallow s claim s based on exposure to
defoliants and insecticides, thus ruling that there are no plausible
hypotheses relating any disabilities to chem ical exposure. The W A A ,
understandably, continues to fight against this ruling, and there are
several cases cu rrently in the process o f being heard. The other side o f
the coin, however, is that by follow ing the Royal Com m ission findings
alm ost all claim s based on stress as the war-caused catalyst o f disabilities
will be allow ed, as will those in which sm oking and /or alcohol consum ption
are im plicated and w here these behaviou rs are found to be caused or
aggravated b y w ar service (as gen erally seem s to be the case).
In spite o f the seem ing com prehensiveness of the repat benefits,
the V ietn am veteran com m u nity has continued to lobby for special
services. T h e W A A achieved a significant victory in 1982 with the
establishm ent o f the Vietnam V eterans Counselling Service (W C S ).
M odelled on its US counterpart, the service provides a 24 hour, sh op 
front cou n sellin g netw ork for veteran s and their fam ilies. It has records
on over 5000 clients, and reports over 23,000 contacts p er year.
C ounsellors estim ate that the 10 per cent o f all Vietnam veteran s that
they have seen to date represents perhaps h a lf the total nu m ber w ho are
in need o f som e counselling. Som e o f those who contact the W C S have
only m in or problem s, but a large num ber have been diagnosed as having
PTSD. Th e service seem s to have fulfilled a need, and has the support o f
all veteran groups, although som e w ould like to see the service broadened
to include veteran s o f all wars. The W C S is very m uch a child o f its
times. It epitom ises the anti-psychiatry, non-drug therapeutic fashions
o f the 1980s; and its success con firm s the lim its o f the highly
bureaucratised, establishm ent m edical care which is provided through
the repat system .
Speaking for the Veterans 20
A fte r the final, low -key w ithdraw al o f Australian com bat troops
from V ietnam , the w hole episode w as publicly forgotten. The m en who
had fought and returned, and the bereaved fam ilies of those w h o had not
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returned, w ere left to sort out things as best they could. A t that tim e—
in the early 1970s— there was no particular concept o f “the Vietnam
veteran” in Australia. In a newspaper report on the 1970 A n zac D ay
march, the word “veteran” was still presented in quotation m arks. It w as
only in the follow ing years, as the issue o f veterans and especially A gent
Orange cam e to the fore, that this Am ericanism was w idely adopted
along with m any other concepts and u sages from our trans-Pacific allies.
In the early years after the war, there seem s to have been no
feeling that the soldiers returned from Vietnam constituted a special
case. T h ey were eligible to join the RSL, the “natural” spokesm an for all
returned servicem en; the repatriation system w as in place; there w as
little unem ploym ent; they were fit young m en who had only done twelve
m onth’s active service in what w as a m inor conflict anyway.
T o trace the reasons w hy other groups besides the RSL,
especially the W A A , cam e into being in the late 1970s, it is necessary
to consider: first, the nature o f the RSL; and secondly, the im pact o f the
Agent Orange issue.
W h en the large num bers o f Australian servicem en returned from
overseas at the end o f the First W orld War, there was com petition as to
who w ould legitim ately speak for these “returned m en”. T h e w inner w as
the R S L (the initials o f its abbreviated title o f R elu m ed Servicem en’s
League— now de-”sexed”, as it were, to Returned Service’s League), an
organisation which has flourished and enjoys direct governm ent access
at the highest levels. The RSL has unfortunately strayed beyond its b rief
to prom ote the welfare o f ex-service personnel, and its various state
organisations are vocal in support o f fam iliar conservative causes, such
as the preservation o f our current national flag, o f white Anglo-C eltic
dom inance in our culture and racial mix, and o f the traditional role o f
women.
The R SL is only one am ong m any veterans groups, but is by far
the largest and m ost visible. Nevertheless it does not enjoy universal
acceptance am ong the veteran com m unity. Even at its height in the
1920s, the League’s m em bership has been around 265,000, or som e 30
per cent o f those eligible to join. The R SL claim s that Vietnam veterans
are join in g at the same rate as veterans o f previous wars, and that
around 15,000 are currently m em bers.
Each generation has fought its own war, at roughly 20 year
intervals. Each generation has found som e problem with acceptance by
their elders, and no later soldiers in Australia have attained the status
o f those w ho returned from the First W orld W ar, and particularly those
who landed at Anzac Cove in 1915 and served on the Gallipoli Peninsula.
Each group w ill eventually have its turn as leaders o f the veteran
com m unity, as the old soldiers die, but those o f the Vietnam generation
have particular problem s in taking their place.
V e iy large num bers o f Australians, all o f them volunteers, served
overseas in the First W orld W ar and then founded the RSL. Even greater
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nu m bers served in the arm ed forces in the Second W orld W a r (over
660,000). S m all contingents w ent to Korea, M alaya and Borneo. Just
over 50,000 served in Vietnam , over h a lf o f them volu n teers but w ith a
significant n u m b er o f conscripts. T h e Vietnam generation o f soldiers w as
thus a com paratively sm all group, going to a w ar w hich w as not
universally popular, m any o f them conscripted (though not necessarily
very reluctant), and, perhaps m ost significantly, they did not com e hom e
as victors. T h e y did not all find it easy to see them selves as true heirs
o f the A n zacs, n or did they find it easy to m ove into the RSL.
T h e issue w hich brought th eir relationship with the R S L to a head,
however, w as th at o f A gen t Orange.
T h e V ietn am Veterans A ssociation o f Australia (originally the
V ietnam V etera n s’ A ction Association) had its beginnings in the concern
o f veteran s that th eir health and w elfare needs w ere not being m et by the
D VA and that the R S L was ignoring their plight. T h e W A A w ere
operating on tw o levels: they im plem ented a program ofcrisis coun sellin g
and intervention, the forerunner to the W C S ; and they lobbied hard and
publicly fo r the investigation o f their claim s that A u stralian soldiers in
V ietnam had b een exposed to a variety o f chem icals, and that this
exposure had caused widespread health problem s. The R S L did not share
the W A A 's concerns. Its attitude, overall, has been that “all veteran s
have a few problem s, the blokes w h o ’ve been to Vietnam d id n ’t have as
tough a tim e an yw a y”; and that, “the established channels can handle
it anyw ay” . T h ese attitudes, as w ell as som e personality clashes, led to
b itter relation s betw een the R S L and the W A A .
T h e W A A accused the R S L o f “betrayin g” the V ietn am veteran s
by siding w ith the D V A and apologists in the governm ent w ho initially
denied that A u stralian troops had been exposed at all to any chem icals
(this initial foolish statem ent w as soon retracted). “B etrayal” is o f course
a key m o tif in the w hole Vietnam picture:21 the troops w ere betrayed by
the politicians; they w ere betrayed by protesters in the streets; by
unionists; and b y the Saigon regim e w ho white-anted their best efforts,
and then lost the war. Som e A u stralian s even see the A m erican s as
having betrayed them b y m aking a half-hearted attem pt at victory. T h is
pattern o f betrayal con tinu es a well known them e in A u stralian m ilitary
history in w hich A u stralia is depicted as a ju n io r ally, better at w ar than
the sen ior partner, but doom ed to fail overall because o f the senior
p artner’s faintheartedn ess or stupidity.
T h e W A A in its early years thus continued the story o f Vietnam .
There w as a deep and keenly felt cynicism directed against all authority
figures and politicians, both those w ho sent the troops to V ietn am and
those w h o opposed participation in the conflict; and for m an y veteran s
there w as hostility to anyone w ho had not shared their experiences,
especially those connected with the an ti-w ar m ovem ent or who did not
share th eir view s about the problem s o f veterans. This sense o f isolation,
alm ost o f paranoia, seem s to be one o f the factors w hich kept the
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voluntary leadership o f the W A A organisation so motivated. T h e other
more positive factor is a very strong and sincere desire to help other
veterans.
The W A A does not represent all veterans, any m ore than does
the RSL. A variety o f veterans groups m eets a variety o f needs both for
veterans in general and those o f Vietnam in particular. A s well as the
unit associations, there are welfare groups self-styled as “non-political”
in order to contrast them selves with the W A A . Indeed som e veterans
actively dislike the W A A . It is seen as “political” , as being in conflict with
authority, w hereas m any veterans want a harm onious integration into
the dom inant RSL/Anzac Day culture. Some resent the W A A ’s portrayal
o f the veteran as sick or needy with children dam aged by chem icals. For
m any veterans, their identity is not dom inated by their w ar service, and
if they jo in any veterans group they do so for som e com radeship and
com m unity activity rather than as a total commitment.
Like m ost self-help groups, the W A A suffers from chronic
shortages o f funds and experienced and willing personnel, particularly
for m ounting and sustaining legal action. Nevertheless, it has been quite
successful in recruiting and m aintaining m em bership (it claim ed around
15,000 at its peak, though 5,000 seem s typical), and m ost active in
providing help to veterans when they need it most. W ithout the W A A ,
particularly w ithout the energy and dedication o f its leaders such as Phil
Thom pson, it seem s very unlikely that either the W C S or the Royal
Com m ission would have been established.
The future o f Vietnam Veteran groups
The Royal Com m ission has been and gone, although some
groups are still fighting its findings. T h e long-term future o f the Agent
Orange dispute is unclear, and this dispute has been for long the driving
force behind the m ain separate Vietnam veterans action group, the
W A A . If Agent Orange ceases for w hatever reason to be an issue— either
because chem ically-induced dam age is accepted as a cause o f disability,
or because this is finally ruled out— then it is hard to see w hat special
role there will be for Vietnam veterans groups. It appears that m em bership
in the W A A declined considerably after the Royal Com m ission ended,
and after the resolution o f m any outstanding issues by the success o f the
W elcom e Home March in October 1987.
It is likely, it seems, that there will be a gradual m erging o f the
various groups, particularly as the W A A m ellows. Many veterans are
m em bers o f m ore than one group, and in future years the relatively
young Vietnam veterans will in all likelihood take over the RSL. W h ether
they then change its nature, or becom e in their turn integrated into its
conservative political culture, will no doubt be a point o f contention.
Some institutional pressures are already forcing the organisations
to w ork m ore closely together. For instance, the Vietnam W ar Veterans
Trust, which was set up to disburse the m oney received from the class

64

Jane R (m <*

action against A gent Orange in the USA, has representatives from the
RSL, from the W A A , and from other veterans groups.
So too w ith the com m ittee to establish a special A u stralian
V ietnam Forces National Memorial. T h e W A A has been the m ost active
supporter o f this project, and is raising m uch o f the funds, but the
A u stralian G overnm ent has also donated som e $200,000 and the
committee to choose the m onum ent’s design (from entries in a competition)
has a w ide range o f m em bership.22
T h e W A A ’s im m ed iate fu tu re p ro b a b ly lie s in p ro vid in g
personalised counsel and support to veterans and their fam ilies. In this
it will be alm ost an arm o f the W C S , and m ay even becom e redundant,
being m ore like the cam araderie groups such as the R S L and the
Vietnam Legion o f Veterans.
In assessing the effectiveness o f the W A A as an organisation, the
m ost striking thing has been its success at defining the im age o f “the
veteran” through the media. From the time o f its form ation in 1980, the
W A A d epicted th e experien ce o f retu rn in g from the w a r as an
overw helm ingly negative one.
D uring the 1980s, alm ost the only
discussions o f Vietnam in the m edia were in term s o f “the veteran and
his problem s", problem s which have been seen as caused by either
exposure to toxic chem icals and/or the unpopularity o f the war. T h e
im ages o f the w ar which linger in the public m ind— insofar as they do
linger at all— are probably drawn m ore from Am erican than Au stralian
experiences. T h e popular culture o f the US— its m ovies, pop m usic, and
television— have b een as im portant in depicting the nature o f the w ar
and o f the veteran experience as U SA political leaders w ere in defining
the nature o f the Vietnam “problem ” years earlier.
Welcome Home 23
T h e return hom e of the Vietnam veteran has been portrayed in
m any A m erican film s and literary works. T h e indifference o f the m ethod
has been universally condem ned as an insensitive and alienating
approach to the repatriation o f a soldier fresh from com bat or at least
from service in a w ar zone: take him from his unit; load him on a plane:
land him som ew here in the US; and then send him home; once there he
is given no parades; no cerem onies; and no peer support during his
readjustm ent period, which m ay be relatively short (particularly if he
rem ains in the service), or m ay be a never-ending process.
T h is picture has been accepted com pletely as portraying the
A ustralian experience also, but this w as not the case for a large num ber
o f servicem en. True. A ustralian soldiers w ere som etim es, even often,
dum ped at an airport in the m iddle o f the night and left to m ake their own
w ay hom e, but others were treated like w ar heroes at least briefly.
W h eth er or not this b rie f welcom e hom e cerem ony was sufficient either
as com fort, reward, or m erely served as a gesture o f transition, is indeed
arguable, but it is im portant that the veteran s’ experiences are recorded
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accurately before w e can begin to argue about what would be desirable
treatm ent. One hopes that the Vietnam experiences in both the US and
Australia w ould lead to the services adopting as routine the practices of
extensive debriefing and group support after any active duty, but neither
set o f institutions has shown in the past that they are prone to learn
expeditiously from soldiers’ experiences.
The A ustralian army prided itself on the m orale and group
cohesion o f its units,2,1and the infantry units w ere rotated on a unit basis
rather than individually. They served for 12 m onths in Vietnam , but
before this had som etim es gone through m onths or even years o f training
as a unit. Since all individual soldiers norm ally served 12 m onths in
Vietnam also, this would m ean— in theory— that all soldiers w ent to
Vietnam together in their unit and returned with it 12 m onths later.
Unfortunately this did not w ork out quite so well in practice, and
generalising statem ents that Australian personnel rotation was on a unit
basis need to be treated with some caution. The m ain m od ification to the
group rotation theory came about through the operation o f National
Service (as the draft w as called in Australia). Those who were “called up”
were obliged to serve in the arm y for two years (later reduced to 18
months), and were inducted into the arm y in four intakes per year, at
three m onth intervals. W hen their two years service was com pleted, o f
course, they were discharged from the arm y and had no m ore im m ediate
obligations.
Because the intakes were staggered, so too were the discharges,
and som e soldiers served only a few m onths in Vietnam before they
returned to Australia. These “nashos” , as they were known, accounted
for m ost o f the turnover in the units, but there were also the unavoidable
departures occasioned by death, injury, disease, or on com passionate
grounds. So , in practice, significant num bers o f soldiers even from
com bat units did not return hom e with their units. Many, however, seem
to have returned in groups, o f varying sm all sizes, with others who had '
undergone basic training at the sam e time, and those who trained
together always forged strong bonds. (The sm all size o f the A ustralian
arm y m eant that there were only three recruit training battalions, and
drafts who had com pleted their basic training tended to go to the sam e
units.) Other soldiers, from combat and non-com bat units alike, returned
home as they had arrived in Vietnam : more or less alone. It is not possible
to say exactly how m any were in each o f these categories.
Som e soldiers returned quickly, lifted out o f their unit and then
onto a charter flight, while some cam e as m edevacs in A ir Force Hercules.
Arguably, the lucky ones took the slower boat trip home, with a chance
to begin to adjust to leaving the w ar zone w hile still with their support
providing unit. But no m atter how they returned, readjustm ent w as a
difficult tim e for alm ost all soldiers— as no doubt it has always been, no
m atter how heroic the return. The easiest readjustm ent was, no doubt,
for the career soldiers who rem ained in the arm y com m unity, m any of
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whom would choose to return to Vietnam for a second tour. For them
there w as relatively little contact with the civilian community. There
seems to have been little questioning within the services about Australia’s
role in Vietnam , adding to the continuity o f high morale.
M any veterans seem to have only dim m em ories about the return
home, discharge from the army, and readjustm ent period. For those
whose fam ilies provided a warm welcom e there seem s to have been
relatively little traum a, but m ost veterans have tales to tell o f being
greeted with “haven’t seen you for awhile— where’ve you been?” This
apparent lack o f knowledge, and, worse, o f interest, about where they
had been or what they had been doing, was the m ost typical rem em bered
reaction, although there were also cases o f hostility directed at the
returning soldiers, especially in the later years o f the war.
Public opinion polls and the results o f two federal elections
showed that the Australian electorate was not, at least initially, particularly
opposed to the war. On the contraiy, the reception given to those troops
who did m arch on their return home, shows that there was abundant
warmth and welcom e in the com m unity towards the soldiers. It is an
interesting aspect o f the collective veteran m em ory o f Vietnam that these
earliest “welcom e hom e" m arches seem to have been so com prehensively
forgotten. The truth is that all o f the battalions m arched in capital cities
when they returned to their home bases— sixteen m arches in all—
accom panied by other troops who had returned at or near that time.
Most o f these m arches took place in Sydney and Brisbane, but there were
some in Adelaide and Townsville (a provincial town in north Queensland
which has an arm y base nearby). From the first march, in June 1966 in
Sydney, until the last one, in Decem ber 1971 in Townsville, the troops
were cheered and clapped by thousands— even hundred o f thousands—
o f onlookers. Looking back, the rem arkable thing is how little the spirit
o f public welcom e for the soldiers seem ed to be affected by the growing
anti-war feeling. The final march was ju st before Christm as 1971, in
Townsville:
Thousands of Townsville people turned on a rousing heroes’
welcome. Cheering drowned the sound of marching feet for three
city blocks as Townsville made the most of the last major parade
by troops from Vietnam. The marchers were swamped with
streamers and ticker-tape thrown from balconies and roadside
vantage points. The crowd which packed the Flinders Street
footpaths to capacity has been described as the largest ever to
turn out and welcome troops returning from the war zone.25
The End o f the War
The parade in Townsville alm ost m arked the end o f the w ar for
Australia, but significantly, it did not mean the end o f the war in general,
nor was it an occasion for rejoicing or for the sort o f victory celebrations
that had heralded Arm istice Day at the end o f the First W orld W ar, or
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Victory in the Pacific Day in 1945. There was, o f course, no v ic to iy to
celebrate.
Australia’s end to its commitment w as aptly termed a “withdrawal".
But som e soldiers and others in the w ider com m unity retained the idea
that A ustralian forces were som ehow victorious in at least their own
province o f Phu ocTu y. The argum ent goes that Australia’s w ar in Phuoc
Tuy resulted in the substantial destruction o f the Viet C ong forces there;
that the province at the time o f the w ithdrawal o f the T ask Force was
“secure” ; and it is added, generally, that had Australia, as a nation and
a m ilitary presence, been sufficiently large and com m itted to w aging w ar
all over the south of Vietnam , then the final result would have been quite
different. W e, it is claim ed, w ould have w on.20
It is im portant to appreciate this view o f the war, in order to
understand the attitude of Vietnam veterans in Australia. Not all o f
them, by any m eans, m ake these claim s to partial let alone total potential
victory; but a significant num ber do, and are to be found at all levels o f
the A rm y and o f veteran s’ organisations. M any o f the m ore m odest m ake
the defensible claim that the Australian forces perform ed very w ell in
Vietnam , and in this were true heirs o f Anzac. T his claim too is im portant
for an understanding o f the position o f Vietnam veterans. Am erican
forces were perceived as not only beaten, in that they abandoned the war,
but A ustralian soldiers also tend to be very patronising about the com bat
perform ance o f Am erican soldiers; seeing them as having been “beaten"
in m any instances at the tactical level. T h ey tend to ignore the great
differences betw een the sheer scale o f their efforts and the Am erican
com m itm ent, and also the extent to which they relied on the A m erican s
for logistic and operational support. Nevertheless, there has been none
of the postw ar criticism o f the arm ed forces in Australia that occurred in
the United States, let alone any suggestion that the Australian forces in
Vietnam “disintegrated”.
The sight o f the tanks rolling into the Presidential Palace during
the “fall” o f Saigon in 1975 dispelled the illusion o f victory for som e o f the
com m itted; others still m aintain that “we w on” . But the events o f 1975
were the clim ax to a w ar which had ground on through so m any lives for
so m any years. A fter the ownership o f the south w as finally resolved, and
the Vietnam question w as buried, there began a quiet period for Vietnam
veterans. No longer were they participants in any sort o f conflict, m ilitary
or political; theirs was very m uch a forgotten war, but at least for
veterans in Australia it was not as discredited as in the USA, nor had
their part in it been subjected to so much criticism.
The decade after Vietnam was one o f considerable social change
in Australia, and the issue of Vietnam and of its veterans w as not on the
agenda. Som e o f the issues which did com e to the fore, however, such as
those involving the re-definitions of m asculinity and fem ininity, and the
place o f m ulticulturalism and o f non-Anglo-Celtic m igrants (particularly
those o f A sian extraction) in Australia, did bear directly on the experiences
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o f the veterans. W ere th ey being m ade to feel that fighting against A sia n
com m u nists, fo r oth er Asians, w as som ehow an im portant con trib u tion ?
W as the w h ole A n zac m yth now som ehow ou t-of-place? (The 75th
A n n iversary o f G allipoli in April 1990 revitalised interest in the w hole
A n zac m ythology. T h e intense m edia flirtation w as nothin g if not in
m arked con trast to the near disdain o f the previous decade or m ore.)
T h e m yth o f A n zac com es from an older Australia, a sim p ler and
m ore hom ogen eou s country, w h ere m ascu line virtu es w ere suprem e
and u n ch allen ged and the British or A m erican em pires w ere gloriou s to
be dependent upon. A n zac Day, the m ain ritual celebration o f the m yth,
is not a place fo r su b tleties (though it no doubt m eans differen t things
to different people), n or for the celebration o f pluralism and differences.
Vietnam , w ith all its am biguities, does not fit easily into the sequence o f
A u stralian wars, for even though it w as typical in being an alliance w ar
with A u stralia participatin g to ensure the future protection o f a great and
powerful friend, th is tim e we were not on the w inning side, and som e
even argued that we w ere not on the right side.
A ll that m ost veterans w anted w as to be able to feel like the
veteran s o f previou s wars, but there seem s to have been a doubt that they
were fu lly w orthy. Som e o f them w ere sneered at by older soldiers in R S L
clubs— ”you b lok es never had it tough like we did”— and oth ers obviou sly
had doubts th em selves about w h eth er they truly deserved to be ranked
with the An zacs. T h ese doubts m ay, however, have been largely o f their
own m aking, as the public seem s to have welcom ed them on A n zac
m arches and th eir num bers there were a w elcom e addition to the
declining ranks o f the veteran s o f the earlier world w ars. From the
earliest yea rs o f the war, soldiers w h o had returned from V ietn am took
part in A n zac m arches. In 1967, the S yd n ey Morning Herald reported:
. . . in the continuing story o f the Anzac tradition, soldiers who
had returned from the conflict in Vietnam marched down Martin
Place with veterans of Korea, Malaya and Borneo and members
of the 3rd and 6th Battalions RAR.27
A ccord in g to the report the you n g on lookers w ere the on es leadin g the
cheers am on gst the 100,000 w h o lined the streets. In the im m ediately
follow ing years, the Sydney Morning Herald alw ays m ade special
m ention o f the V ietn am veteran s in A n zac m arches, culm inatin g in 1972
w hen th ey w ere given the honour o f leading the m arch in Sydney. T h is
was the high point o f their participation, as far as m edia rep ortin g w as
concerned. In 1973 and 1974 they w ere still m entioned, but in the years
after this the celeb ration o f A n zac Day itself underwent change. It
becam e m ore o f a focu s for d issen ting activities, and w as reported as
such in the m ajor cities. G roups such as W om en Against Rape in W a r (a
p articu lar favou rite am ongst soldiers as the butt o f jok es). Gay ExS ervicem en ’s A ssociation s, and ethnic com m u nities w ith variou s and
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com peting w ar histories and agendas o f their own, began to dem and the
right to participate in the march. T h e R S L fought hard to retain the
ownership o f A n zac and to disallow these m inorities central participation.
D uring this tim e the V ietn am veterans w ere largely unheard of,
until the A gen t Orange issue w as aired at an A n zac Day m arch in Sydney
in 1980. A b ou t 100 veterans m arched w ith sm all pieces o f orange paper
on th eir jack ets, but the organisers were eager to em phasise that they
were not radicals:
•This is not a political protest. The crepe paper signifies our
concern over the issue. We are the conservative element in
Australia. We are members of RSL clubs. We served our country
and we would like our country to serve us.28
T his statem ent could w ell be taken as the them e o f the 1987 W elcom e
Hom e March.
The success o f the welcome home m arches in the USA, particularly
that in W ash in gton D.C. in 1986, w as contagious. A com m ittee w as set
up in Sydney in 1986, supported by a variety o f veterans groups, the
state branch o f the R S L (not the national body), and som e Sydney local
governm ent representatives. The pow er o f the Vietnam w ar to divide,
still, w as seen in som e o f the exchanges reported as occuring in the
cham bers o f the Sydney City Council. A veteran on the C ouncil accused
those opposed to the m arch o f being part o f the “gay com m unist faction ” ,
while a councillor w ho had been an anti-conscription activist countered
that “there has never been an attem pt at repatriation for those w h o chose
the path w hich history has shown w as the m orally right p ath” .29T h is idea
w as repeated frequently on an A u stralian B roadcasting C orporation
(ABC) T V program m e. Hindsight, broadcast in M ay 1990, w hich m arked
the 20th anniversary o f the anti-w ar M oratorium m arches.
In the days preceding the m arch, the m edia was full o f contrary
opinions about w hat the m arch, and indeed the w ar itself, w as all about.
W hile som e saw it as a reconciliation and were w illing to let bygones-bebygones, others were keen to argue their case yet again. C onservative
w riters in the national daily newspaper, the Australian, explained w h y
“It w as right for us to be there” , and blam ed “Left-liberal anti-South
Vietnam , pro-H anoi forces" who w ere “traitors to their ow n troops. T h ey
are the ones w h o should apologise to our veteran s and to the V ietn am ese
who m arched with th em ” .30 (M any A u stralian s resented the activities o f
one university group who had collected m on ey to send to the V iet C ong
for m edical supplies— it still rankled years later.)
The m ain W elcom e Hom e M arch w as held on the m orn in g o f
Saturday 4 O ctober 1987 in Sydney, follow ed by an afternoon and
evening o f congregation and further cerem ony, including a concert.
O th er lo c a l and m u ch sm a ller m a rch es and c e le b ra tio n s w ere
subsequently held all over Australia.
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M an y veteran s in the Sydney m arch took delight in ignoring the
Labor Party Prim e M inister, R.J. L. (Bob) Hawke, as he took the salute
on the steps o f the Sydney Tow n Hall, because the Lab or Party had
(according to the m arch organiser) “so strongly opposed the forces”
presence in V ietnam ". (This in fact w as not strictly true. T h ou gh the
Labor Party did even tu ally propose w ith draw in g A u stralian troops, by
the tim e it cam e to governm ent, in D ecem ber 1972, the only troops
rem aining w ere the advisers, the m ajor troop w ithdraw als havin g taken
place un der a Liberal G overnm ent, but m an y veterans m isrem em b er the
sequence o f events.)
T h e m edia treated the 1987 W elcom e H om e M arch in m uch the
sam e w a y as th ey had treated the w ar and its veterans in the past, with
glib and often inaccurate analysis, and using im ages based on the “sick
veteran " as portrayed by the W A A in their subm issions to the Royal
C om m ission and through their jo u rn a l Debrief and elsewhere. Th e sam e
im age occurs th rough ou t much A u stralian Vietnam literature, film , and
television.31 Ju st before Anzac D ay 1987 the Sydney Morning Herald
reported that:
For Australians who served in Vietnam the stench of a “dirty war"
has been hard to shake. They have always trailed at the end of
Arm y contingents in the Anzac Day parade—as if an
afterthought.32
A few days later the sam e paper in an editorial w rongly stated: “F or the
first tim e, V ietn a m veterans led the A n zac D ay m arch in Sydney" (as we
have seen, they led it in 1972). T h e sam e editorial em phasised the
potential o f the W elcom e Hom e M arch as a ritual sign ifyin g the
reintegration o f veteran s into the com m unity; but it w arned against
believin g that the parade was in itself enough. It needed to m ark a new
beginning, to be a sign that we had all “begun to gain a sense o f historical
perspective on the profound con flicts w hich the Vietnam W a r arou sed".33
W h eth er this in fact has happened is debatable, but the m arch
w as a great su ccess for the veteran s involved, probably alm ost h a lf o f
those w h o had served in Vietnam (the m arch w as estim ated at 22,000),
including veteran s o f the AR VN m arch ing u n der the old Saigon flag. The
brilliant sp rin g w eath er saw huge, frien dly crowds linin g the streets,
cheering th e veteran s and leaving little doubt as to w h eth er th ey w ere
w elcom e hom e or not. There w ere none o f the feared “incidents" from
form er an ti-w ar groups, and m ost o f the sign s and crowd com m en ts (not
to m en tion the com m en tary on the nationally-broadcast televised version
o f (h e even t34) w ere distinctly “pro-w ar”. The reunions will provide w arm
m em ories for yea rs to come, and it seem s that the m arch did provide
som e sort o f finale to the w ar for m an y o f the veterans.
But as w ith every facet o f the Vietnam war, there w as not
com plete con sen su s about the m arch. O utsiders view ed it from variou s
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p ersp ectives, som e seein g the c o m m u n ity accep tan ce o f th e v e te ra n s as
b ein g p ro o f th a t “it w a s righ t fo r u s to b e th e re ” . E ven w ith in th e v e te ra n
com m u n ity, th ere w ere those w h o ign ored it, as b ein g irreleva n t to th eir
p resen t lives, an d th ere w ere th ose w h o sa w it as little m ore th a n “a
recru itin g d rive fo r the R S L ” .
T h is w a s v e ry m u ch a m in o rity criticism o f the m arch , b u t it d oes
raise th e v e ry im p o rtan t qu estion o f h o w fa r in tegration o f th e w a r and
v e te ra n s resu lts in th eir in co rp ora tio n in to a n a tion al m yth w h ic h is
rath er m ilitaristic. M ichael C la rk h as d escrib ed th is p ro cess in th e
U n ited S tates, s a y in g th at th e c u ltu ra l a p p a ra tu s w h ich h ad so
s u ccessfu lly ch a n n elled the m em ories o f th e V ietn a m w a r to fit th e
p attern s o f oth er, m o re acceptab le w a r exp erien ces, h a s fin a lly offered
“w ith a triu m p h a n t flou rish . . . th e sp ecta cle o f its m o st su ccessfu l
creation , th e v e te ra n w h o w ill figh t the n ex t w a r.35
Is th is w h a t “b ein g an A n z a c ” rea lly m ea n s?
v e te ra n s w o u ld w a n t? Is it th e p rice o f a ccep ta n ce?
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W ho C a re s fo r th e C aregiver?
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“G en erally speakin g I w ou ld not begin to com m en t on the
A m erican H osp itals or nursing, ou r grou p w as so sm all com p ared w ith
their hu ge cu m u lu s” ,1w rites N ell Espie, one o f the forty-three officers o f
the R oyal A u stra lia n A rm y N ursin g C orps (RAANC) w ho served in South
V ietn am b etw een 1967 and 1971.2 T h e “vast cu m u lu s”, b y contrast,
com prised m ore th an five thousand m em b ers o f the A rm y Nurse Corps,
the R A A N C ’s U nited States coun terpart, w h o nursed in South V ietn am
betw een 1962 and 1973.3
N ot on ly w as the A u stralian group m uch sm a ller th an the
Am erican , it w a s con siderably m ore hom ogeneous. Its size and nature
brou ght both advan tages and disadvantages, then and in later years.
“W h o cares fo r the caregiver?” looks at the backgrou n ds o f the A u stralian
nurses, at th eir exp erien ces in South Vietnam , and at som e o f the
con clu sion s w h ich th ey have since draw n from those experiences. It
focuses in p articu lar upon tw elve nu rses w h o com pleted qu estion n aires
for m e b e tw e e n 1986 and 1990.4 T h e y c a n be tak en as b e in g
represen tative o f the larger group.
“I w as su rprised to learn a n u m b er o f them [A m erican n u rsing
officers w ork in g at th e 36th E vacuation Hospital, V u n g Tau] w ere
recently ou t o f N u rsin g College and that som e w ere m arried ”, recalls one
o f the A u stra lia n nurses, J a n M cCarthy, w h ose tour o f du ty in South
V ietn am lasted from M ay 1968 to M ay 1969. “A t this tim e if you w ere
m arried in ou r system you had to resign so this w as quite a su rp rise.”5
She and h er R AAN C colleagu es w h o w en t to South V ietn a m w ere all
single (although the regulation preventing m arried wom en from rem aining
in the corp s w a s ch an ged in 1970), all w om en (the R A A N C 's first m ale
officer w as on ly ap p oin ted in 1972), and all officers. (The U S A rm y Nurse
Corps sent both m ale and fem ale n u rsin g officers to South Vietnam .)
A lth ou gh fem ale oth er ranks w ere enlisted in the RAANC at this tim e,
they w ere not sent to South V ietnam . M ale other ranks at th is stage w ere
enlisted in the R oyal A u stralian A rm y M edical C orps (RAAM C ), not the
RAANC, alth ough this w as based upon an “u n derstan din g” rath er th an
a w ritten p olicy.6
T h e R AAN C nu rses w h o served in South Vietnam w ere all white.
Eleven o f the tw elve in m y sam ple w ere Australian -born. F u rtherm ore
the sam e eleven all described th eir paren ts as Australian. In 1971, only
79.78 p er cen t o f the A u stralian popu lation in gen eral had been b o m in
A u stralia.7 T h e tw elfth nurse w as N ew Z ea la n d -b om o f N ew Zealand
parents. She an d six o f the A u s tra lia n -b o m nurses had b een b o m in
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rural areas. T h e tw elve nurses in gen eral cam e from larger th an average
fam ilies. T h e average num ber o f children (including the nurses) in each
o f their fam ilies w as 3.8. The highest average num ber o f live b irth s for
m arried w om en b o m in Australia betw een 1898 and 1928, during w hich
tim e one assum es that m ost o f th eir m oth ers w ere b om , w as on ly 3 . 1.8
The tw elve n u rses’ fathers included an arm y officer, a public servant, a
railw ay guard, a psychiatric nurse, a w orks overseer, several farm ers, an
accountant, and a com pany representative; m ost of th eir m oth ers had
been engaged in hom e duties. T h e tw elve nu rses w ere edu cated at
governm ent or C atholic schools (six are Catholics, five Protestants),
except for one w ho attended a Church o f England school, in m ost cases
com pleting betw een two and four o f a possible six yea rs o f secondary
schooling. T w o worked as shop assistants, one as a telephonist, one as
a secretary (and later as an other rank (the A u stralian n om en clatu re for
enlisted personnel] in the RAANC), and another on h er fam ily’s farm ,
before begin ning th eir nursing training, w hich the others com m en ced
soon after leaving school.
W h y did they becom e nurses? “I really cant [sic] rem em ber, I
think som e o f m y school friends w ere doing it. It was a w a y to get to the
city. I did not w ant to m arry the b oy next door and have kids” , w rites
Elizabeth Healey. Econom ic factors certain ly influenced som e. “I had
alw ays had an interest in a health-related profession. [In] 1963 (m y first
year o f tertiary study) U niversity fees w ere still being levied and unless
a student w as w ealth y or awarded a university scholarship— the entry
to U n iversity w as prohibitative [sic] to the average student. N u rsin g w as
a ‘secu re’ alternative profession” , recalls D iane Badcock, w h o had
com pleted the full six years o f secondary schooling. “I had really w an ted
to do M edicine but had to leave school early (fam ily situation) so I then
opted for nu rsing and have never regretted m y decision” , w rites Pam
Barlow. G row ing up during the Second W orld W ar, du ring w hich
A u stralian arm y nurses had a high public profile, also inspired som e. In
reply to a question asking: “W h at factors influenced y o u r decision to
becom e a n u rse?” , J a n M cCarthy writes: “Not sure. A lw ays w an ted to do
nursing fo r as long as I can rem em ber. Perh aps [it was the influence o f
the ] w ar yea rs and living in an arm y tow n [Seym our, V ictoria]— [I] often
saw m em bers o f R AAN C in tow n [and it] m ay have influenced m e ”.
H er an sw er also helps to explain w h y she and som e o f the other
nurses had decided to jo in the army. Nell Espie, one o f the older nurses
to serve in South Vietnam , who had join ed the RAANC in Ju n e 1951 and
served in Jap an and Korea during the Korean W ar, for exam ple, had also
been influenced by Second W orld W a r nurses. “Contact w ith R eturned
Sisters during post basic nurse training. Advertisem en t for n u rses to
serve in K orea”, are the reasons she gives for jo in in g the army. O nly two
o f the tw elve jo in e d the army specifically because o f the V ietn a m W ar. “I
w as v ery k een to nurse in S.V.N .[South V iet Nam]", w rites D iane
Badcock. “W ith m y fam ilial contacts & p rior know ledge o f the services,
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I had no ap p reh en sion in applying to jo in the R .A .A .N .C .” H er father,
uncle, broth er, and cou sin had all served in the arm y at variou s tim es.
Ten o f the oth er n u rses cam e from fam ilies in w hich num erous m em b ers
had belonged to the arm ed services, particu larly during the tw o w orld
wars; several had b roth ers w h o also served in the V ietn a m W ar. A ll
probably had som e sym path y w ith the follow in g view espoused b y Trish
Ferguson: “I had this b e lie f then (as I still have) that each o f us should
do som e tim e in the services.” M ost o f the forty-three n u rses originally
surveyed w ere A rm y, rather th an ju s t V ietnam , nurses. T h e m in im u m
period w h ich an y o f the forty-three had spent as officers in the RAAN C
before g o in g to South Vietnam w as seven m onths, the m axim u m w as
nineteen yea rs and one m o n th . and the average w as approxim ately three
years and one m on th .9 Sixty per cent o f th eir US A rm y N urse C orps
counterparts, how ever, had had less than six m on th s’ A rm y experience
before goin g to South V ietn a m .10Eight o f the tw elve nurses in m y sam ple
were in th eir tw en ties w hen th ey w ent to South V ietn am (the three
you n gest w ere tw enty-three), the rem aining fou r being thirty-five (a
m atron), forty-tw o, forty-four, and forty-five (another m atron).
“W e did not lose any N u rses in V ietn am and w e w ere located in
one area” , w rites J a n M cCarthy. “T h e US A rm y Nurse C orps w ere m uch
larger and w ere located throughout the cou n try in som e instances
fu rther forw ard o f th eir hospitals, n u rsing in M U S T [M edical U nit S e lf
Tran sp ortab le] un its I understand th ey lost som e nurses w h en units
were rocketed b y the V iet Cong.” 11 E ight m em bers, in all, o f the US A rm y
Nurse Corps, died in South Vietnam : two in a helicopter crash near
Saigon on 18 F eb ru a iy 1966, fou r in an aeroplane crash n ear Q ui N hon
on 30 N ovem b er 1967, one from disease on 8 J u ly 1968, and an oth er
from shrapnel w ou n d s w hich she received during a rocket attack at the
312th E vacu ation H ospital at Chu Lai on 8 Ju n e 1969.12
F o u r m e m b e rs o f th e R A A N C jo in e d 8 A u s tr a lia n F ield
A m b u lan ce at V u n g T a u , the site o f 1 Au stralian Logistic Su pport Group,
in M ay 1967 (nu rses having b een requested by the Au stralian D irector
G eneral o f M edical Services), then jo in e d 1 A u stralian Field H ospital
w hen it w a s raised there in 1968. A fte r these nu rses com p leted their
tours o f d u ty the nu rsing strength w as increased to six. B y 1969 th ere
were nine R AAN C offices on the staff. In that particular yea r there were
m ore th an 9 0 0 US A rm y Nurse C orps officers in South Vietnam , the
highest at an y stage du ring the w a r.13W h en 1 A u stralian Field H ospital
w as closed in 1971, th ere were tw elve nurses on its staff, includin g one
m atron, fou r captain s, and seven lieutenants. T w o o f these n u rses w ere
m em bers o f the R oyal N ew Zealand N ursing Corps (RNZNC). In total, seven
RNZNC n u rses w orked w ith the R AAN C at V u n g T a u . Tw en ty-n in e o f the
RAANC officers com pleted their tw elve m onth tours o f duty; the others,
who rem ain ed in South Vietnam for periods ran gin g betw een three and
ten m on th s, retu rn ed to Au stralia for health reasons or becau se o f the
h ospital’s c lo s u re .14
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No one really attem pted to prepare the nurses fo r w h at w a s to
come. “W e received no professional b rie f before leaving A u stralia— the
only b riefin g from the senior nu rsing officer in the COMD [C om m an d ].
was on w h at to take”,15 states Leslie M cGurgan, in a belated “b r ie r
w ritten and presented in 1990. Perhaps, in som e ways, no one could
prepare them. D escribing her flight to Saigon in April 1969, Nell Espie,
also a veteran o f the Korean W ar, says that “this occasion seem ed
different som ehow to the previous experiences [of travelling w ith troops
going on active s e r v ic e ]... The Vietnam W a r w as different, or seem ed so
even th en to m e” .16T h e nurses’ sense o f dislocation, o f b eing th ru st from
one w orld to another very different one, m ust have been underlined by
their con stant chan gin g o f clothes on the way. “W e left A u stralia in
sum m er uniform , but had to change into civilian dress before lan din g in
Singapore and later back into uniform to arrive in S aigon ",17 N ell Espie
recalls.
T h e first fou r nurses, in particular, found them selves w orkin g in
basic conditions. Heat, sand, and a lack o f running w a ter all caused
problem s in the field am bulance’s huts, w h ich were situated in sand
dunes n ear the beach. One o f the original nurses, Terrie R oss (form erly
Lieutenant Roche) rem em bers that, “Supplies and equipm ent w ere only
ju s t adequate— h ow ever ju stified perhaps b y the fact [that] Fd A m b w as
doing a H ospital jo b ”. Conditions gradu ally im proved, and b y the tim e
that N ell Espie took over as m atron in A p ril 1969 she found a “w ell
established” hospital. “T h e wards, I.C.U. [Intensive Care Unit], operating
theatre and som e departm ents were airconditioned— the m ess qu arters
and offices w ere not.” Supplies and equipm ent also im proved. “In
V ietnam [they were] initially not very good u n der A u stralian system o f
supply it becam e a lot m ore efficient using the A m erican system ",
com m ents Jan McCarthy. W hen necessaiy, theAustralians also frequently
borrow ed from the Am ericans. “One w eekend w e had to borrow blood
from the A m ericans, when we had used 500 bottles!— not including
ordinary fluid replacem ents”, recalls Trish Ferguson.
“O rderlies at first were quite resentful [towards the nurses] bu t
after [a] short tim e [became] co-operative”, T errie R oss recalls. T h e
nurses w ere responsible for running the wards, and fo r train in g the
orderlies [sim ilar to US corpsm en], bu t w ere not granted con trol o f the
latter. “T h e Sisters did not know one day from the next w hich m edics
w ould be allocated for ward du ties”, Leslie M cG urgan reports. “T h is in
turn restricted their ability to train their charges and provide som e
continuity not only in training but also in the nursing care o f their
patients.” T h ere were other anom alies caused by the division o f labou r
by gender, one o f the m ost notable being that relating to salaries. “T h e
corporal in the operating theatre w as paid m ore than the n u rsing officer,
w h o w as a captain, in charge o f the operating th e a tre ",18 Leslie
M cG urgan also notes. Despite such problem s, the doctors, nurses, and
orderlies developed a professional relationship w hich D ian e B adcock,
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who as Lieutenant Lawrence worked at 1 Australian Field Hospital from
February 1969 to February 1970, describes as “nothing short o f a
m iracle”.
T h e 110-bed 1Australian Field Hospital w as considerably sm aller
than the 600-bed 36th Evacuation Hospital, the m ain A m erican hospital
with w hich RAANC nurses had contact in South Vietnam and w hich w as
situated on the airfield at V u n g T a u until about 1970.19Jan M cCarthy,
who m ade a n u m ber o f professional visits to the 36th Evacuation
Hospital, w as grateful to belong to the sm aller hospital. “The operating
theatre had 13 operating tables com pared with ou r two in one th eatre” ,
she recalls. “It w as large and I felt I w ou ldn’t like to w ork in this area w ith
13 operating team s going at the one tim e.”20 There were, however, som e
disadvantages in w orking in a hospital with a very small staff. Th ere w as
no backup for the nurses. W h en the need arose, the h ospital’s handful
o f nurses sim ply kept on nursing. Leslie M cG urgan records, for exam ple,
that: “A n outbreak o f m alaria in 1968/69 to ok the 100 bed hospital to
259 with no extra staff.”21 The RAANC nurses were usually rostered to
work twelve hours a day (with som e shifts being split), six days a week,
but often w orked for m uch longer hours. Pam Barlow, w ho as Lieutenant
M atthews w orked in South Vietnam from M ay 1968 to M ay 1969, notes
that hours o f w ork “could be anything up to 16 hours— you lost count
after aw h ile."L eslie M cGurgan also records that “during the Tet offensive
in 1968/69 the O TT [operating theatre and triage] worked around the
clock for several days.”22 Beryl Hogarth, who worked at the hospital from
August 1 9 7 0 to A p ril 1971, rem em bers w orking at tim es for “over 14 days
w ithout a b reak ” .
Both A u stralian and Am erican nurses were called upon to
undertake v e iy heavy and stressful nursing in South Vietnam. “Com pared
with previou s wars, in SVN [South Viet Nam] we had a m uch higher
proportion o f v e iy severe blast injuries com pared to gu n shot wounds:
and due to the rapid evacuation and triage system these casualties
becam e a v ery heavy nursing com m itm ent— in previous w ars these
patients, they w ould never have reached a hospital b ed ”, explains one
A ustralian nurse. The Australian hospital treated som e A m erican
servicem en (but they w ere usually soon m oved to Am erican hospitals),
along with South Vietnam ese servicem en and civilians. North Vietnam ese
and Viet C ong prisoners-of-war, but m ost o f its patients were A u stralian
and N ew Zealand servicem en. Th e m ost com m on surgical and intensive
care unit nursing, as described by Trish Ferguson, involved: “M ine
Explosions— traum atic am putations. M assive and enorm ous am ounts
o f d e b rid e m e n ts. S h o ck lu n g, m a la ria l lu n g, ce re b ra l m a la ria .
Laparotom ies & Thoracotom ies from being peppered by sh rap n el”. T h e
stress o f such nu rsing was exacerbated by the fact that the nu rses’
professional qualifications did not always m atch their appointm ents.
The A u stralian nurses, however, were probably not pushed to the extent
that som e o f th eir A m erican counterparts were. “Professionally they did
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m ore advanced procedures than we attem pted such as IV [intravenous]
therapy, intubation o f patients, and insertion o f chest drainage", Jan
M cCarthy says o f US Arm y Nurse Corps officers. “At this tim e in our
system D octors coverted [sic] these aspects. I think they [the A m erican
nurses] were trained in IV therapy aspects but were often placed in
situations for which they w eren’t trained.”23The very speedy evacuation
o f patients to Australia m eant that the nurses “did not have the
satisfaction o f seeing the results o f [their] labours” .24
There w as “No debrief follow ing m edivacs [sic] (indeed there w as
no tim e for any professional training at all)” .25 How then did the nurses
cope, or attem pt to cope, with such stressful nursing? The m ain w ay w as
by relying upon one another. “We w ere a closely knit group with
traditions and a corps background. I got the im pression the US Nurse
Corps did not have this closeness am ongst its officers and they felt
som ewhat alone” , Jan M cCarthy writes. “W e relieved our stress levels by
discussing our patients injuries, KLAs etc am ongst ourselves and we felt
we gave each other support. I don’t know how the Am ericans reacted but
I believe their stress levels were greater than ours throughout th eir tours
o f V ietn am .”26
The nu rses’ accom m odation at V u n gT au was “Prim itive, rivalled
W W I but liveable— night duty w as a problem — trying to sleep w ith the
heat” . D uring the d iy season, lack o f w ater w as a problem . Trish
Ferguson recalls that “often only one 2-m inute shower [was] allowed
daily— [due to] w ater shortage when w ater lines [were] blow n up” . Th e
deep trench latrines were, in Pam B arlow ’s words, “quite revolting” .
During the day the Australian nurses wore grey ward dresses (which
some were fond o f because they sym bolized Australian A rm y nursing
tradition s), unlike the white dresses w orn by Am erican and N ew Zealand
nurses; on night duty, they wore ju n gle greens. Elizabeth Healey, w ho
as Lieutenant Hall served in South Vietnam between Ju n e 1969 and
June 1970, considers that the uniform was: “Totally in ap p rop riate... Too
hot and difficult to m aintain in SVN. Due to lack o f starch and the wet.
Still w earing veils!!?? W e coped with great difficulty— spent hours on
uniform no starch— had it sent from hom e to SVN or bought it on the
‘black m arket’”. M ost o f the nurses found the A m erican food to be, in
Maggie H opcraft’s words, “an acquired taste”. The “Paper Pulp and
Cranberry J a m ” , as the turkey and cranberry sauce was dubbed, was,
in the w ords o f another Australian nurse, “H ideous stuff!!".
“A s the m atron I was responsible to provide adequate nursing
coverage [with] only 25% o f staff to be allowed out o f the unit at one time.
W ith only 7 sisters later nine it allowed for little activity” , recalls one o f
the hospital's m atrons, Nell Espie. In order to let the nurses have as
much recreation as possible, she usually rem ained at the hospital
herself. W h en they could, the nurses swam at the local beach, held
barbecues, saw film s in theatres at the Am erican and A u stralian bases,
visited the local town about two m iles away, and went to parties, at which
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som e had th eir on ly contact w ith the A m erican nurses. E lizabeth H ealey
says o f th e A m erican nurses w h om she m et at such parties, “I thought
they w ere older than us overall, m ore ‘sophisticated-’ in sexual b eh aviou r”.
Som etim es the nurses attended con certs at the Peter B adcoe Club in the
com pound. D iane Badcock, how ever, says, “I on ly went to one. I felt they
were m ale audience orientated/objective & fem ales in the audience w ere
not at all expected to be present”. Som e o f the nurses sought out m ore
w ork in th eir spare tim e. “It m ay be interesting to note that in ou r o ff duty
time m an y o f us adopted an orphanage in V u n g Tau V illage— togeth er
with others like engineers, carpenters. M edics, Pharm acists & D octors
etc.” , w rites Pam Barlow. “W e helped in m any w ays to m ake life a little
easier fo r these beautiful children w h o had lost their fam ilies due to w ar.”
The n u rses w ere allow ed five days’ rest and recuperation leave, which
som e spent in Penang, and three days’ rest “in country” , that is, in South
Vietnam . N ell E spie describes h er tim e in Penang as “a life saver” .
“T h ere w as no d ebrief on our return to Australia", reflects Leslie
M cG urgan. W h at happened to the nu rses after they returned hom e?
How, if at all, have their Vietnam experiences affected th eir lives? W h at
con clu sions have they drawn from those experiences? T h ree nu rses left
the arm y im m ediately; two, the current D irector of Nursing Services—
A rm y (D NS-A, or M atron-in-C hief), C olonel J.C.A. M cCarthy, and
Lieutenant-C olonel L.M. M cGurgan, w ere still in the A rm y as o f J u ly
1990, and the other thirty-eight rem ained in the arm y for fu rther periods
ranging b etw een one m onth and seven teen years and ten m onths, and
averaging three yea rs and eleven m onths. M ost o f the RAANC nu rses w ho
served in South V ietn am held short term com m issions in the arm y,
which lasted fo r tw o years and could be renew ed for fu rther two year
periods. E xcluding Colonel M cC arthy (who as o f Ju ly 1990 has been a
RAANC officer fo r tw enty-three years and ten m onths) and Lieutenant
Colonel M cG urgan (twenty-one years and four m onths), the V ietn am
nurses served as officers in the RAANC for total periods (including their
V ietnam service) ranging from one yea r and six m onths to tw enty-eight
years and eight m onths, averaging seven years and ten m onths.27
Som e m arried after they returned to Australia, but the exact
figures are difficult to ascertain. Seven o f the twelve w ho com pleted
questionnaires did so. A t least three o f these wom en left the A rm y at
about the tim e o f their m arriages. T h ree o f the seven, perhaps not
surprisingly, m arried arm y officers, one o f w hom had served as an arm y
pharm acist in South Vietnam , an oth er m arried a p h otojou m alist who
had also w orked there. Six of the m arried w om en have had children, two
having three, the others two each.
U nlike their predecessors from the First W orld W ar, m an y o f
whom could not face nursing again after that war, m any o f the Vietnam
nurses have con tinued nursing in one form or another. All o f the tw elve
nurses in m y sam ple have since nursed, eith er in the arm y (in five cases),
or in civilian hospitals, for considerable periods. One, w h o has nursed
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in neurology and neurosurgery fields, com pleted a post-basic intensive
care unit course, worked in ICU (Intensive Care Units) at different
hospitals, and has been a clinical instructor in a post-basic ICU course
at a school o f nursing, since her return from South Vietnam , says o f her
arm y experience in general that: “It m ay have affected m y m ove tow ards
ICU but I’m not sure. I w as always traum a inclined anyway” . Som e, like
m any o f th eir A m erican counterparts, have found civilian nursing
frustrating after th eir wartim e experiences. “Ever since Vietnam , I have
been frustrated in civilian nursing by the enorm ous inadequacies o f the
system, & the enorm ous attention paid to non-issues” , w rites Trish
Ferguson. “[I] Have pursued num erous avenues (i.e. certificates in
nursing, degree in Psych. & Sociology, different nursing experiences.)—
to no avail.— this during the ’70s w hen I did not acknowledge I had been
in Vietnam ” .
“It h asn’t been until now that I have realised how m uch Vietnam
in particular has m oulded my life” , writes Pam Barlow, who believes that
she m atured a great deal during her tim e in South Vietnam . “You can ’t
experience w h at we did and not be m ore aware o f the Q uality o f Life.
There w ere som e o f the Arm y nurses w h o were affected both m edically
& socially.” Little is known of the nurses’ health w hile they w ere overseas.
“Health o f nurses— no records”, Leslie M cG urgan states bluntly. Several
nurses, as m entioned earlier, returned to Australia for health reasons
before th eir tours o f duty were due to end. One o f the forty-three nurses
died from illness, thought at the tim e not to be war-related (although this
has recently been questioned) in N ovem ber 1971, after her discharge
from the army. M any o f the A ustralian nurses claim to be grateful for
having had the opportunity o f serving in South Vietnam , and con sider
them selves to be b etter people for the experience. One, for exam ple,
b elieves h e rs e lf to be “a m ore toleran t, m ore com p a ssio n a te &
understanding person because o f it”. T h ey have, however, paid a high
price for such personal developm ent. Like som e o f their A m erican
counterparts,28 som e of the Australian nurses have exhibited sym ptom s
o f Post-Traum a Stress Disorder (PTSD). Th e nurse who m ade the above
com m ent, for exam ple, has had alm ost daily m igraine headaches and
has awoken constantly at night, since her service in Vietnam . Restlessness
and a low tolerance o f frustration, especially in regard to civilian nursing,
are also frequ ently hinted at in nurses’ com m ents. W h eth er they view
this positively or negatively, som e o f the nurses also see them selves as
isolated, both from civilian nurses, and, p eh apsm ore interestingly, from
returned nurses from other conflicts. “I feel we have had som ething
special in ou r lives that sets us apart from non-Arm y nu rses”, w rites one
nurse. “W e feel as returned sisters from S.V.N. very isolated and
consequently an isolated group— very distinct from previous w ars &
those sisters”, w rites another.
Strong feelings o f sisterhood have sustained m any o f the Australian
nurses in the postw ar years. One says o f her tim e in South Vietnam :
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“T his year cem ented and m ade friendships which are peculiar and
special to only those nurses who served in that theatre o f w ar— these
friendships continue after 20 yrs & I cannot see them dim inishing". Even
one o f the nurses who has not rem ained in touch with her form er
colleagues com m ents, “I have lost touch with the girls I w orked with but
I often think o f them ". The RAANC nurses w ho served in South Vietnam
have had to rely upon one another for support, both at the tim e o f their
wartim e service and in subsequent years. T w enty years after going to
South Vietnam , Leslie M cGurgan, writing of the need for debriefing after
m edical and surgical em ergencies, says that “we did not ‘care* for the care
givers, only the patients".29
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International Factors Influencing Australian Governm ents'
Responses To The Indochinese Refugee Problem
James E. Coughlan

Introduction
T h e yea r 1975 w as an im portant year for Australia: the econom y
had plunged into a severe recession, with high unem ploym ent and
interest rates, the w orst since the 1930s depression: the G overnm ent
was rocked b y m inisterial involvem ent in a m ajor illegal international
loans scandal: and a variety o f other significant political disruptions,
which culm inated in the m ost serious constitutional crisis in Australian
p olitical h istory— the dism issal b y the G overn or-G en eral, Q u een
E lizabeth’s representative in Australia, o f the elected Labor Prim e
M inister Gough W hitlam . There was one significant international event
in 1975 which w ould have m ajor political and social ram ifications for
Australia over the follow ing decades: the revolutionary changes in the
Cam bodian, Lao and Vietnam ese Governm ents.
T h e com m unist victories in the three countries which used to
com prise French Indochina triggered two types o f large-scale population
m ovem ents: the forced deurbanization o f Cam bodia and governm ent
population relocation program m es in Vietnam on one hand, and the
exodus o f over two m illion Indochinese asylum seekers on the other.
Although the m agnitude o f the exodus o f Indochinese asylum seekers
over the past decade and a h a lf is sm aller than some o f the other
contem porary refugee crises, its direct effect on the international
com m unity has been substantial, largely due to the influence o f the
United States Governm ent. For Australia, the decision to adm it alm ost
150,000 Indochinese refugees and im m igrants in the decade and a h a lf
since early 1975 has had a significant direct and indirect im pact on the
social fabric o f A u stralian society.
The aim o f this article is to discuss som e of the international
factors which have contributed to A u stralia’s Indochinese refugee policy
form ulation since early 1975, with only passing attention given to
dom estic considerations. The article also seeks to show that the
overw helm ing determ inant of A u stralia’s Indochinese refugee policy has
not been dom estic or hum anitarian considerations, but rath er the
political desires o f the Australian G overnm ent and the D epartm ent o f
Foreign Affairs and Trade (the Australian equivalent o f the US Departm ent
o f State) to im prove A u stralia’s relations with Asia, especially with the
A ssociation o f South East A sian Nations (ASEAN) countries, Brunei
D arussalam , Indonesia, M alaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and
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Thailand. Thus, like the United States o f Am erica. A u stralia’s recent
refugee policy has been more o f a foreign policy tool than an im plem ent
o f G overnm ent hum anitarian concern.
The following section will provide a short background to Australia’s
overall refugee policy, which will be followed b y a discussion o f the
international factors which have contributed to Indochinese refugee
policy formulation in the three Australian governments since the beginning
o f 1975. The final section presents a b rief discussion and conclusion o f
the issues raised.
Background
Australia is a signatory to the 1951 United Nations Convention
Relating to the Status o f Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the
Status o f Refugees, and thus accepts the definition o f the term refugee
encom passed in these United Nations instruments. However, in m ore
recent tim es Australia, as well as other countries involved in Indochinese
refugee resettlem ent and the southeast and east Asian countries, has
narrowed its interpretation o f the term refugee. At the sam e time,
Australia is incorporating more stringent procedures in the determ ination
o f refugee status. This m odus operandi has been adopted not only in
order to separate the genuine political refugees from the econom ic
m igrants am ongst the asylum seekers, but m ore im portantly to ju stify
publicly the rejection, and possible m andatory repatriation, o f asylum
seekers who, the Government determines, are non-refugees.
Australia’s response to specific refugee situations takes into
account such factors as the m agnitude o f the specific refugee problem ,
the region in which the problem occurs and the strength and nature o f
Australia’s relationship with that region, with particular im portance
placed on the relationships with the country o f origin and country o f first
asylum o f the asylum seekers. A s with the USA, Australia’s refugee policy
was until recently based upon ad hoc responses to specific refugee
crises. A fter a considerable am ount o f dom estic and international
pressure in 1978 the Liberal Governm ent o f Prim e Minister, M alcolm
Fraser, introduced a regular refugee com ponent into Australia’s annual
im m igration programme. The form ulation o f a formalized refugee policy
in the late 1970s w as due to a num ber o f factors, the m ost im portant of
which w as the growing number o f refugee crises around the world and
the increasing pressure placed on Australia by various governm ents and
organisations to resettle refugees.
Australia is in a similar position, with regard to the Indochinese
asylum seekers, to the other Asian countries, and unlike other W estern
countries, in that it is both a country o f first asylum, that is a country
where asylum seekers initially seek refuge, and a third country, that is
a country o f refugee resettlement. Australia com m enced resettling
Indochinese refugees in 1975, when slightly m ore than one thousand
were resettled, though a substantial resettlem ent program me w as not in
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place until 1978, w hen over seven thousand w ere accepted. In late April
1976, alm ost a year after the com m unist take-over o f Saigon, the first
boat carrying Vietnam ese asylum seekers arrived on Australia’s northern
shores, heralding w hat would be the arrival o f over fifty boats o f first
asylum Vietnam ese boat people during the follow ing five years. In
addition, since late 1989 three boats carrying Cam bodian boat people
have successfully landed on Australian shores. The unannounced
arrival o f Indochinese boat people on A u stralia’s northern shores has
been a significant factor in the creation o f A u stralia’s policy tow ards the
Indochinese refugees.
A s a final background issue, at the beginning o f 1975, as part o f
the C olom bo Plan o f which Australia is a m em ber, there w ere over five
hundred Indochinese students sponsored by the Australian Governm ent
attending educational institutions in Australia. The m ajority o f these
students w ere from South Vietnam , but also included 19 students from
North V ietnam and six high school students nom inated by the Pathet
Lao faction in Laos. T h e Labor Governm ent under the Prim e M inister,
Gough W hitlam , had established diplom atic relations with North Vietnam
in 1973, and had actively worked to im prove relations between Australia
and North Vietnam . Following the changes o f governm ent in the three
Indochinese countries in 1975 Australia continued to provide a sm all
am ount o f developm ental and hum anitarian aid to Laos, although
sim ilar aid and cultural exchanges between Australia and the Socialist
Republic o f Vietnam were suspended in early 1979 follow ing V ietn am ’s
intervention in Cam bodia, influenced by the perception that Vietnam
was both profiting from and forcibly expelling Vietnam ese boat people.
However, since 1983 Australia has been involved in providing bilateral
and m ultilateral hum anitarian aid to Vietnam , and there have been a
small num ber o f cultural exchanges. Australian businesses have also
been active in assisting Vietnam.
The Whitlam Government’s Neglect: 1975
At the beginning o f 1975Australia maintained diplomatic relations
with the four nation states of Indochina and was providing developm ental
aid to these countries. The diversification o f Australia’s relations with
Asia, follow ing the election o f the W h itlam Governm ent in late 1972, w as
part o f W h itlam ’s b elief that Australian foreign policy should not be
restricted due to ideological and m ilitary considerations, but should also
include cultural and econom ic facets, and that Australia should seek to
expand its relations within the A sian region.
A s part o f the desire to restructure Australia’s foreign relations,
an im portant initiative o f the W hitlam Governm ent w as the form al
abolition o f the W h ite Australia Policy and the adoption o f a policy o f
m ulticulturalism initiated by the M inister for Immigration, M rA l Grassby.
The W h ite A u stralia Policy w as the com m on nam e given to the
Immigration Restriction Act, 1901 which sought to restrict non Anglo-
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Celtic im m igrants from entering Australia. The historical backgrou nd to
this A ct is sim ilar to that o f com parable regulations enacted in Canada
and the U S A during the latter part o f the nineteenth century. There w ere
some provisions within the Immigration Restriction Act, 1901 which
perm itted som e A sian people to im m igrate to Australia, though thennum bers were very small.
Since the end o f the Second W orld W a r there had been a grow ing
awareness on the part o f some Australians that Australia’s restrictions
on non Anglo-C eltic im m igration were presenting a negative im age o f
Australia internationally and ham pering A u stralia’s effectiveness in
international forum s. Upon its election the W h itlam Governm ent m oved
rapidly to form ally abolish the W hite Australia Policy, which resulted in
a m arginal increase in the proportion of Asian-born im m igrants settling
in A u stralia during the early years o f governm ent. However, the first
significant test for the non-discrim inatory nature o f A u stralia’s new
im m igration policy w as to come with the first Indochinese refugee crisis
o f early 1975.
In the spring o f 1975 W hitlam perceived that Australia w as not
in a position to accept Indochinese refugees, and w as in essence
unwilling to grant entry to Cam bodian and even Vietnam ese nationals
with A u stralian connections. T his perception arose due to a nu m ber of
factors. T h e Labor Party in Australia at the tim e w as m ore ideologically
aligned with the North Vietnam ese Governm ent, as well as the Provisional
Revolutionary Governm ent of South Vietnam , the Khm er Rouge and the
Pathet Lao factions, than the Am erican-backed regim es in Indochina. A t
the sam e time, som e o f those involved in the labour m ovem ent expressed
concern at the possibility o f having a large num ber o f V ietnam ese
workers in Australia, which could threaten the level o f wages o f Australian
workers, and thus the welfare o f Australian society. The G overnm ent
was concerned at a possible electoral backlash from both conservative
forces in society and its own supporters if Indochinese evacuees and
refugees were settled perm anently in Australia.
D uring April 1975 the Australian Labor Governm ent did not plan
to follow the US exam ple o f extracting Cam bodian and Vietnam ese
nationals w ho had connections with Australia or who w ere perceived as
being at risk after the com m unist victories. T h e W hitlam G overnm ent,
and especially som e o f its senior m inisters, appeared concerned with two
issues at this time: the desire not to offend North Vietnam by seem ing
to m eddle in the internal affairs o f South Vietnam through accepting
Vietnam ese nationals fleeing the advancing com m unist forces: and
concern at perm itting the entry o f a large num ber o f conservative South
Vietnam ese w ho it was felt m ight seek to disrupt Australia’s relations
with North Vietnam . By the time the com m unist forces had entered
Saigon less than a hundred Vietnam ese nationals had arrived in
Australia from Vietnam under special consideration. Up to the end o f
April 1975 the W hitlam Governm ent’s inaction in getting the rem aining
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fam ilies o f V ietnam ese already in Australia out o f South V ietnam , prior
to the com m u nist take over, brought it substantial criticism from the
opposition political parties, humanitarian organisations, som e academ ics
and the gen eral com m unity.
A fte r th e com m u n ist forces en tered S aigon th e W h itla m
G overnm ent experienced a substantial am ount o f condem nation, both
dom estically and internationally, directed at its lack o f response in
bringing out South Vietnam ese nationals with A ustralian connections.
The W h itlam G overnm ent had incorrectly interpreted the gen eral feeling
o f the population tow ards the situation o f the Vietnam ese in Australia,
and underestim ated the international criticism s it would be subject to.
Australia soon cam e under pressure from the United States and the
ASEAN countries, especially M alaysia and Singapore, to participate in
resettling som e o f the 130,000 Am erican-assisted evacuees and refugees
who had fled C am bodia and Vietnam . A s a result o f this pressure, two
im m igration officials w ere sent to Guam, H ong Kong, M alaysia and
Singapore to interview evacuees and refugees for entry to Australia. A t
the end o f this exercise in m id -1975 ju s t over one thousand V ietnam ese
were selected for entry into Australia. T his token response w as not
received enthusiastically both dom estically and internationally, and w as
viewed by som e A sian countries as an indication that the W h ite Australia
Policy w as not dead and buried as the W h itlam G overnm ent had
announced, w hile in certain dom estic quarters it added to the grow ing
public discontent w ith the W hitlam Governm ent. However, the dom estic
political situation w ith in Australia w as about to change and by the end
o f 1975 the W h itlam Governm ent had been sacked by the G overnorGeneral, S ir Joh n Kerr, and a new conservative (Liberal) G overnm ent
under M alcolm F raser had been elected.
In sum m ary, the position o f the W h itlam G overnm ent tow ards
the Indochinese evacuees and refugees in early 1975 w as that it did not
wish to offend and dam age relations with, the newly victorious governm ent
o f North Vietnam . However, after a significant am ount o f dom estic and
international pressure, m ainly from the ASEAN countries and the United
States, the G overnm ent acquiesced and accepted a token nu m ber o f
Indochinese evacuees and refugees. The policy towards the Indochinese
refugees during 1975 w as initially determ ined by some powerful m em bers
o f the W h itlam G overnm ent, w ho largely ignored the requests o f dom estic
and international pressure groups. T h e view s o f som e other G overnm ent
m em bers w h o thought that A u stralia should do som ething to assist the
evacuees and refugees were largely ignored.
The Fraser Government’s Initiatives: 1976— 1983
T h e first concerted attem pt to develop a refugee policy w ith in the
fram ew ork o f overall im m igration policy cam e in 1977 under the Fraser
G overnm ent at the instigation o f the then M inister for Im m igration and
Ethnic A ffairs, M ichael M acKellar. In the form ulation o f an Indochinese
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refugee policy the task at hand w as to balance various dom estic and
international considerations, w hile at the sam e time attem pting to
project to the international com m unity, especially the A sian region, the
im age o f A u stralia as a responsible m em ber o f the A sian -Pacific
com m unity. T h e Fraser Governm ent, like the W hitlam G overnm ent
before it, recognised the im portance o f developing m ore substantial
relations w ith A u stralia’s Asian neighbours.
D uring the late 1970s an im portant feature o f the developm ent
o f refugee policy w ithin the overall im m igration program m e w as the
form al structural incorporation o f the then Departm ent o f Foreign
Affairs, now the Departm ent o f Foreign Affairs and Trade, into refugee
policy form ulation. Though the Departm ent o f Foreign A ffairs had had
input into A u stralia’s ad hoc refugee policy determ ination previously,
there w as no particular section w ithin the Departm ent which had
responsibility for this matter. A s an aside, it is im portant to note that
since the onset o f the Indochinese refugee phenom enon the D epartm ent
o f Foreign A ffairs and Trade has consistently recom m ended a higher
intake o f Indochinese refugees than the Departm ent o f Im m igration,
Local G overnm ent and Ethnic Affairs. Th e Departm ent o f Foreign A ffairs
and Trade believed that if Australia resettled a large num ber o f Indochinese
refugees, then it follow ed that Australia would be perceived as being a
responsible m em ber o f the A sian region, and this perception in turn
could be used as a tool by Australia to im prove its regional relations with
the A sian countries, especially the ASEAN countries, and, probably m ost
im portantly, Indonesia. A s a result o f the perceived im portance o f the
Indochinese refugees in Australia’s bilateral and m ultilateral relations,
a “refugee section” w as established in the Departm ent o f Foreign A ffairs
in early 1981.
In addition to raising A u stralia’s status and prestige w ithin the
A sian region, another m atter which also prom pted the A u stralian
Governm ent to take a m ore active role in the Indochinese refugee issue
w as the arrival o f ju s t over two thousand Vietnam ese boat people in 51
boats on A u stralia’s northern shores during 1976-1981, the largest
proportion arriving between 1978-1979. The arrival o f these refugees
sparked a heated debate in Australia, and in som e quarters old fears o f
an A sian invasion o f Australia resurfaced. The Governm ent w as concerned
with these unannounced arrivals for two reasons: fear o f the dom estic
political backlash if increasing num bers o f boat people w ere to arrive
unannounced in Australia, and the problem posed by genuine refugees
who w ould have to be resettled by Australia, although they w ould not
have been selected via norm al m igration procedures. The latter issue
w as o f concern to the Departm ent o f Im m igration and Ethnic Affairs as
Australia norm ally accepts the m ajority o f its im m igrants before they
enter Australia: in selecting refugees outside o f Australia im m igration
officials had the ability to select refugees who, they thought, w ould be
able to integrate successfully into A ustralian society. T h is pow er o f
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selection was not available in the case o f genuine refugees who landed
in Australia without prior selection, and thus the element o f controlled
selection was absent.
A s a result o f the unannounced arrival ofVietnam ese boat people
on Australia’s northern shores, the Governm ent made special advances
to the Indonesian Governm ent in an effort to persuade the Indonesians
to hold any Vietnam ese boat people who wanted to travel on to Australia.
If this request was met, Australia promised to take a greater num ber of
Vietnam ese boat people from Indonesian camps. Sim ilar advances were
made to the M alaysian Government, and in m id -1978 the Australian
Governm ent approached the US Governm ent and requested their
assistance in persuading the Indonesian and Malaysian Governm ents to
slop boats ofV ietn am ese refugees planning to go to Australia, in return
for Australia taking more refugees from Indonesian and M alaysian
refugee camps. This action would thus help the United States resettle
Indochinese refugees, while at the same time reducing the num ber of
refugees in Indonesia and Malaysia, but most im portantly it would
permit Australian im migration officials the opportunity to select the
refugees Australia wanted to resettle. In early 1979 when the Indonesian
Governm ent offered two islands as possible sites for an Indochinese
refugee processing centre, the Australian Governm ent was im m ediately
supportive o f this proposal and offered to m eet part o f the cost of
establishing such a centre.
The Australian position in 1978-80 was essentially to tiy to stop
Vietnam ese boat people from com ing directly to Australia by accepting
a large proportion o f its Indochinese refugee intake from the countries
from where the Vietnam ese boat people would most likely attem pt to
continue their jou rn ey to Australia, viz. Indonesia and Malaysia. During
the late 1970s and early 1980s when the refugee camp populations in
Indonesia and M alaysia were declining, and those in Hong Kong and
Thailand increasing, Australia continued to take the m ajority o f its
refugees from Indonesia and Malaysia, with m ost o f the intake from the
other Asian countries consisting only o f those refugees who had immediate
fam ily m em bers in Australia who were in a position to sponsor them out
of the refugee camps.
D uring the late 1970s, despite what it perceived as its adequate
response to the growing Indochinese refugee crisis, the Fraser Government
came under increasing international pressure from the first asylum
ASEAN countries, as well as the USA and the office o f the United Nations
High C om m issioner for Refugees (UNHCR), to resettle more o f the growing
num ber o f Indochinese asylum seekers arriving in Asian first asylum
countries. O n the domestic scene, the growing media coverage o f the
plight o f the Vietnam ese boat people and the horrific images o f em aciated
C am bodians en tering Thailand raised public con sciousness and
sympathy, thus perm itting the Government, now also under increasing
dom estic pressure, to raise more readily its intake quota o f Indochinese
refugees.
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Also in the late 1970s the Vietnam ese boat people situation
changed m arkedly with the arrival o f a num ber oflarge freighters in Asia
with thousands o f Vietnamese asylum seekers aboard. It soon becam e
apparent that the maj ority of people on these freighters had paid the local
equivalent o f thousands of dollars to leave Vietnam, and that their
departure from Vietnam had been arranged with the assistance of
corrupt Vietnam ese Government officials. W ith the growing num ber of
Vietnamese asylum seekers arriving on the shores o f Asian countries the
Australian Government, mirroring the US Government, announced in
early 1982 that it would examine each asylum seeker’s claim for refugee
status on a case-by-case basis, rather than giving refugee status to all
Indochinese asylum seekers. Shortly after the arrival o f the large
freighters in southeast Asia a new term began to be bandied around—
the “economic refugee”. At this time for m any resettlement countries it
became fairly clear that a sizable proportion of Indochinese asylum
seekers, especially amongst the Vietnamese boat people, had fled their
countries for economic rather than political reasons, and thus were at
best economic, rather than political, refugees.
Also in 1982 the Australian Government took the first immigrants
from Vietnam under the Orderly Departure Programme (ODP) which was
initiated in 1979 following negotiations between the Government o f the
Socialist Republic ofVietnam and the UNHCR. Unlike in the United States,
all Vietnamese leaving Vietnam under this programme, which in Australia
is now termed the “Vietnamese Family M igration Programme” , entered
Australia as immigrants and not as refugees. The almost three year delay
between the signing of the Memorandum o f Understanding between the
UNHCR and the Vietnamese Government, and the first arrival in Australia
of emigrants from Vietnam under the ODP was due to the finalisation o f
procedural matters. However, it should be noted that between 1976 and
1982 several hundred Vietnamese nationals were able to emigrate from
Vietnam to Australia under normal migration channels, although it
should be noted also that the m ajority o f these people had been given
entry visas to Australia prior to 30 April 1975.
During the late 1970s under the Fraser Government, Australia’s
principal goals with respect to the Indochinese asylum seekers were:
firstly to improve Australia’s image internationally, especially with the
ASEAN countries: and secondly, to act to prevent adverse domestic
opinion which arose each tim e Vietnam ese boat people arrived
unannounced on Australian shores. W hen reports began to emerge in
the late 1970s that boats carrying Vietnamese refugees had been pushed
off from the shores o f some o f the ASEAN countries, the Australian
Government did not publicly condemn these actions as strongly as did
other W estern governments, and indicated that the problem w as with
the Vietnam ese Government, and that the international com m unity
should be more understanding of the difficult position of the developing
ASEAN countries. Such action on the part of the Fraser Governm ent was
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to indicate its condem nation o f the V ietnam ese Governm ent and support
o f ASEAN’s position on the boat people, which would assist in im proving
A u stralia’s relations w ith the nations o f the region. The adoption o f this
position w a s to ensure also that Vietnam ese boat people w ould be
prevented from arriving in Australia unannounced, and w ould ensure
that the F raser G overnm ent acquired both dom estic and international
benefit. T h e Fraser Governm ent took account o f both dom estic and
international factors in determ ining its Indochinese refugee policies,
while at the sam e tim e approaching the issue w ith som e sem blance o f
hum anitarianism .
The Hawke Government's Disengagement: 1983-1990
B y the m id -1980s the w orld ’s attention had drifted aw ay from the
plight o f the V ietnam ese boat people and the Cam bodian refugees along
the Thailand-C am bodia border. The w orld’s m edia had not bothered
about the situation o f the Lao and Hm ong refugees in Thailand.
A m erica’s w ar in Laos has been labelled a “secret w ar” and thus very few
people in the W est knew about the existence o f Laos or A m erica’s m ilitary
involvem ent there in the early 1960s. A t the sam e time, the principal
Indochinese refugee resettlem ent countries o f Australia, Canada, France
and th e U S A b e g a n to experience what h asb ecom e known as com passion
fatigue, their desire to resettle enthusiastically, an apparently never
ending stream o f Indochinese asylum seekers, especially Vietnam ese
boat people, w aned significantly. Th is decreased enthusiasm m ay be
m easured by a gradual decline in each cou n try’s Indochinese refugee
quota or ceiling. A u stralia w as not an exception to the gradu al
disengagem ent o f resettlin g Indochinese refugees. However, through its
then M inister for Foreign Affairs, and now Governor-General, Bill
Hayden, A u stralia strongly sought a diplom atic solution to the conflict
in Cam bodia, w hich w as perceived as an im portant first step in the
resolution o f the Indochinese refugee problem . Indeed, from the late
1970s to the m id 1980s the situation o f the Indochinese refugees had
m oved from a crisis to a problem that refused to go away.
In its desire to play a leading active role in seeking a settlem ent
to the C am bodian problem , and in an effort to obtain substantial
regional support for its initiatives, Australia accepted few er Indochinese
refugees, but the proportional decrease in the Australian intake w as not
as high as that o f the other principal resettlem ent countries. A policy o f
gradual disengagem ent w as im plem ented in order to use the Indochinese
refugee issue in discussions on the Cam bodian situation w ith the ASEAN
countries. In an effort to be in a favourable position to take the initiative
in the resolution o f the Cam bodian problem the new ly elected Labor
G overnm ent, under Prim e M inister Robert Hawke, decided in 1983,
under a recom m endation o f the D epartm ent o f Foreign Affairs, to resettle
a greater proportion o f Indochinese refugees from Thailand, w here the
m ajority o f the Indochinese refugees w ere to be found.
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A n oth er o f the Hawke G overnm ent’s principal foreign policy
objectives w as to substantially im prove relations w ith Vietnam , w hile at
the sam e tim e strengthening relations w ith the other A sian countries.
Both o f these objectives were achieved over the follow ing seven years,
though it is im portant to note that A u stralia’s initiatives tow ards both
im proving relations with Vietnam and seeking a solution to the Cam bodian
conflict, som ew hat dam aged relation s w ith the ASEAN countries,
especially during 1984-1986. A n oth er dam aging issue w as w hat has
com e to be called the A sian Im m igration D ebate, or, the Blainey Debate,
so-called after the Melbourne U niversity historian. Professor G eoffrey
Blainey, w ho initiated the debate in March 1984.
T h e very em otional, public A sian Im m igration D ebate w as
essentially about the perceived high level o f Asian im m igration to
Australia. D uring m ost o f the 1980s about 35-40 per cent o f A u stra lia ’s
annual im m igrant intake was com prised o f A sian -b o m im m igrants, a
level w hich som e Australians perceived as being too high. One o f the
international repercussions of this debate, which w as w idely reported in
the A sian m edia, w as that Australia w as again being perceived as a racist
country, and the notion o f the officially defunct W hite A u stralia Policy
was m entioned occasionally in the A sian media. The debate on the level
o f A sian im m igration has waxed and w aned since 1984, though the
dam age done to A u stralia’s im age in A sia w as perceived to be substantial
enough to w arrant action. One initiative taken was to m aintain the
intake o f Indochinese refugees at a reasonable level, while con cu rrently
not chan gin g im m igration policy in effect to decrease the overall level o f
A sian im m igration to Australia. Such action w as perceived b y the
G overnm ent as dem onstrating to A sian countries that A u stralia w as not
racist, and w as still w illing to resettle Indochinese refugees at a fairly
constant level at a time when other resettlem ent countries were reducing
their intake o f Indochinese refugees. T his action together with A u stralia’s
reaching a consensus with the ASEAN countries on the C am bodia
conflict assisted in Australia regaining its influence in the ASEAN region,
indicating as they did that its initiatives on the Cam bodian conflict were
for the benefit o f the Asian region and dem onstrating that Australia w as
not a racist country.
Partly as a result of the Asian Im m igration Debate and other
dom estic factors a non Governm ent com m ittee was convened in late
1987 to report to the Governm ent on future directions for A u stralia’s
im m igration policies. The Committee to Advise on Australia’s Im m igration
Policies, which w as chaired by D r Stephen Fitzgerald, A u stra lia ’s first
am bassador to the People’s Republic o f China and an internationally
renowned Sinologist, reported to the Governm ent in m id -1988. One o f
the reports recom m endations w as that Australia should gradually
d is e n g a g e it s e lf fro m In d o c h in e s e re fu g e e re s e ttle m e n t. T h is
recom m endation appears to have derived from a negative im age o f
Indochinese, especially Vietnam ese, refugees in Australia and a g ro w in g
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opposition to ongoing Indochinese refugee resettlem ent w ith in the
Departm ent o f Im m igration, Local Governm ent and Ethnic Affairs.
However, the Hawke Governm ent was quick to indicate that it would not
follow this recom m endation, a decision which was taken in response to
substantial pressure from the Departm ent o f Foreign A ffairs and Trade.
D uring the late 1980s Australia began working very closely with
the ASEAN countries on a solution to the Cam bodia conflict. Associated
with a resolution o f this conflict was the Indochinese asylum seekers
issue. By early 1989 Australia had essentially reached a consensus with
the ASEAN countries both on the m ethod o f resolving the Cam bodian
conflict and the problem of the Indochinese asylum seekers. During
1989-1990 Australia continued to liaise closely with the ASEAN countries
on the resolution o f the Cam bodian conflict. A t the Ju ly 1989 Geneva
conference on Indochinese asylum seekers Australia, with the ASEAN
countries, voted “for" the m andatory repatriation o f Vietnam ese asylum
seekers, opposing the Governm ents o f the United States, the Soviet
Union and Vietnam . During subsequent international m eetings on the
issue o f the Indochinese asylum seekers, Australia and the ASEAN
countries continued to oppose the United States on the issue o f
m andatory repatriation o f Vietnam ese asylum seekers.
A n im portant outcom e o f the Ju ly 1989 Geneva conference w as
that Australia com m itted itself to resettling 11,000 long-term Vietnam ese
boat people during 1989-1992. This initiative cam e from the D epartm ent
o f Foreign A ffairs and Trade, not the Departm ent o f Im m igration, Local
Governm ent and Ethnic Affairs. W hile this decision obviously pleased
the ASEAN countries, as well as Hong Kong, not all sections o f the
Vietnam ese com m unity, and som e o f those involved with resettling
Indochinese refugees, are pleased with this decision. C urrently m ost o f
those providing services to the Indochinese com m unities have severely
over-burdened w ork loads, and the prospect o f settling 11,000 long-term
refugees, the m ajority o f whom have been in cam ps for over five years and
do not have relatives in Australia, is daunting.
In late 1989 a new problem appeared on the horizon o f A u stralia’s
Indochinese refugee program me; a boat load o f Cam bodian asylum
seekers landed on Australian shores, and by m id -1990 two additional
boatloads had arrived. Australia was quick to dispatch envoys to
Indonesia in an attem pt to persuade the Indonesian Governm ent to hold
any C am bodian boat people who sought asylum in Australia. W ith an
increasing num ber o f Cam bodian and Vietnam ese boat people arriving
on Indonesian shores, m any o f w hom have been pushed o ff from
Malaysia, and a decreasing num ber o f refugees being resettled in third
countries, there is little incentive for the Indonesian Governm ent to hold
Indochinese boat people headed for Australia, as it has done in the past.
A t present, there are also strong indications that Australia will stop
accepting refugees from Laos (as o f Septem ber 1990). Australia's decision
to resettle 11,000 long-term Vietnam ese boat people during 1989-1992
m ay end up causing m ore problem s than it solves for the Governm ent.
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Since the Hawke Governm ent cam e to office in 1983 A u stralia’s
policy on the Indochinese asylum seekers has been very closely associated
with the desire to find a solution to the Cam bodian conflict and improve
relations with Asia, especially the newly industrialising ASEAN countries.
Despite grow ing dom estic opposition to resettling more Indochinese
refugees, both on the part o f the public and from with in some Governm ent
departments, Australia’s annual intake o f Indochinese refugees has
rem ained around 6-7,000 persons per annum for m ost o f the life o f the
H aw ke G o v e rn m en t. D u rin g th is tim e, in te rn a tio n a l p o litic a l
considerations have been the param ount driving force behind A u stralia’s
Indochinese refugee policy, with dom estic and hum anitarian factors
being seem ingly less important over time.
Discussion and Conclusion
The changes in Australia’s Indochinese refugee policy since early
1975 have been influenced by a variety o f international and dom estic
political considerations. On the domestic side such factors as com m unity
attitudes to the acceptance o f the Indochinese refugees, the general
economic situation and various public debates relating to im m igration
in general, and since 1984 Asian im m igration in particular, have been
of concern. Internationally, Australia’s response to the Indochinese
refugee problem has been based on developments in the three Indochinese
countries, the refugee situation in the Asian countries o f first asylum,
the attitudes o f the other principal Indochinese refugee resettlem ent
countries, especially Canada and the USA and the subsequent pressure
placed on the Australian Government by the Governm ents o f the US and
the ASEAN countries. Since the m id-1980s the perceived damage done
to Australia’s reputation in Asia as result o f the widely reported Asian
im m igration debates in the Asian m edia has also been a factor for
consideration. Thus the determination o f Australia’s Indochinese refugee
policy has had to take into account a complex, and at times contradictory,
set o f international and domestic considerations, often with the strength
of the international factors out-weighing the politically sensitive and
potentially dam aging domestic considerations. Indeed, it m ay be said
that there were times when the Australian Governm ent’s Indochinese
refugee policy was in direct confrontation with dom estic political
considerations. A t the same time, A u stralia’s policy tow ards the
Indochinese refugees, especially the Vietnam ese boat people, has been
diam etrically opposed to Australia’s refugee philosophy and other
aspects o f the governm ent’s overall im m igration policies.
Australia’s apparent reluctance to take Cambodian, Hm ong and
Lao refugees extended from a b elief that the m ajority o f these refugees
were o f rural or unskilled backgrounds, and thus would find it nearly
impossible to integrate into industrial and post-industrial Australian
society. Those refugees from Cambodia and Laos who would have been
suited for resettlem ent in Australia, that is the educated and the skilled,
were perceived as probably having a knowledge o f French rather than
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English, and thus w ould be m ore suitable for resettlem ent in Canada or
France. There was a perception also that the m ajority o f the Vietnam ese
boat people were from the urban localities in southern Vietnam , and
thus would be able to integrate readily into Australian society. It w as also
the opinion o f som e policy m akers that refugees from C am bodia and
Laos w ould be w illing to return to their hom elands once the econom ic
and political situations in these countries stabilised. Not only w as this
position all too vague, but it also exhibited a lack o f understanding o f the
com plex socio-historical situations in these two countries, especially
with respect to Laos.
The country o f origin o f the refugees to be selected was the
subject o f discussions, as well as strong disagreem ents, betw een the
D epartm ent o f Im m igration, Local Governm ent and Ethnic A ffairs and
the D epartm ent o f Foreign Affairs and Trade. The acceptance o f m any o f
the C am bodian refugees in the early to m id -1980s appears to be a victory
for the D epartm ent o f Foreign Affairs and Trade, as the D epartm ent o f
Im m igration, Local Governm ent and Ethnic Affairs perceived that the
Cam bodians, as w ell as the Lao, were largely uninlegratable due to their
poor level o f hum an capital. From an econom ic perspective these
perceptions w ere to be proven wrong, as data from the 1986 Australian
Census o f Population and Housing indicated that Lao-Australians were
the m ost econom ically successful o f the Indochinese refugee communities,
with the C am bodian-Australians only m arginally less successful than
the Vietnam ese-Australians.
The decision to select Indochinese refugees from specific first
asylum countries w as determ ined b y a com plex set o f econom ic,
geopolitical and historical factors, foreign governm ental pressure and
perceptions o f which refugees would m ost readily integrate into Australian
society. U nder international pressure in the m id-1970s, prim arily from
the UNHCR and the US Governm ent, Australia accepted the m ajority o f
its Indochinese refugees from Thailand. W ith the com m encem ent o f the
m ajor exodus o f Vietnam ese boat people in 1978 Australia started taking
a large nu m ber o f refugees from M alaysia, again m ainly due to
international pressure and A u stralia’s historical Com m onwealth and
m ilitary links with Malaysia. A fter a num ber o f Vietnam ese boats arrived
on Australian shores in 1978-79 a significant proportion o f the Indochinese
refugee intake cam e from Indonesia. In the early 1980s, as international
pressure m ounted to assist the resettlem ent o f the growing num ber o f
Cam bodian refugees, Australia again redirected part o f its attention to
Thailand, though Indonesia and M alaysia rem ained the m ain source o f
Indochinese refugees. These three countries were to continue through
the 1980s a sb ein g the m ain source o f Indochinese refugees for Australia.
From the beginning o f 1990 about 37 per cent o f the Indochinese
refugees resettled in Australia cam e from Malaysia, 30 per cent from
Thailand (o f w hich about one-third were Vietnam ese), 16 per cent from
Indonesia, six per cent from H ong Kong and four per cent from the
Philippines.
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In th e early 1980s A u stralia cam e u n d er som e criticism for on ly
taking the cream o f the refugees and rejecting the elderly and uneducated.
Indeed this practice had been goin g on since the late 1970s, and for a
short period du ring 1978-79 som e A u stralian im m igration officers
w orkin g in M alaysia deliberately split fam ilies in order to select you n g
single fem ales fo r en try to Australia. A fte r increasing criticism o f
A u stra lia ’s acceptance procedures from som e first asylum govern m en ts
and A u stra lia n com m u nity grou p s actively involved in th e resettlem en t
o f Indochin ese refugees, the G overnm en t decided that a sm all p rop ortion
o f the refugees to be resettled w ou ld be difficult to settle cases. H ow ever,
the m ajority o f these difficult to settle cases had fam ily m em b ers in
A u stralia w h o w ere able to assist w ith th eir resettlem ent.
In conclu sion, the m ain driving force behind A u s tra lia ’s policy
tow ards the Indochinese refugees over the past decade and a h a lf has
been international political considerations, especially based on the
relations b etw een the A u stralian G overnm en t and the ASEAN countries.
H owever, th e m ain factor lim iting the level o f A u stra lia ’s respon se to the
Indochinese refugee problem w as dom estic political con sideration s,
especially the poten tial dom estic political backlash if too m an y refu gees
w ere accepted. O nly in a few instances have gen u ine h u m an itarian
con sid eration s com e into play. T h is is highlighted even m ore w h en one
con siders the recent decision to accept 11,000 V ietn am ese lon g-stayers
from A sia n refugee cam ps, at a tim e w h en dom estic resettlem en t
resources can ju s t cope with those resettled in Australia, and w h en
A u stralian unem ploym ent is increasing and un em ploym en t w ith in the
V ietn a m ese-b o m com m u nity is in the ord er o f 30-35 per cent.

'The Funny Place': Australian Literature and the W a r in Vietnam.
Peter Pierce

M en w h o fought in the A u stralian and A m erican forces in the
V ietnam W a r w ere never persuaded for long o f a good reason w h y they
were there. M ost, however, soon found others w h o experienced enough
to tell them w here th ey were. In Nasho (1984),1a novel b y the A u stralian
conscript M ichael F razer (who did not see service in V ietnam ), it is
quickly explained to the protagonist. Turner, a jou rn alist w ith the
supposed A rm y Inform ation Corps, that,
It’s not called the funny place because Bob Hope does a concert
there eveiy year. It’s really a strange war. It’s a politicians' war,
not a soldiers’ war. If the Americans declared war on the
Antarctic penguins, Australia would have a battalion there.
Th e explanation o f the why, o f the causes o f A u stralian and
A m erican involvem ent in the war, is nihilistic and despairing. T h is is a
w ar that soldiers m u st fight but w h ose objectives are in no w a y under
their control. A u stralian s felt such im potence the m ore strongly, as the
last sentence o f F razer’s extract suggests, because A m erican diplom atic
and m ilitary initiatives apparently dictated and circum scribed their
freedom o f action.
For som e A u stralian novelists, several o f whom — including Joh n
Rowe, R hys Pollard, W illiam Nagle and ‘David A lexander’ (Lex McAulay)
— had seen active service, the causes o f the w ar m ay have b een the
righteously proclaim ed ones o f anti-com m unism and o f the defence o f
(South) V ietnam ese national self-determ ination. All o f them certainly
believed w ith a sardonicism w hich strayed tow ards bitterness that these
ideological aim s w ere fatally com prom ised b y the strategic dependence
o f A u stralian troops upon an inferior A m erican m ilitary com m and
structure, b y the unreliability o f the South Vietnam ese allies, b y the
difficulty o f distinguishing friend from foe in the field and b y the
increasing hostility to the w ar on the hom e front. Australian novelists o f
the V ietnam W a r have tended to be unofficial if not unwitting spokesm en
o f the view s o f servicem en. In consequence they have depicted anti-w ar
protestors unsym pathetically. For a character in Pollard’s The Cream
Machine (1972)2they are “smug bastards”. In Nagle's novel The Odd Angry
Shot (1975)3 th ey are “long-haired bastards”. Such attitudes w ere not
pecu liar to Au stralia, n or was the sense o f the abandonm ent o f troops
in V ietnam b y authorities at home. Th u s these serving m en w ould be
assisted in the characterisation o f themselves, in Jeffrey W alsh ’s analysis,4
as the latest o f a series o f lost gen erations o f soldiers.
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Abandoned, it m ight seem , b y the society and culture from w hich
they had come, and therefore to a degree estranged from the A rr'ac
m ilitary tradition that had been a long agreed piety o f A u stralian lile,5
Australian soldiers (as they spoke in m em oirs, or w ere spoken for in
fiction) m ade confused, prejudiced, partial efforts to discover w hat place
it w as that they had com e to in Vietnam . T h is “funny place", o f w hose
existence there had been scant political, let alone public aw areness
w hen m em bers o f an Australian A rm y T rain in g Team first w ent there in
1962,6 has figu red fitfully but significantly in A ustralian literature o ''e r
the last two decades. Th e most im portant o f its representations have
been, in neither chronological nor hierarchical order: first, as the site o f
a w ar w hich although initially it appeared likely to replicate the ju n gle
conflicts in w hich Australia had taken part in the Pacific during the
Second W orld W ar, from early on refused to do so. Vietnam proved to be
m orally as w ell as m ilitarily recalcitrant and am biguous— a lost cause,
for all the recent refurbishing o f the historical record both by A u stralian
politicians and by Vietnam veterans: groups w h o are in m ost other
respects m utually antagonistic.
Second, Vietnam and the Vietnam ese, how ever im perfectly
understood by com batants or com m entators, becam e the latest filter of
the m ingled fear and desire that has characterised Australian xen ophobia,
especially tow ards Asians, for a century and a half. T h is attitude has
been evident since Chinese im m igration to the New South W a les and
Victorian goldfields in the 1850s. W h ile focussed again on the Japan ese
in the 1930s and 1940s, it has been in m ost decades a gen eralised
apprehensiveness tow ards “A sian s” , especially when they could be
called com m u nists as well. The significant shift o f bearing that occurred
in som e w ritin g about the Vietnam W a r was that while the V iet Cong, the
N VA and their civilian sym pathisers join ed the pantheon o f enem ies o f
Australia w hom the culture has needed and thus identified,7som e o f the
people o f this scantly known Asian country were anxiously sought out
as potential m entor figures for Australians.
Less often than in post-Vietnam W ar literature written in Am erica,
has “V ietn a m ” becom e for the characters im agined b y A u stralian
authors (as distinct, perhaps, from elem ents o f the veteran population)
a vague, all-encom passing, exculpatory m etaphor for the subsequent
m ess m ade o f th eir civilian lives. In A ustralian literature that treats, even
tangentially, o f the Vietnam W ar, there have yet been few returned
servicem en (as Australian “veterans” were long styled before the Am erican
term b egan to be adopted in the late 1970s) am ong its protagonists. A
sociopath called Graham turns up in David W illiam son ’s play Jugglers
Three (1972);8 “T h e Yanks had th eir grass and heroin, but w e saw it
through on F osters”; M ichael Hackett, a payroll robber and m u rderer
(significantly seeking revenge against his plutocrat father) in C.J.
C a im cross’ novel The Unforgiven (1977).9 By analogy, the plight o f the
psychologically and physically dam aged veteran s was exam ined through
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the recep tion o f a G allipoli veteran w h en he com es back to a cou n try tow n
in A u stralia in the film Break o f Day (1976).
F requ en tly Vietnam w as depicted b y indirect m eans in the
A u stralian p oetry and fiction that has been w ritten since the m id -1960s.
A score o f novels, including C hristopher K och ’s Across the Sea Wall
(1 9 65 )10 and The Year o f Living Dangerously (1978);11 R ichard B eilby’s
The Bitter Lotus (1 9 7 8 );12Robert D rew e’s A Cry in the Jungle Bar (1 9 79 );13
Bruce G ran t’s Cherry Bloom (1 9 80 );14 B lanche D ’A lp u get’s Monkeys in
the Dark 11980)15 and Turtle Beach (1 9 8 1 );16 Ian M offitt’s The Retreat o f
Radiance (1 9 8 2 ),17 w ere set in A sian countries other than Vietnam .
Australian protagonists o f Sri Lanka, Singapore, the Philippines, Malaysia,
Indonesia, w ere m ore peaceful, but no less m ystifying, than that o f their
cou n terparts in the w a r fiction.
B eginn ing in the 1970s, a second w ave oflite ra tu re o f the G reat
W ar, one that particu larly focussed upon the Gallipoli lan din gs o f 1915,
appeared in Au stralia. T h e divisions on the hom efront du ring that war,
notably over the issue o f conscription for overseas service (referenda on
this issue w ere defeated narrow ly in 1916 and 1917), the m oral
am bivalence o f “the w ar to end w ar” (a conflict w hose w ar aim s, as A.J.P.
T aylor has suggested, had to be invented after the fact), the fissu res
which the w a r m ade in A u stralian society and its presum ed, and m ythic
role in p u ttin g an end to national innocence, could all be m ade to appear
as prem on ition s o f Vietnam .
T h e V ietn am W a r also figu res in A u stralian literature as a
speedily forgotten place, beneficiary o f an A u stralian propensity tow ards
historical am nesia (though Gore V id al has ironically saluted his cou n try
as “A m n esia the B eau tifu l”) . 18 Finally, “the funny p lace” is a site o f
various, though not essentially con testing Australian m yths, none o f
which is new. A ll had earlier been shaped from the experience o f other
wars in w hich A u stralian s had fought. Notable am ong them w ere the
m yth o f a hostile hom efront, the m yth o f incom petent allies (an old story
this, that apparen tly stands endless retelling in bar-room s and in books:
w itness British Butchers and Bunglers o f World War One (1 9 8 8 ),19 a
“study” o f gen eralsh ip b y the expatriate A u stralian Joh n Laffin), the
m yth o f “the legend o f Anzac uph eld”— that phrase being the plaintively,
defensively revealin g sub-title o f Lex M cAulay’s account o f The Battle o f
Long Tan (1986).20
A rm y training film s and still b lack and w hite photographs o f
A u stralian troops in Vietnam w hich w ere m ade and taken during the
1960s— adm ittedly in the early years o f A ustralian involvem ent and
therefore im bued w ith the expectation that victory would be the inevitable
result o f the jo b bein g done— concentrate on the beneficient interaction
o f the m ilitary w ith V ietnam ese civilians. The kindly dentist is a
ubiqu itou s presence. In addition these visu al im ages often offer,
con sciou sly or not, a stereotypical profile and posture o f the A u stralian
Digger. M oving through a ju n gle landscape, leading w ith th eir clea n 
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shaven, craggy ja w s , the D iggers are pictured so as nostalgically to recall
the gen eration o f their fathers w ho fought against the Japan ese. T h e
different enem y, the novel social and topographical contours o f V ietnam ,
are w ish ed aw ay as the visual im ages return us to that Second W orld W a r
whose occasion seem ed blessedly unam biguous. T hat such throw backs,
fighters from an older war, could not continue to press on straightforwardly
through the ju n g le to victory in V ietn am w as one o f the ugliest shocks
that “the fu n n y place” delivered. It ought not to have been, b u t lessons
from K orea and the M alayan E m ergen cy had not been w ell learned.
Som e authors refused to concede th at Vietnam m igh t con foun d
the gloriou s traditions o f Au stralian sold iersh ip , or saw b etrayal o f A n zac
traditions from w ithout as essential to the national m ilitary experience
in Vietnam . N otable am ong them w as Lex M cAulay, w ho did three tours
o f duty in Vietnam , and who wrote his novel When the Buffalo Fight (1980) ,21
set in 1966, a m ore sanguine tim e for A m erica and its alies in the war,
under the pseudonym ‘David A lexa n d er’. T h e book’s title com es from
what ‘A lexa n d er’ describes, in term s that E dw ard Said would savour, as
“an old A sian saying” : “when the buffalo fight, the sm all an im als are
tram pled” .
M cAulay endeavours to portray the ostensible enem y, the V iet
Cong, as w orth y opponents o f the A ustralians, although he redu ces thenideological position to cartoon: “Hoa has laid down his life fo r the
R evolution”, one cadre declares. The V ietnam ese peasantry are nam eless
and innocent victim s o f the war, but the veritable losers th at the novel
depicts are the A u stralian servicem en and th eir fam ilies at hom e. T h e
latter are preyed upon by night-slinking “creatures", that is, an ti-w ar
protestors. Serving m en suffer from the m inistrations o f opportunistic
A u stralian politicians, the m ilitary ineptitude o f the A m erican s and the
“indolent” , “som nolent", “lounging” soldiers o f the ARVN. A s he locates
enem ies o f A u stralian life and m ilitary hon ou r all around, w rites from a
position o f frustrated, raging em battlem ent. M cAulay as ‘A lexa n d er’ (the
pseudonym draw n perhaps from a general w ho m ight have b een ruthless
enough to w in the war) is true to the m elodram atic tem per o f the national
literature, especially w hen its precious, reassuring m oral and m yth ic
verities are jeopardised. Australian w ar literature in particular highlights
a need for enem ies, fo r conflict th at will guarantee enlistm ent in history,
together w ith a contradictory desire to be left in an unthreatened w orld
o f dream , or delusion.
W ritin g his battle history o f Long Tan, M cAulay even -han dedly
dedicated it to “the young m en o f both sides who fought that day".
Trenchantly, he gave as his sub-title “T h e Legend o f A n zac U pheld” .
Some o f the adm ittedly few A u stralian novelists w h o’d com e previou sly
to w rite o f the w ar in Vietnam w ere m ore uncertain o f the place that it
held in Au stralian m ilitary traditions. In The Cream Machine, P ollard ’s
narrator seem s uncertain o f w h ether his stance tow ards such tradition s
is or should be ironic:
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Looking along the row of slouch hats and rifles 1grope for the
supposed similarity between us and the traditional national
image: where are all the tall bronzed Anzacs? the once-famed
Diggers who stormed the ragged impossibility of Anzac Cove or
died jeeringly in the mud beneath Mont St Quentin? Where is the
morale and endurance o f Tobruk or the Kokoda Trail, the dash
and inevitability of Kapyong? Perhaps it lies in the unconscripted
element?
T h a t is, in this conclusion, where it always used to be: in volun teer
and regular arm ed forces. Certainly the young soldier is not contem ptuous
o f “the tall b ron zed” figures of A n zac legend. But where can they be found
in V ietn am ? W h at proper nam es will that w ar add to the A u stralian
m ilitary honour roll?
Pollard's novel fils a pattern o f story that C.D.B. Bryan, a US
veteran o f V ietn am turned novelist, described as peculiar to this war:
“T h e G en eric V ie tn a m W a r N a rra tiv e ”22 B ryan su m m a ris e s the
predictable, devastating succession o f incidents that such narratives
treat, w h eth er they are cast as novels or as m em oirs: “There is the first
p a tr o l... T h ere is the atrocity scene, to dem onstrate that M y Lai w as not
an isolated incident ... There are dope scenes ... There is R and R in
Saigon w ith Susie the bar-girl”. Bryan concludes that the generic
narrative o f the w ar “charts the gradual deterioration o f order, the
disintegration o f idealism , the breakdown o f character, the alienation
from those at hom e, and finally, the loss o f all sensibility save the will to
survive”. It’s a som ew hat unsym pathetic aesthetic com plaint m ade
earlier the sam e year by M ichiko K akutani in the New York Review o f
Books : “In novel after novel, a variation o f the following true to life
sequence occurs . . .”.23
W h ile he has traced a pattern that fits Australian as well as
A m erican Vietnam W a r narratives, Bryan is blind to his ow n intuition o f
how characters and their authors suffer entrapm ent. T h ey can find no
optim istic w ay in m oral terms, or m etaphorical way in literary term s out
o f these narratives, hence back to the relative and supposed sim plicities
o f stories o f the Second W orld W ar. Not for nothing is Joh n W ayn e—
celluloid hero o f m any theatres o f that conflict— a presiding, if sardonically
regarded presence in “Generic Vietnam W a r N arrative”.
The Cream Machine conform s to the pattern that B ryan sketches.
Com m encing w ith the narrator’s departure from Australia, it introduces
his com rades-in-arm s; has intim ations o f the dom estic life w hich he has
left behind: continues with the ritual induction o f the you n g m an to war.
He is posted to battalion, m eets its m en, hears its legends, learns the
necessary acronym s. Some A u stralian novels o f Vietnam , in com m on
with m an y from Am erica, com e with glossaries. The first patrol, the first
corpse, the first m atter o f conscience routinely follow. In The Cream
Machine, the latter involves the arrest o f an old Vietnam ese wom an.
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w hile in the testim ony o f one o f the “A u stralian V oices” w hich are
gathered in Stuart R intou l’s collection o f oral testim onies, alm ost all by
grieving and dam aged veterans. Ashes o f Vietnam ( 1987)24 it w ou ld be an
accidental atrocity. T h e narrative design o f Pollard’s novel is substantially
repeated in W illiam N agle’s The Odd Angry Shot, which op en s w ith
em barcation fo r V ietn am and proceeds speedily with the con ven tion al
sequence o f first things: Vietnam ese corpses, an A u stralian casualty, the
purchase o f “Saigon tea ” . The indispensable m om en t in such sequ ences
is the first sight o f a com bat victim , w hose bod y is the talism an that
unlocks the right to report.
But w h at is there to report? No clear-cut ideological victory to
com plem ent the m ilitary one that never happened w as available in
V ietnam as it had seem ed som etim es to be from the Second W orld W ar.
Seem ed, at least, in the accounts o f their w ar by the fathers o f V ietn am
veterans, stories that are often derisively included, particularly in fiction
b y Am ericans. In that earlier conflict, the Japan ese enem ies portrayed
in A u stralian fiction had occasioned no rem orse o f conscience. T h ey w ere
characterised as “apes with pants on ” and “little, grinning, m ustardcoloured J a p a n ese” in Norm an B artlett’s Island Victory (1955),25 w hile
for Ron Fisher, hero o f ‘D avid Forrest’s ’ The Las t Blue Sea (1959),26 “From
the dark ages they cam e” . The “nigels” , “n ogs” , “slope h ead s” rou tin ely
despised in The Odd Angry Shot indicate at least the characters’ fealty to
that A u stralian tradition o f racial contem pt and fear. M uch other
evidence is, however, contradictory and com plicating.
For m an y A u stralian poets o f the war, the true en em y w as not
V ietnam ese at all. W h en Vietnam ese people appeared th ey w ere alm ost
alw ays civilians, arrayed as the victim s o f A u stralian and A m erican
atrocities. Poets sought em pathy with them. David Campbell, forinstan ce,
m ade a stagey entrance into the heart and m ind of a peasant w hose
buffalo has been shot b y Am ericans. Th e poem ’s focus at once shifted to
blam e the perpetrators, whose brutal, childish voices are overheard.
Such a polem ical positioning o f h im self against the w ar m ust have been
m ore difficult for C am pbell, who had served w ith distinction in the Royal
A u stralian A ir Force during the Second W orld W ar, than fo r the m an y
w ell-intentioned, incapable protest poets w hose w ork (along w ith that of
established, skilled, and usually older poets) w as gath ered in such
places as the anthology We Took Their Orders and Are Dead (1971),27
edited by Sh irley Cass and M ichael W ilding. In the history o f A u stralian
poetry o f and since the Vietnam period, C am pbell’s case w as uncom m on,
for few other careers were as notably affected in Australia, especially by
com parison w ith the changes w rou ght in the w ork o f A m erican poets
such as D enise Levertov and R obert Bly.
A u stralian poetry of the V ietn am W ar, then, is m arked by
strident an ti-Am ericanism and its corollary: a lam ent fo r A u stralian
dependence. W h ile poets often rushed to em pathise with the V ietnam ese,
it was the people, rath er than individuals, w h o w ere the targets o f th eir
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em brace. T h e desired relationship in som e A u stralian novels w as
revealin gly different. In The Wine o f God’s Anger (1968),28 a porten tou sly
titled b ook b y th e com petent jo u rn ey m a n K enneth Cook, the protagon ist
w ho has volu n teered to save th e w orld from com m u nism b elieves at first
that his en em y is this alien ideology. In the clim actic b attle against the
Viet C ong in the novel, he kills “the gen tle little chance acquaintan ce
w h o’d looked after m e w h en I w as dru n k ... I had killed a m an I k n ew ” .
The th eoretical en em y is b elatedly recognised as the veritab le friend.
Even fo r th is con fu sed young m an, w ho goes A W O L in B an gk ok in the
afterm ath o f the battle, another ideology— that o f A m erican im perialism
is w ell on its w a y to being perceived as the tru e enem y o f Au stralia.
M ore nu m erou s than the A u stralian novels which treat directly
o f the w a r in Vietnam , o f which still no m ore th an a dozen have been
published, are those set in other A sia n cou n tries and w ritten over the
past qu arter o f a cen tu iy. In these books, Vietnam receives at best a
passing m ention. Its im plicit and— for w ant o f a less am bigu ou s w ord—
m oral presence is signalled by the desire o f num bers o f the protagon ists
o f these n ovels to seek out A sian m en tors as teachers, perh aps as
friends, although not often as lovers. Earnest endeavou rs b y A u stralian
govern m en ts since the 1960s to prom ote trade w ith A sian cou n tries and
by entrepreneurs to create what Paul Fussell has called tourist “bu bbles”29
there m ay have con tributed to this shift o f interest beyond the national
borders. M ore p rofou n d ly affecting such a choice o f subject and setting
is in part the assuagem ent o f guilt over the A ustralian m ilitary penetration
o f and involvem ent in Vietnam . Now, instead ofth at violent, m etaphorically
sexual assau lt u pon th at country, A u stralian novelists have often
brought th eir ch aracters hum bly, alm ost sacrificially to places all over
Asia in search o f chasten ing enlightenm ent. T h is literature has, to an
extent, b een put to the covert w ork o f discharging a burden o f gu ilt that
the w riters have assum ed con cern in g A u stra lia ’s role in the V ietn am
War. It m ay also com e to be seen as an oth er o f the con tem porary artistic
expression s o f a cu ltu ral death w ish in Australia.
V ietn a m provided no heroes for A u stralian legend-m ills though
this is not su rprising in a country w h ose m artial trium phs have alm ost
alw ays b een represen ted in corporate term s. F or a nu m ber o f A u stralian
novelists and historians, the tradition s o f A n zac were treach erou sly
tarnished on the hom efront during Vietnam , and have only retrospectively
and w ish fu lly b een refurbished. In com pensation, perhaps, assidu ou s
w ork at legen d-m ak in g from other, older sources w ent on in A u stralian
fiction, dram a, history and film du ring the 1970s. Th e h istorical fortu n es
o f eccen trics and ou tcasts were rem em bered and revised. F igu res such
as the b u sh ran ger M artin Cash and the politician King O ’M alley featured
in polem ical m u sicals b y M ichael B od d y and Bob Ellis. T h e bush
balladist cu m B oer W a r soldier ‘B reak er’ M orant, executed b y the British
fo r sh ootin g B oer prisoners, w as th e protagon ist o f Kenneth R oss’s play
o f 1978 and later o f a film . H istorian M anning C lark w en t In Search o f
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Henry Lawson (1978).30 These characters had b een celebrated and th en
punished for b eing ju s t such social renegades as the servin g m en in
V ietn am had no opportu n ity to be and— on th eir return h om e— few chose
to becom e.
F rom the sam e period, poetry and fiction and the u n flaggin g
industry o f m ilitary history in Australia refought the Great W ar. Surrogate
fo r V ietnam , it w as represented as a cru cial m oral and h istorical
w atershed in the nation al life. N ovels b y R oger M cDonald, 1915 (1979),31
D avid M alouf, Fly Away Peter (1982)32 and G eoff Page, Benton’s
Conviction ( 1985)33 as well as p o e tiy b y Les A. M urray (“T h e C on scrip t” ,
“V isitin g A n zac in the Y ea r o f M etrication”) and Chris W a llace-C ra b b e
(“The Sh apes o f G allipoli”) insist with a troubling unanim ity on a division
b etw een the innocent, rurally-oriented (at least in term s o f its proclaim ed
values), ante-bellum Australia o f 1914 and the post-w ar society w h ose
idealism had b een m isplaced, although its h istory had p rop erly begun.
The G reat W a r w as a dom estically divisive conflict, as V ietn a m was.
C om pu lsory m ilitary service overseas w as perh ap s as im portant a factor
in opposition to the latter war as w ere objections to A m erican hegem ony.
V ietn am w as a foreign w ar, as all A u stra lia ’s w ars have been: this is a
cou n try that has know n no border disputes, no hereditary enem ies, no
invasion an d w h ich has never initiated a conflict. A u stralian s at first
rushed w illin gly to volun teer for the G reat W a r and m ost su pported it
striden tly for a time. T h e strong initial public endorsem ent o f the
cou n try’s involvem ent in Vietnam had begu n to wane b y the end o f the
1960s. T h e parallels that can be draw n and im agined b etw een the two
conflicts suggest how w riters who m ade a nostalgic return to the G reat
W a r im plicitly argued that the innocence lost then, the depen den ce on
greater pow ers w illin gly em braced, prepared at the rem ove o f two
gen eration s fo r Vietnam .
A u stralian forces were involved in V ie tn a m fro m 1962 u ntil 1972,
that is for con sid erab ly lon ger than in any other w ar w h ere A u stra lia n s
fou gh t. Y e t th a t m ilita ry en g a gem en t w a s sca n tly re g is te re d in
con tem porary im aginative literature besid es the ephem eral protest
poetry and the handful o f novels already discussed. Nor has there b een
m uch analytical com m entary on w h y th is w as so.34 O f those au thors
w hose first b oo k w as a Vietnam book, w h eth er they served there o r not,
few have m anaged to develop a w riting career. Nagle shifted to collaborating
in film scripts, notably o f the Vietnam m ovie Fire Base Gloria (1989). O ut
o f the arm y because o f the con troversy cau sed b y his V ietn a m novel
Count Your Dead (1968),35 Joh n Row e has w ritten several th rillers o f
im pending apocalypse. It’s w ar b etw een India and China in The Warlords
( 1978)36 and good b ye to the A sw an D am in The Jewish Solution (1 9 79 ).37
O f Frazer, Pollard, Carroll, little m ore has b een heard. ‘A lex a n d er’
becam e M cA u lay again to jo in the m ost sizeable ban d o f A u stra lia n prose
w riters o f the war: m em oirists, authors o f battalion h istories and
accounts o f p articu lar battles. T h ese w riters choose w h at m a y seem to
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them to be an undisputed terrain, one w hich is authorised by their
personal experiences.
If V ietn am w as at variou s tim es a place w h ere A u stralian s
thought they never w ere or never had been (in the years from 1962 until
regular forces other than the T rain in g T eam w ere com m itted; then for
m uch o f the decade after the A u stralian w ithdrawal in 1972), it has
recently been given polem ical and m ythical co-ordinates. V ietn am has
becom e the site o f and the vehicle for a betrayal story that can be told in
several ways. Early rem arked and perhaps longest resented is the
supposed lack o f support or sym pathy back in Australia fo r the lots o f
individual soldiers, as distinct from the abstract causes in w h ose nam e
the w ar w as prosecuted. Vietnam has becom e the site o f and th e vehicle
for a betrayal story that can be told in several ways. Back in Sydney,
H arry and the narrator o f N agle’s The Odd Angry Shot reflect upon the
indifference w ith w hich they’ve been received:
Pitch your condescending change to the organ grinder's monkey
dressed in his green. Well, green once. (The girl beside me at the
bar is making gesturesas if to advertise the fact that I stink.) And
I will lick up the droplets of your pitying safely and clutch them
to my inept self, and sniff the dogs-arse of your offerings, and let
the wash of your pious love hang about my ears as the lace
curtain of my military halo.
“So here w e are”, they echo one another. Th e last spoken w ords o f the
novel are echoed as well: “Fuckin’ terrific” . Earlier, one o f their com patriots.
Bung, has w ondered “if w e’ll stink w h en w e get out o fth is place” . His fear
is that a m an could still smell o f V ietn am “for years to com e, even w h en
he’s out o f this arsehole country” . The com m ent loses som e o f its
ingenuousness, and takes on a m acabre aspect given the subsequent
reckoning o f physical consequences o f exposure to A gen t O range and
other trau m as o f service in Vietnam .
“E m barrassed” is the w ord that a group o f Vietnam veteran s from
Frazer’s novel Nasho , gathered at an A n zac D ay m arch, find for their
feelings once b ack in Australia. Initial im pressions had often been o f
outrage. “Shitw itted protestors”, placard-carrying “m oth er-fu ckers” (an
A m erican epithet im ported into A u stralia during the V ietn am W ar)
interrupted the w elcom e for T. Spriggs, as he recollected in Desperate
Praise (1982),38 edited b y John Coe. In particular he rem em bered an
A u stralian w om an as the enem y: “this poxy excuse for a fem ale,
s c r e e c h in g an d c a r r y in g a p la c a r d s a y in g C H IL D K IL L E R S ” .
“H om ecom ing” is the title and subject o f a poem that tries to m ake
som bre peace out o f this process. Bruce D aw e’s threnody tells w ith grave
tenderness o f the return o f the bodies o f slain m en to th eir Au stralian
hom es, “to cities in w h ose wide w eb o f suburbs” in which “the spider web
grief sw ings in his b itter geom etry.” D awe lam ents, “th ey’re brin gin g
them hom e, now, too late, too early.”39
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T h e betrayal o f fighting m en b y venal, self-serving p olitician s is
a venerable th em e o f w ar literature, as old as H orace, if b ru tally
reinforced in this centu ry through th e experien ces o f m an y wars. T h e
incom petence o f gen erals on one’s own side has been a com m on place
since the b attles o f the W estern Front in the G reat W ar, w h en Siegfried
Sassoon’s “T h e G eneral” did for both H arry and J ack “w ith his p lan o f
attack” . V ietn am confirm ed these predictable betrayals, b u t as never
before A u stralian w riters turned the blam e fo r the d efeat in process
(which th ey saw as A m erica’s defeat anyway, rather than th eir own)
tow ards the allies o f the A u stralian arm ed forces. T h e even ts o f the
V ietnam W a r becam e a m eans o f bitter protest against a ren ew al o f
A u stralian dependency upon a great power, w h ich since the begin n in g
o f the w a r in the Pacific in 1941, had been the U S A rather th an Britain.
Supposed reportage in A ustralian fiction o f Vietnam : accoun ts o f “the
b loody big-tim e, interfering, bu sy-body b loody Y an k s” as one A u stralian
castigates th em in R ow e’s Count Your Dead, o f their carelessn ess on
patrol, th eir prodigality with soldiers’ lives, are polem ically driven. T h ey
are a m ordant, som etim es near hysterical variation o f the com p lain t o f
the slighted colleague, who is really a dependant. The South V ietn am ese
allies fare even worse, being despised (as typ ically they are in A m erican
literature o fth e Vietnam W ar as well) for treachery, cowardice, corruption.
Old A sia n stereotypes w ere confirm ed for A u stralian s,40 at least from the
w itn ess o f th eir prose w ritings o f the war. Sadly, still another foreign w ar
becam e a b u ttress for A u stralian parochial prejudices, as w ell as an
occasion for the reassertion o f the m artial spirit that w as presum ed to
enshrine the best o f national traditions. T h e “funny p lace” w hich
V ietn am b ecam e in the slang o f A u stralian serving m en could be
accom m odated to allow the parade o f abiding national an xieties and
insecurities. T h e literature has not y et b een w ritten in A u stra lia that
com prehends this failure o f courage and o f introspection. 1
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Dismembering the Anzac legend: Australian Popular Culture and
the Vietnam W a r
J e ff D o yle

T h e lon gevity and continuity o f a particu lar strand o f its pop u lar
m yth ology m ark a cu ltu re’s deepest concerns, reflecting the repeated
and con tin u in g attem pts to form u late th at cu ltu re’s respon ses to, and
its interpretation s and evaluations of. particu lar social and political
crises. D evelopm en t o f new narratives, or substantial m od ification s to
existing m yths, signal areas o f active ideological con cern w h ere crises or
ruptures w ith in the cultural stru ctu res and their va lu a tion m ay be
occurring. T h e representation o f A u stralian involvem ent in V ietn am ,
and its often u neasy conflation w ith aspects o f the A n zac legend and its
surroundin g m yths, provide ju s t such location s o f rupture in A u stralian
culture.
F or both A u stralia and the US, the V ietn am w a r has ch allen ged
the dom inating p op u lar im agery o f th eir figh ting m en. C onsiderable
gestu res tow ards recuperation, revalu ation and reh abilitation o f the
m ilitary culture in the United States have been m ade, especially
throughout the 1980s. In the 1990s it seem s likely that in the light o f the
build up to, prosecu tion and, subsequent com pletion o f the G u lf W ar,
som e w ill determ ine that these processes o f cultural re-in vestm en t in
the A m erican m ilitary ethos have once again achieved for m ilitary
standards the “highs" associated w ith the icons o f pre-V ietn am soldiery.
The sam e re-in vestm ent o f the m ilitary ethos w ith in the culture, or to put
it another w ay w ith a sim ilar effect, o f the cu ltu re’s re-in vestm ent in the
m ilitary ethos, has not been true o f A u stralia until the late 1980s and
early 1990s. Precisely how the G u lfW a r m an ifests its im agery w ith in the,
albeit m ore constrained, perceived recuperation o f A u stralia’s m ilitarism
is as y et m ore difficult to determ ine than in the US exam ple. In the
A m erican case, V ietn am has loom ed large, as the negative exam ple, the
pattern w h ich the G u lfW a rw a s not to sim ulate. This appeal to Vietnam ,
despite the initial stated determ ination to exclude it from an y reference,
has becom e alm ost as num erous a correlative appendage to the G u lf
presentation as that other iconographic m arker— the appeal to Saddam
H u ssein’s H itlerian likeness— an appeal harking back to m em ory o f an
enem y b y his v ery evil nature, and one inviting a m ore straigh tforw ard
ju stifica tio n o f the noble cause. R eferen ces to V ietn am m ay prove fo r the
A u stralian case a m ore divisive aide m em oir. E vidence o f ch an gin g
attitudes w ith in A u stralia to the m ilitary ethos before th e G u lf W a r
b egan im plies a perceived recuperation in A u stra lia ’s m ilitary ethos, a
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rec u p e ra tio n in w h ich A u s tra lia ’s V ie tn a m in vo lvem en t w a s d ra w n fro m
its m a rg in a l sta tu s in to th e m ain stream . S ign ifican t ges tu re s to w a rd s a
restru ctu rin g if n o t qu ite a reh a b ilita tin g o f th e A n za c m y th o lo g y rea ch ed
som e k in d o f p e a k in th e celeb ra tio n s su rro u n d in g the 75th a n n iversa ry
o f A n za c D a y in 1990 an d in the fo llo w in g an n iversa ries o f th e fa ll o f
S a igon an d th e 1970 A u s tra lia n M o ra to riu m m arch es, w h ich w ere
celeb ra ted in th e fo llo w in g tw o w eek s. A ll w ere m a rk ed b y a sw a th e o f
print, ra d io an d televisio n pro gram m es d evo ted to those even ts an d th eir
rea ssessm en t. O n severa l occasion s th e A n za c m yth w a s res tru c tu re d to
in co rp o ra te th e V ie tn a m m aterial.
M oreover, as th is p op u la r m ed ia rew ritin g o f b oth G a llip o li and
V ie tn a m at on ce crea ted and en h an ced th e stro n g ly evid en t sen se o f th e
n ew ly a ll-e m b ra c in g A n za c m yth , it also served to c o n stru c t w ith in
p op u la r c u ltu re a n o th er loca tion fo r a n ew n ation alism . T h e L a b o r
G o vern m en t orch estra ted a h igh ly m ed ia -va u n ted retu rn to G a llip o li o f
fifty-eigh t orig in a l A n za cs. Th e sp eech given th ere by th e P rim e M in ister,
R.J. H aw k e, exh orted A u s tra lia n s to rem e m b e r th eir e a rlier w a rs an d th e
sa crifices m a d e on th e ir beh alf, and m o reo v er u rged A u s tra lia n s to fo llo w
th e A n za c s o ld ie rs ’ m o d e l o f sacrifice, cou ra g e an d m atesh ip . T h e sp eech
refo cu ssed th ese A n z a c co m m o n p la ces as the m ea n s o f c a rry in g th e
n a tion th ro u gh to th e n ext cen tu ry. In d eed H aw k e u rged th e n a tio n to
face th e n e w c u rre n t en em y— A u s tra lia ’s v ersio n o f the W e s t’s c o n tin u in g
econ om ic a d v e rs ity — w ith a sp irit em u la tin g th at o f th e origin a l A n zacs.
M ore, he u rged th is econ om ic w a rrio r sp irit as a m ea n s o f refo u n d in g th e
n ation as it n ea red its second fed era ted century. T h e logic w h ich
a p p eared to b e o p e ra tin g in P rim e M in ister H a w k e’s sp eech is w ell
know n: “N a tion a l c h a ra c te r” and h en ce the n a tion ’s cu ltu ra l in teg rity
w as b e q u e a th e d to th e fu tu re n ot so m u ch b y th e fou n d in g o f A u s tra lia
as a fe d e ra tio n o f 6 S ta tes in 1901, b u t th rou gh , in m ilita ry p arlan ce, th e
“b lo o d in g ” o f th e n a tio n at G allip oli in 1915. In ap p ealin g to th e in fu sion
o f a n e w ly in v ig o ra te d A n za c sp irit H a w k e ’s sp eech seem ed to argu e th at
th is w o u ld en su re th e n a tio n ’s econ om ic in teg rity in th e next cen tu ry. In
the w eeks follow in g A n zac celebrations, the m edia conflated the sentim ents
o f that 7 5 th A n za c D ay w ith a c e leb ra to ry rea ssessm en t o f th e Au stralian
in vo lvem en t in V ietn a m , and rew ro te th at in volvem en t in to a reva lu ed
an d “re m e m b e re d ” n a tion a list m yth , p ra isin g th e sold iers’ cou ra ge, thensacrifices, th e ir m atesh ip . S im p le ack n o w led gm en t o f th e effects o f
V ietn a m u p on th e sold iery, let alo n e in tegra tion o f th e ir w a r in to th e
m yth, h ad n ot a lw a ys b e e n so straigh tforw ard .
A t th e co st o f sim p lification , th e A u s tra lia n p a tte rn o f p o p u la r
m em o ry o f V ie tn a m follow ed in th e m a in th e A m e ric a n p attern —
although n atu rally th e culture-specific m yth s dem onstrate som e variation.
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Indian Country
O f the m any bizarre euphem ism s which the w ar produced, the
US high com m and’s “Indian country” cam e to refer both to the enem y
territory in Vietnam and to the idyllic rem em bered time o f the A m erican
frontiersm an. W ritin g on Scorsese’s Taxi Driver (1976) Robert B. Ray
develops an argum ent which can be applied m ore widely to the US film
industry’s response to Vietnam. He points to the relevance o f the basic
Am erican frontier m yth of “regeneration through violen ce” and the
pervasive tribal im agery of the film, and so links it back im plicitly
through a string o f Vietnam w estern s.1 The driving narrative behind
“regeneration through violence” lies in the “captivity narrative” which
depicted the Puritan forefathers engaging in swift and violent action to
retrieve the w om an captured by the Indians. Rescue had to be swift to
ensure that the weaker-virtued wom an did not succum b to the libidinal
tem ptations for which Indian w ays stood. These narratives allegorized
the sinful falls and saving restitutions located w ithin the deep-set m ental
landscape o f Puritan religious turmoil. “Indian country” represented and
was depicted less as a forest or ju n gle and m ore as an infernal reflection
of the Puritan m ind in religious foment.
It is hardly surprising that as Am erican representations o f
Vietnam dem onstrated the am elioration o f the US experience o f the war,
em phasis shifted from the fighting m an as the site of disruption to the
failure o f the nation and specifically its Governm ent to em body and
protract its otherwise ju s t political w ill.2 Indeed in some Vietnam film s
individual soldiers win not only each engagem ent with the Vietnam ese
but, m ore significantly, victory over the forces o f m oral degeneracy
within their own system .3 Vietnam becom es a m ere site for the w orking
out o f the U SA’s own problems, m oral and political, and in effect Vietnam
as a real geographical place disappears as a reality for further A m erican
consideration. T o this day the United States obfuscates any need for
reparation to Vietnam on the grounds o f the non-ratification o f N ixon’s
Paris peace negotiations, coupled with m oral indignation arising from
the touchy issue o f MLAs. And while this latter is a popular source for
Vietnam films, few if any of the Am erican popular im ages present or
accept liability for any long-term effects o f the w ar on Vietnam . For
Am ericans the Vietnam war has found an internal resolution, which has
facilitated a strong redefinition o f the nation’s own identity, largely at the
cost o f erasing the form er enemy.
Diggers in Vietnam
A ustralian popular culture’s representations o f Vietnam have
displayed a considerable appropriation o f the Am erican visu al m ed ia’s
presentation o f the war, consciously or otherwise. In certain areas, such
as A u stralia’s W elcom e Home m arch in October 1987, this appropriation
has extended to the returned servicem en them selves, for w hom there
seem s to be an uneasy psychological conflation o f fragm ents o f the Anzac
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tradition, often brought together with elem ents derived from the US
m ilitary and m edia im agery.4 Here and elsewhere the pattern o f
conflating w ars was repeated as often as the Anzac story was retold. And
in that retelling there was an im age developing—the im age o f the
revivified original Anzac conflated with the picture o f a neo-patriotic and
econom ically m otivated digger. In the weeks surrounding the 75th
Anzac celebrations there were m any other confirm ations that Australian
society had reassessed the popular iconography of the m ilitary in
general, and in this process had begun to restructure its responses to the
Vietnam W a r in particular. But unlike the acceptable face o f Vietnam
now propagated by the Am erican cultural industries, with Hollywood at
the forefront, the Australian responses evident in those celebratory
weeks in April and M ay 1990 did not find a resolution. Rather the various
debates which ensued are suggestive o f a continuing and politically
active irresolute stance within Australian culture, seemingly to dismember
Anzac.
Earlier patterns o f recalling Vietnam were sim ilartoth e Am erican
evolution towards closure, but without the recuperation. Tracing that
evolution m ay explain why the popular im age of A n zac rem ains
incom pletely resolved.
A s early as 1967-68 the Com m onwealth Film Unit m ade a
num ber o f training films to aid in fam iliarising the troops with their
duties and roles in Vietnam. Th eir im agery blends the traditional Anzac
strands o f the defence o f a weak and defenceless ally and the necessary
stand against the im m oral enemy, with a resolute fighting spirit and
intense com radeship. Australian Task Force Vietnam, and Diggers in
Vietnam were m ade for the Directorate o f Public Relations, in 1966 1967, w hile a third. Action In Vietnam, was m ade by the Com m onwealth
Film Unit in 1966. John Abbot m ade a fourth. The Third Generation, for
Project ‘66’ and the National Television Network. In narrative structure
and style all are extrem ely similar; in each troops are shown engaged in
the various tasks o f Vietnam, the least time consum ing apparently
actual patrols.5 In contrast to the surreal nowhere/everywhere o f the
Am erican frontier vision o f Vietnam Australians, at least as far as these
films are concerned, are consistently interested in the strict defining o f
the m aterial conditions, locations, intentions o f their war. Initially this
searching for a definite locus o f activities finds expression in im ages from
the A n zac past. The ju n gle patrol scenes are nostalgic for the W orld W ar
II New Guinea cam paigns, as m uch as they are professionally located in
the counter-insurgency techniques learned during Confrontation and
Malaya. In the boldest terms o f bodily icons, the soldiers upon w hom the
cam era focusses are m ore often than not physically suggestive o f the
Anzac icon— the long angular-faced, tall and lean-bodied, sun-bronzed
reticent, professing a preference for action; his hum our is sardonic and
often self-deprecating, his stare deliberate.
A t the sam e tim e as they fix an Anzac icon, these film s insinuate,
in spite o f them selves, the futility o f the m ilitary activities being
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undertaken. In the contacts, the searches, the interrogations, and the
operations to search and destroy, the films demonstrate time and again
that the NLF was rarely to be found, let alone engaged, and yet seemed
to be everywhere. Tim e and again the voice-over o f each film lam ents ihat
“Charlie”ju st sim ply w asn’t there, despite all the intelligence, despite the
discovery o f his food, his ammunition, his capture in large numbers and
clearly in some encounters his overwhelm ing casualties by com parison
with the allies. A s the Australians return to base, these films observe that
control returns to the invisible but ubiquitous enemy. This scenario is
all too well known, but these films presented that dilemma in 1967 and
1968 and their audiences either evaded or could not read the message.
The "tossed-up fucked-up never-come down land”
Australian popular cinema and television charted a course
similar to but of a miniscule scale in com parison with Hollywood. Major
Australian representations o f Vietnam are relatively few in number.
Where the US industries’ original evasion o f direct com m ent and
confrontation with Vietnam found expression in the appropriation o f
other genres, notably in the western, the smaller but burgeoning
Australian film industry, and its television counterparts, emphasised
Australian society at the turn o f the century, that is upon an Australian
equivalent o f the western and upon the originating myth o f Anzac itself.
Films such as Breaker Morant (1980), Gallipoli (1981), The Man From
Snowy River (1981), and mini-series such as A Town Like Alice, (1981),
1915 (1983), Against the Wind [1978], and ANZACS (1985) explored the
territory o f the Anzac legend or its components, such as the alleged bush
or outback (frontier) origin of the Australian national character. Embedded
in the structure o f m any Hollywood westerns, the captivity narrative
proved a seed bed for the development o f Vietnam ’s restorative narratives
on the contrary in Australia the reassessment o f Anzac in the 1970s and
1980s offered no such pattern o f redemption through enforced violence.
The home grown product o f Australian cinema became increasingly
radicalised against the positive representations o f military action.
Australia has so far produced three large-scale popular movie
“texts” on Vietnam. The earliest. The Odd Angry Shot (1979), adapted
from W illiam Nagle’s novel of the same name, belongs to the tradition of
Remarque’s All Quiet on the Western Front and Mailer’s The Naked and
the Dead, focussing relentlessly on the ever decreasing squad or platoon,
to the exclusion o f the enemy, and typical o f the latter novel and film
drawing disturbing parallels between military power and sexual adequacy.
Tom Jeffrey’s The Odd Angry Shot is focussed relentlessly on the squad,
a closeness o f focus which it shares with m ost Am erican films. The
difference lies in the way Jeffrey’s film, following Nagle’s novel, introduces
overt political comment— in a m anner not found in m ost Hollywood
“frontline” films. At the risk o f over-simplification, Jeffrey’s introduces
political content directed neither at a simplistic denunciation o f
communist aggression, as in the most politically naive (or at best black-
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vs-white) level o f Joh n W ayn e’s T h e Green Berets or som e o f the M IA
genre, nor is his political attack directed at the supposedly im m oral
governm ent agents or agencies which betray the com bat soldier in a
num ber o f exam ples o f the Rambo II genre. Instead Jeffrey’s film gives to
the senior m em ber o f the squad, Harry, a series of statem ents. These
define the political locus o f the fighting m an as the sticky fingered
politicians’ playthings, as counters in the politicians’ next election
campaign. T his com m ent is o f a different order to the Hollywood
denunciation o f venal politicians or the CIA. In the US exam ples, political
com m ent rarely strays into posing m ore than suggestions about the
distributions o f soldiers into ranks by class evident within the salaries,
risk levels and social reim bursem ent o f the officers and other ranks.
Certainly the inequitable distribution o f race and educational
levels w ithin the US forces are im plicit in a num ber o f Hollywood film s
but these issues are rarely if ever the focus o f the film.6 W h en internal
rifts occur within the Hollywood films they present opposed and com peting
versions o f the A m erican dream— either an extrem e version o f the m iddle
class pursuit o f happiness and leisure, the fruits o f im perialism paid for
by the blood o f colonised nations— or the barbaric distortion o f
individualism , in which extreme m ilitarism stands not for reticent
justice but as the all too willing executive arm o f corporate greed. The
happy resolution is a restoration o f a m iddle class m oderation in which
the individual w ill stand for both his own and his nation’s sovereignty.
(The use o f the m asculine pronoun is purposive here). Such a political
stance is, this article contends, relatively sim ple-m inded. T h is is not so
in The Odd Angry Shot, where the class system and its correlative
exploitation o f the low er orders is exposed not ju s t as the sym ptom o f the
Vietnam W a r’s wrongs, but alm ost as if it were the root cause o f the war.
Jeffrey’s and N agle’s attack is not sim ply directed at the failures o f
political will, neither the USA’s nor A u stralia’s; it falls m ore strongly
upon the w hole political and social structure o f Australia— a nation in
which the egalitarian appeal o fA n z a c to the “fair g o ” holds sway. H arry’s
speeches expose the fact that the “fair g o ” is a m yth observed m ore in the
breach. W h en another younger soldier. Bung, poses this question: “W h y
are we here then?" Harry replies:
You’re a soldier, the same as every other silly prick in this tossedup fucked-up never-come down land, and that’s why you’re here,
because there’s no one else and everyone’s gotta be somewhere
and you're here, so get used to it.
If “Indian cou n try” is the fam iliar though threatening environm ent o f the
US m ythology o f warfare, its resurgence in Vietnam “texts” m arked a
shift in exp erien cin g the w ar— a m ove aw ay from the su rrea lly
dehistoricised landscape that had characterised the early Vietnam
“texts” , such as Dispatches and Apocalypse Now, to a site o f m ythic re
em powerm ent, no less dehistoricised, no less decentred from the physical
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site o f combat, but recognisably Am erican, and rational. The Odd Angry
Shot is significant in marking the early phase o f the Australian
interpretation o f the w ar as different to Am erica’s. Harry's reasons for
Australian being in Vietnam pose the Australian version o f the surreal
no place, the “funny place"7— "the tossed-up fucked-up never-come down
land"—which was Australia’s Vietnam. The war is being fought by the
lower classes: “not too m any silvertails here”.
The sexuality o f the Australians in T h e Odd Angry Shot is
universally doomed as being more or less failures with wom en despite
their own sense o f prowess. Harry found that his wife ju s t did not want
to be with him, preferring the company, the inference is sexual, o f other
men. He is bewildered by the female response to him. T h e only norm al
relationship depicted in the film, between Bung and his girlfriend, ends
when she and his m other are killed. Bill’s girl writes only one letter— the
proverbial Dear John— which sets a context for his R&R. Before
conscription he urgently initiates sex with his girl lying down with her
in the back garden— on R&R he refuses to lie down with the Saigon bar
girl: his refusal manifests a damaged sexuality, a failure o f trust.
Throughout the film and the novel the soldiers’ language is obsessively
sexual, but it is all telling, all m asculine jok in g about sex. There is no
evidence that any o f them have had successful sexual relations over a
long time. Their most effective sexual expression is the construction and
presentation o f a “wanking” or m asturbating machine for the padre. The
obsessions and limitations are stereotypically patriarchal. In a m acabre
reversal which proves the rule o f sexual dysfunction, the hideously
wounded Scott is visited by the rest o f the squad. The scene parallels that
in All Quiet on the Western Front’ when the platoon visits the wounded
Kamerik who has lost a leg. Scott writes a note to his visitors, a one word
question: “Balls?” A s senior man again it falls to Harry to explore the
circum stances and he lifts Scott’s bedclothes to inspect his body.
Happily he reports that Scott has his due testicular quota. Here Nagle's
novel is more specific about the loss o f m asculinity inherent it seem s in
the wounds o f Vietnam. The film omits the novel’s com m entary about
soldiers wounded in the genitals, and the unforgiving social consequences
they will suffer when they have returned to the homeland. It m ay be that
the technical nature o f Vietnam wounds— a large number o f Australian
wounds were related directly to mine injury— is reflected in these
fictional observations; there is as well memorial evidence to suggest that
at least for Australians the most recalled wounds are those to soldierly
masculinity. Stuart Rintoul’s Ashes o f Vietnam collects a large body of
soldiers’ reports, and comments on the war. Am ong the num erous
clusters o f images which can be seen to develop from the diversity of
memories, injuries to genitals is one o f the m ost dominant.0
In the late 1980s Australian culture had begun the processes of
rewriting Vietnam as a more positive account o f the experience o f war,
and even as a means o f reconciliation of Australia within the southeast
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A sian sphere. T w o television m in i-series appeared in 1987, Sim psonLeM esu rier’s Sword o f Honour and K enn edy-M iller’s Vietnam. Both
presented a set o f “represen tative” A ustralians, and both m ap a route
o f redem ptive loss and reintegration via the varied experien ces o f the
V ietnam war.
In Vietnam , the m icrocosm o f A u stralian society is the G oddard
fam ily, th eir con cern s reflecting precisely the pattern of divisive reactions
to A u stralia’s place w ith in the larger contexts o f southeast A sia n and
A m erican politics and culture. In the figures o f th e fam ily the historically
divided sectors o f A u stralian society are draw n alm ost allegorically. The
father, D ou glas, is a sen ior public servant for the Liberal G overnm ent.
Initially in favou r o f the war, his developm ent to a position o f political
opposition sch em atises the developm ent o f political aw arenesss in
Australian society throughout the war. The m other, Evelyn’s, developm ent
from house bound and suppressed wife to liberated and m ature fem ininity
is suggestive o f th e pattern o f social and political em pow erm ent w hich
som e strands o f the 1970s w om en ’s m ovem ent m ay have located in
opposition to the V ietn am war. M egan, the daughter, “drops out o f
school, jo in s m oratoriu m m arches, experim ents w ith sex and ‘life-styles’
and acts as the protector for h er som etim e boyfriend Serge— a draft
dodger”; and lastly the son Phil, w h o is conscripted and is sent to
V ietnam w h ere he com es to believe in the necessity o f the war. He also
establishes rom an tic connections w ith a V ietn am ese w om an, w h o turns
out to be a V ietcon g and is su b sequ en tly killed by his platoon. On his
return to A u stralia he is alienated from the new ly “aw are” and anti-w ar
nation, and su ffers from PTSD.
W h ere the “fu n n y place” o f The Odd Angry Shot finds its location
at worst as the locu s o f non-sense and o f political exploitation, Vietnam
attem pts m ostly successfully to locate its action quite specifcially in
geograph ic and historical space. T o som e extent the certainty o f locale
is lost in the m iddle o f the alm ost eight and a h a lf hours o f television
view in g tim e (excluding advertisem ents) w h en the focus shifts to P h il’s
covert activities in a non-specifc w a r zone— "V ietn am ”, but gen erally
setting in tim e and place is detailed and precise. Precision is achieved in
the first instance in the opening sequence, w hich consists o f a m ontage
o f television im ages beginning with the then w ell know n A u stralian
B roadcasting C om m ission new sreader (in tod ay’s parlance he w ou ld be
an an ch or m an), J am es Dibble, introducing a speech b y the Prim e
M inister, R obert M enzies. M enzies’ speech is w ell known in Au stralia,
opening w ith the lines “You know m e, for better or worse"; dou bly ironic
in the context; first, it announced the com m itm ent o f A u stralian support
to Vietnam ; secon dly by appealling to recognition o f the p ast’s solid
reality, Vietnam seeks to place the unfolding dram a as a fiction true to
life, w ith a real p olitical m essage. M enzies is follow ed im m ediately b y a
series o f “g ra b s ” o f A m erican and Soviet politicians, various A u stralian
and w orld celebrities, and in creasin gly intercutting snippets o f film
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reflecting aspects o f recognisably A ustralian life in the 1960s. T h is
m ontage fades into a shot o f Parliam ent House, Canberra, dated
Novem ber 1964.
Precise A ustralian social and political setting is thereby fram ed
b y the w id er set o f cultural values— easily recognised to Au stralian s as
their own, and this in turn is fram ed by w ider social m arkers o f
international political and social events. Th is process o f narrow ing the
focus from the world stage to the A ustralian is repeated in a n u m ber o f
ways throughout the series. In the first instance, in each o f the ten
separate “hours” o f Vietnam there is another m ontage adding new
contexts, events and people relevant to the unfolding history o f the war.
Additionally several o f the “scenes” w ithin episodes conclude w ith a
special historic event “freeze-fram ed” for em phasis. A nu m ber o f these
internal m ontages are further “naturalised” w ithin the story as they form
part o f a scene in which the fam ily and associates watch television news
reports about Vietnam as part o f the dram atic action. Effectively the
prelim inary m ontages and these intrusions o f “history” into the fiction
validate both the news and the com plete dram a o f the m iniseries—
teaching the 1987 television audience how to watch historic television,
and how to watch the m iniseries itself. The news, the “history” , is also
validated in the process, and it needs validation, since the history it
presents is highly selective and urges a particular reading o f A u stra lia ’s
V ietnam experience. This is not to argue that Vietnam is heavily biassed
in its treatm ent o f the Australian experience o f the war. M ore often than
not Vietnam is even-handed in its assessm ents o f the variou s and
opposed sides to the war, at least those w ithin Australia. T h e reading it
provides is com fortable with a balanced view o f the war, and m oreover
with the m ore accom m odating climate o f 1986-87 in which the participant
soldiers, if not the w ar itself, had begun to be accepted m ore easilyw ithin
the com m unity. In its overall shape Vietnam's message, beyond its appeal
to entertainm ent, is anti-war, but not stridently so, and not w ithout a
large com ponent o f com passion for the serving men, like Phil, and the
public servants and politicians, like Douglas, w ho becam e politically
aware during and because o f the war.
Television generally, and the soap-opera and m ini-series genres
in particular, tend to “norm alise” m iddle-class values and lifestyles, and
at the same time heighten the events o f m iddle-class life into m elodram atic
tragedies. Running em otions at this high stress sim ultaneously evades
the confrontation o f serious and detailed dilemmas. Results or resolutions
are achieved through catastrophic switches o f circum stance, not through
exploration and analysis. As m iniseries go, Vietnam is exceptional since
it does not opt in general for this style o f dram a nor for the all too glib and
com fortable (and com forting) happy ending, neither for the fam ily nor for
the nation. Douglas has learned the need for political rigour and honesty
but it m ay cost him his job , Evelyn’s m aturity seem s likely to depend on
w ithdraw al from the family. Phil’s return to Australia and eventually to
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the fam ily is rent b y the lasting effects o f traum atic stress. On this level
the dram a is touched how ever with the light glow of optim ism .
N evertheless Vietnam’s urgent fixing o f the specific location
m arks in spite o f itself a sense o flo s t certainty w ith in A u stralian culture.
A rgu ab ly perhaps, the sweep o f w orld events fram ing the A u stralian
m aterial, togeth er w ith the political events traversed b y the action,
dem onstrate again and again ju s t how m arginal A u stralia w as both in
V ietnam and to the U S A ’s con cerns gen erally in the sou theast A sian Pacific region. A n d th is m arginalisation finally isolates the abiding
political attack o f Vietnam. Its strongest an ti-w ar m essage is m ost firm ly,
though often In in sid iou s fashion, levelled against US im perialism .
D ou glas’ edu cation in political subtlety begins when the A u stralian
diplom at M on tgom ery tells him the truth about the disastrous effects o f
US m aterialism upon Vietnam ese culture. Later, in one telling m ontage
sequence. President Joh nson speaks o f the strategic bom bing o f North
V ietn am ’s “con crete and steel” as a m eans o f com batting aggression and
defending the w eak South Vietnam ese from the spread o f com m unism .
Im m ediately un dercu ttin g these w ords are file footage im ages o f the
bom bing o f villages. In the fictional story which follows the V ietnam ese
girl Le, w h o is frien dly with the A ustralians, is raped and h er gran d fath er
m urdered b y a platoon o f A m erican soldiers. Le is taking h er gran d fath er
to hospital w ith the aid both o f m oney and foodstuffs given h er by Phil
and his com rade Laurie. In this incident m otivation or m ore exactly the
“excuse” is provided b y the discovery o f the A ustralian aid— specifically
a tin o f pears, and its w ilful m isin terpetation as loot, b y the Am ericans.
A fter her gan g rape, one o f the A m erican soliders is ordered to kill Le and
take a “sou ven ir”— h er ear. In a string o f densely packed com bat film
cliches the soldier, w h o had not participated in the rape, is deem ed a
“ch erry” and m ust redeem his m anhood b y the act o f m u rd er and
m utilation. Still w ith in the bou n ds o f cliche the Am erican “w im p ” only
pretends to shoot Le but takes the souvenir. T his tragic event is one o f
the m ore obviou s elem ents o f m ak in g A u stralia’s Vietnam com fortable
for the television audience, by exculpating A ustralian soldiers from such
acts w h ile labou rin g the point o f A m erican im perialism ’s atrocities
within Vietnam . For Australians there is the added irony, which redoubles
the point, that it is th eir aid, th eir W H A M (W inning-the-hearts-andm inds) w h ich effectively sanctions the atrocity. A s a m icrocosm then, the
aid o f Phil and Laurie m irrors the com plicity o f A u stralian support w ith in
the larger th eatre o f war.
In this fashion the specific m ontage and ju xtap osition o f “w orld
events” w ith local fam ilial history destabilises A u stralia’s role in Vietnam .
A n ti-A m erican ism is present everyw here in A ustralian w riting, not only
about V ietnam , but seem s endem ic w ith in 1980s A u stralian culture. For
V ietnam anti-Am erican sentim ent also touches upon the too easy
appropriation o f the w ell known betrayal m yth underlying G allip oli’s
adduction as the founding m yth o f the nation. W here the British high
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com m and’s bungling im perialism had cost Australian youth its life at
Gallipoli, the nation found its origins. Vietnam as myth tended to replace
the British flag with the Am erican. Certainly as Australian political
allegiances swung from Europe to the Asia-Pacific region, the US
replaced Britain as the m ajor ally and not surprisingly as the m ajor focus
o f the fascination-repulsion with the harbinger o f cultural dom inance
which characterises m uch that is Australian .9 But w here G allipoli
provided a focus for fledgling nationalism , Vietnam had until 1990
provided only layers o f dislocation. In Vietnam the underlying structure
o f anti-Am ericanism betrays the insecurity o f Australia's m ovem ent
from an inward looking, conservative and com fortable nation aspiring to
an An glo-E u ropean culture long since passed, to a player o f w hatever
calibre on the world stage and in particular on the stage o f A sia-Pacific
m atters. T h at m ove had been and rem ains troubling and problem atic.
Vietnam traces m uch o f the deep concerns w ithin Australian culture.
Vietnam also explores all o f the fam iliar Hollywood tropes. P h il’s
alienation from his fam ily m anifests a m ild form o f PTSD and m irrors the
larger disaffection o f m any o f his veteran colleagues from the w hole
society. H is subsequent return to the fold plays a significant variation on
the captivity narrative, as it is through the agency of w om en that the
revenant soldiery is healed in this Vietnam narrative. Phil’s m ental
dam age is reflected in the physical dam age o f his m ate Laurie, w hose
sexual dysfunction again touches upon the failure o f the m asculine
image to find a com plete resolution. The m ini-series ends w ith a tentative
reconciliation, in which the lost son Phil arrives at his m oth er’s flat. His
plaintive greeting, “It’s m e— sort o f sum s up the dual im petus o f the
series towards a hopeful reunification o f the fam ily and by inference o f
the nation. The hesitancy suggests the residual traum a, refracting the
hope that Australia had reached a point at which the healing process
m ight begin in earnest.
In its tenth and concluding episode Vietnam drew to a close
several strands o f narrative. The im ages o f physical dism em berm ent in
the last episode are both literal and m etaphoric, and becom e the focus
o f two scenes in which Phil is able to recover som e of his m ental stability.
Phil’s com rade Laurie has returned to Australia and m arried the rape
victim Le. Laurie is confined to a wheelchair, the victim o f an am bush
which Phil believes w as engineered by Le’s cousin and his one tim e
rom antic interest. Lien. Phil's stressed condition m anifests itself strongly
in L e’s presence as a distrust o f all things Asian. I f Lien w as VC, Phil
m aintains the b elief that Le is VC too, and that far from loving Laurie she
is using her sexual favours as a m eans o f staying in Australia. Le is
constantly placed in physically threatening positions by Phil; cam era
angles and confined spaces argue that the rape m ay be repeated. A s well
Phil’s m ental shattering is m irrored in the physical shattering o f Lau rie’s
body. Both m en bear the m arks o f their legacy o f Vietnam . So too does
Le; she is finally drawn to display her m utilation to Phil as a m eans o f
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proving her bona fides as Laurie's wife, and o f circum venting Phil’s
sexual threat to her. M oreover she explains to Phil the fam ily ties and
cultural necessity o f Lien’s actions, the reasons why she was forced to
join the VC and why she seemed to use her sexuality duplicitously upon
Phil. The audience knew much o f the detail which Le relates, but the
effect o f her telling the stoiy again o f Lien’s VC connections em powers
Phil’s understanding o f Vietnam ese culture, m akes him see the dam age
necessarily enforced by the Vietnam ese upon them selves in opposing
W estern actions. The long cultural history o f fam ily ties becom es the
focus as Le explains that Lien had to jo in the VC when her brother was
killed. Put sim ply it is difficult to conceive o f the power o f this scene as
acted. Structurally it is an essential scene, m uch like the resolution in
m utual m ercy and pity o f King Lear and Cordelia in Act 4 scene 7 o f King
Lear. Nor is the com parison with the highest literary standard odious or
com pletely detrim ental to the quality o f Vietnam's script, direction or
acting. Finally, however, the resolution o f the Laurie-Phil-Le triangle is
an uneasy one as none o f the participants is m ade whole. Rather in the
m arriage o f Laurie and Le is allegorised a possible resolution o f Australia
and Asian cultures, uneasily and uncomfortably resolved. Other examples
will be m ore m elodram atic, m ore oriented to the happy ending, and less
true to the prevailing conditions within Australian culture.10
Tu rning to his family, Phil’s traum atic alienation from them and
Australia stands for the way large sections o f the veteran com m unity
perceived them selves to have been treated upon their return to Australia
and subsequently. In the fictional version Phil has returned from
Vietnam but has not contacted his fam ily at all. Indeed he steadfastly
refuses to contact them, seeing his sister’s anti-war stance as a betrayal.
But released b y the confrontation with L efrom the guilt and anger o f his
Vietnam experience he now turns to effect a resolution within the family.
Both this turn and the preceeding one have focussed on issues of loyalty
within families. W here Lien’s act m arks the Vietnam ese people’s history
of unsw erving loyalty to their state (as Vietnam com prehends it), Phil
attem pts to locate the root o f loyalty and hence love w ithin his own
family. This is effected by a confrontation by telephone with his sister.
An activist in the peace m ovement, M egan is giving an interview and talkback on local radio w hen Phil calls her to ask how she would offer com fort
to Laurie and the other veterans who have given the integrity o f their
bodies to defence o f the nation, and have now been seem ingly discarded.
Once again the focus is on the bilateral m irroring o f shattered m inds and
bodies. Phil asks M egan what she offers the shattered body o f Laurie, her
reply offers com fort to the shattered mind o f her brother, w ishing him
back into the fam ily’s heart. The w ar is condem ned but the soldiers
exonerated, the nation at last w ishing to absolve them from guilt and
return them to the fold. The last episode concludes with a restored
though largely dam aged Goddard family, as Phil finally returns. The
restoration is incom plete as his telling “It’s me— sort oF last line m akes
clear.
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In 1987 w hen the series w as first show n that hesitant resolution
looked like a position to be desired; a desire partly fulfilled in the latter
part o f 1987 w hen the Australian version of the Vietnam W elcom e Hom e
March w as held in October. B y early 1990. considerable distance had
been travelled by the com m unity and m uch o f the, at least surface level,
adjustm ent had been com pleted and a good deal o f healing achieved.
Curiously both Vietnam and Sword, o f Honour were subject to repeat
broadcasts in early 1990, tapping or anticipating not only the society’s
m ore ready level o f acceptance o f Vietnam and an obviou sly high
reappraisal o f the soldiers, together with the accepting context o f the
events surrounding the 75lh anniversary o f A n zac day in 1990. T h e
three events, re-broadcasts and 75th anniversary, are perhaps apiece in
charting the newly accepted m ilitarism w ithin Australian cu ltu re.11If this
inference can be drawn then the second screenings o f Vietnam and Sword
o f Honour m ight well m easure less the com m unity’s valu ation o f the
m essage they contain and m ore the all too easy accom m odation o f
V ietnam as a piece o f televised history relevant only as negative exam ple
o f how to conduct a war, as it threatened to becom e for the United States
during the 1980s and so blatantly did becom e in the early 1990s. W orse,
these events m ay have been reduced to com m ercial opportunities
w h erein h istory and its fiction al rep resen tation s are alike m ere
entertainm ents: Vietnam as a w ar o f the long distant past, w ith little to
tell us save the universal truths o f suffering, courage and the like.
Vielnam is a w orthy vehicle for the m ore com plex cultural con text which
produced it, than this latter treatm ent would allow, but the ease with
which the m ilitarism has again arisen w ithin Australia and the popularity
o f Vietnam, am ong other vehicles which exploit V ietnam -as-subject for
ratings w inning m elodram a (Tour o f Duly, and China Beach for exam ple)
argue for the w orst case. It is too early to be definitive. Togeth er with the
long term outcom e o f the G ulf w ar such cultural indicators m ay effect
different outcom es in Australia, than they appear to be doing in the
United States.
Sword o f Honour is less com plex, but its choice o f characters is
sim ilarly schem atic. From abackground o f rural selection Ton y Lawrence
is the recipient o f the “Sword o f H onour” as the num ber one cadet in his
year at the officers’ m ilitary training college, Duntroon, w ith a brilliant
m ilitary career aw aiting him. Both his career and personal life are
blighted by Vietnam . His girlfriend. Esse Rogers, is enlisted in the peace
m ovem ent at university and their relationship falls apart, signalled by
her letter telling T on y that she has aborted their child. U nable to face the
changed attitudes in Australia T on y flees to Thailand, with a V ietnam ese
refugee, Tam , from Phuoc Tuy. Th ey have a child, Kim. R eversing the
A m erican captivity schem e. Esse searches for Tony, to discover that Tam
has, one m ight unkindly say, conveniently died o fT B , leaving T on y and
Kim ripe for the return. Their reconciliation at the Law rence’s farm is a
far less equivocal version of the H ollywood capivity narrative than that
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o f the G oddard’s, and confirm s a hopeful reconciliation o f the disputing
factions w ith in A u stralian society, here allegorically w elded by the
presence o f the A sian son. Both how ever suggest that the reshaping o f
the national identity has been forged via an incursion into an A sian
setting at the behest o f the A m erican ally.
Conclusions
O ther exem plary “texts" o f the popular Vietnam im agery have
largely follow ed the fictional desire for closure, and have also m aintained
the apparent inability o f the nation to effect a reintegration o f the myth.
The large and w ell attended m arch o f the veterans com m u nity on 4
O ctober 1987 w as for m any held to be the W elcom e Hom e m arch, the
m om ent from which this re-integration could begin. And indeed it
initiated a public process o f recognition and healing o f the psychological
wounds. But the m arch itself and its subsequent recorded versions,
particularly the M artyn Goddard docum entary, dem onstrate that the
in corp oration o f V ietn am into A n za c w as still lack in g com p lete
recuperation. On the contrary, the continued exclusion o f Vietnam
veterans from the full tradition o f Anzac is enforced very noticeably in the
Goddard docum entary and in the num erous photographs reproduced in
the m edia b y the v ery corporeal intrusion o f the veterans. A gain and
again the cam era lingered on the disabled, literally dism em bered,
veterans to the near exclusion o f the able-bodied m archers. T h e
concentration on those whose bodies bear explicit evidence o f w ounds
denied the all too easy incorporation o f Vietnam within Anzac. The
docum entary presents an extrem ely m oving, even excessively m oving,
lingering on the g rie f o f the nurses and form er patients, m ost especially
the veteran G raham Edwards, a double am putee. In this lingering on
excessive bou ts o f shared grief, the docum entary is at odds with the stoic
tradition o f A n za c’s “Lest W e Forget” , and is consequently very' disturbing
in its, until recently un-Australian, focus on em otional release. T h e
strongest im age o f this grief w as provided by several m en who, as the
popular song by political folk-rock band Redgum says, “kicked m ines"
and consequ ently lost limbs. T w o such am putees are interviewed
throughout the 30 m inute program me. The last scene of the docum entary
shows R edgum leader John Schum an singing “I W as Only 19”, w hile to
his right on the stage is the veteran— Frankie— w ho is the subject o f the
song. A n am putee, he sits in his w heel chair surrounded by fam ily and.
as the song continues, by m ore and m ore friends. A t the son g’s
conclusion Schum an shouts out “W elcom e H om e”.
W here the US im agery o f the welcom e home m arch proposed
utopian redress, the A u stralian im age is am biguous, an uneasy
acceptance o f the futility and the mutilation. The continued focus on the
dism em bered bodies o f the soldiers m akes im possible an appeal to the
dehistoricised m yth/m em ory o f Vietnam which characterises the US,
Stone’s B o m on the Fourth of July not w ithstanding, since that film turns
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the dism em bered body into a pieta, if not pietistic image o f the veteran.
D isability becom es the ticket o f entry to Hollywood fame. T h e A m erican
myth o f regeneration through violence is fulfilled. Nor is Stone’s film
unique, for despite the elegance o f the W ashington Vietnam m onum ent,
and its oft noted refusal to soar inspirationally above ground which
ensures a lack o f glorification, its non-figurative nature and the brilliant
m etaphor o f its reflective surface upon w hich the nam es o f the fallen are
inscribed, it evades the continuing legacy o f the war, suggesting a
disem bodied loss. Those who survived physically in part or whole, whose
lives and/or m inds have been rent by the war, and those “m em bers” o f
their fam ilies w hose lives have been irreparably rent by the genetic legacy
o f the war, m ay be reflected in its surfaces but they are not intrinsically
part o f it.
The A ustralian W elcom e Hom e m arch did not avert its gaze from
those im plications, but in 1990 the 75th Anzac Day celebrations
presented the largest recent exfoliation upon the national m yth, and
here dism em berm ent was averted. Central focus in the m edia orchestra
which accom panied the jou rn ey back to Tu rkey came to rest on the last
group o f original A n zacs ever likely to visit Gallipoli and return safely
once again, for all o f these men were in their late eighties or nineties. If
the Anzac m yth, however modified, is speaking to a new m ilitarism , a
new spirit o f national identity, then its appeal lay in their faces and
bodies w hich although age had withered, the m yth had rem em bered,
transm ogrifying them once again into the bronzed .Anzacs. T ru e they
were old m en, their faces were thin and withered, they w alked slow ly and
often with assistance, but the prom ise o f the Anzac myth lived in them,
for they had survived and they were rem em bered. W ill the dism em bered
Vietnam veterans be treated with the sam e fam e? Unless they too can
be turned to effect a political necessity the chances are slim. T h is finally
is the m essage o f the dism em bering o f the Anzac m yth— its true political
focus supporting T h e Odd Angry Shot 's contention that soldiers are the
playthings o f the sticky fingered politicians. 1
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Fatal Environment: The My th o f the Frontier inthe Age o f Industrialization, 18001890, New York, 1985, especially ch. 2.
2 For seminal studies of the American cinematic representations of Vietnam,
studies which underlie much of this paper see Albert Auster and Leonard Quart.
How the War Was Remembered, New York, 1988; Gilbert Adair. Vietnam on Film,
New York, 1981; Rick Berg. “Losing Vietnam: Covering the War in an Age of
Technology", Cultural Critique, 3, 1986, pp. 92-125: Julian Smith. Looking Away:
Hollywood and Vietnam, New York, 1975; and, Richard Slotkin. “Gunfighters
and Green Berets: The Magnificent Seven and the Myth of Counter-Insurgency",
Radical History Review, 44, Spring 1989, p. 67.
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3 This is most easily evident in John Rambo’s frustrated shooting of the array
of CIA computers at the conclusion o f R a m b o : F irs t B lo o d I I but P la to o n a n d B o m
o n th e F o u r th o f J u ly also manifestly remove moral responsibility, and more
tellingly failure from the soldier, placing it upon the system.
4 Jane Ross has written extensively on the contestatory nature of the “image”
o f the Vietnam veteran. See her essay, “Veterans in Australia: the Search for
Integration”, in this volume, pp. 50-73 and others referred to in the Select
Bibliography.
5 Section 1. d o f the Select Bibliography lists a number of these films.
6 It might be argued that the training films meant to demonstrate a certain
verisimilitude towards Australian military practice, in part the expectation that
Vietnam like most wars was mostly spent waiting and preparing for action and
not “in combat”. One of the differences that most reports o f Vietnam seek to
make, is that “in country” meant “in combat” all of the time, since the enemy was
everywhere, combat stress was universal. This point is implicit in Lex McAulay’s
The Battle o f Long Tan: The Legend o f Anzac Upheld Hutchinson, Melbourne,
1986, and he attempts to make it explicit in his day-by-day account of a “typical”
battalion tour in Contact. Australians in Vietnam, Hutchinson, Melbourne, 1989.
However, it should be noted that the amount of time the training films infer that
Australians would spend on “non-combat” duties, in varieties of logistic and
perimeter maintenance, and on the Winning-the Hearts and-Minds tasks, finds
uneasy in-practice confirmation in Terry Burstall. “Policy Contradictions o f the
Australian Task Force. Vietnam, 1966”, in this volume, pp. 35-49. Burstall
argues the evidence for what the films prophetically imagine, that the Australian
combat operations would be seriously attenuated as a result of military and
political contradictions between Australian politicians and their military
leadership, and more dramatically between American combat expectations and
Australian performance.
7 See Chris Flaherty and Michael Roberts. “The Reproduction of Anzac
Symbolism”,Journal o f Australian Studies, 24, May 1989, pp. 52-69.
8 While some films appear to touch on these issues—the separation of the “two
cultures” in Platoon: or, the often clear demarcation of skills and education
arrogated to the nominal protagonists of many films such as Full Metal Jacket,
Platoon, or Casualties o f War, skills, which the films suggest, but do not pursue,
enable them to “write” their way out of the war—the detailed political ramifications
o f race, education and economic back- ground seem hardly to rise beyond
passing observations.
9 Analysis of the language of the political speeches made by both sides in the
Gulf War will when they are written note the overlap of moral, legal, military and
economic motivations. Commentaries unkindly disposed to the “Coalition" may
well note also the conflation of the languages of corporate strategies and military
intervention, and sub- sequently draw the veils shielding the links between
certain kinds of imperialism and their self-justifying calls to defend individual
and national sovereignties, when neither o f these issues are the root o f the
military action.
10 For another discussion of the dis-location o f Australia in Vietnam which
makes specific points about the “funny place”, see Peter Pierce. “The Funny
Place’: Australian Literature and the War in Vietnam", in this volume, pp. 98108.
11 See Stuart Rintoul (ed). Ashes o f Vietnam, William Heinemann, Melbourne,
1987. Peter Pierce discusses in more detail Nagle’s novelistic comments about
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sexually damaged soldiers in “The Funny Place’: Australian Literature and the
War in Vietnam**.
12 See Tom O’Regan. “The Enchantment with Cinema: Film in the 1980s", in
Albert Moran & Tom O’Regan (eds). The Australian Screen, Penguin, Ringwood,
1989, pp. 118-145.
13 For a more detailed corroboration o f the swings in political allegiance see the
two opening papers in this volume, Peter Edwards. “The Australian Government
and Involvement in the Vietnam War", pp. 16-25; and Jeffrey Grey. “Vietnam as
History: the Australian Case", pp. 26-34.
14 It is worth noting the colateral evidence of Australian reaction to Vietnamese
and other Asian refugees as detailed by James Coughlan’s essay, “International
Factors Influencing Australian Governments’ Responses To The Indochinese
Refugee Problem", in this volume, pp. 84-97.
15 For one such early perception o f this tendency see Graeme Cheeseman and
St John Kettle (eds). The New Australian Militarism: Undermining our Future
Security, Pluto Press, Sydney, 1990.
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Introduction
In keeping with the wide range o f concerns o f the essays in this volum e
the bibliography has attempted to cover as m any “subject headings” as seemed
possible. Thu s while the title “Select Bibliography” suggests that the compilers
have collected only the m ajor “texts” o f concern, the following lists are an attempt
to be as complete as possible at the time o f final compilation. “Select” is meant
to convey the fact that the editors are certain (most likely the only certainty
prevailing in scholarly life) that the lists are not complete. This incompletion
applies to some areas more than to others. Newspapers and the general daily
print media, and their radio and television equivalent news industries are the
chief areas o f extreme selection. Transience is the one problem, and the, not
unrelated, determination of importance, the other—the question o f which o f the
thousands o f such daily reports are worth reading is unfortunately beyond the
collecting and sorting powers o f a study such as this.
In the related area o f electronic production, the overwhelming musical
response to Vietnam in American popular and folk music areas, simply drowns
most o f the Australian output, but the fact that we have not here listed references
to the little that was produced in Australia does not reduce its significance. A
number o f examples m ake the point— one would not look to Russell Morris’ late
1960s single “The Real Thing” as directly related to Vietnam but its overall
surreally apocalyptic lyrics, and the accompanying “nuclear explosions” (preDavid Bowie) o f the promotional television “film” (note, film since it predated the
current “rock video” genre), are redolently anti-war. It would pay research to look
into the numerous other popular songs which conflate psychedelia with the
general millenarianism which infected popular music— even that o f “flower
power”— in late 1960s and early 1970s culture. A major problem here is the
overlap between Australian, British and Am erican styles and influences. Later,
in the 1980s Australian popularmusic found a number of voices, chiefly Jim m y
B am es and his band Cold Chisel's “Khe Sanh”, redolently Bruce Springsteen
in style, and the strong folk-politics o f John Schumann and Redgum’s “(I was]
Only 19”. Both “hits”, and therefore in the public ear, so to speak, these songs
too require more study, and they are worthy o f inclusion, if only in passing in
this note. Their context is widened in the same w ay as that o f the Actional
literature when the array o f songs both newly written and revived, dealing with
Australian involvement in other wars, largely and not unexpectedly devoted to
the First W orld W ar, is taken into account. Eric Bogle’s “The Band Played
Waltzing Matilda” springs easily to m ind as exem plaiy. Indeed the compilers felt
that as its products came to light, the area of popular musical culture tended
to grow so large that it required separate study.
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It has also been editorial practice to distribute the material into sections,
more through broad media and generic criteria than by breakdown into more
numerous and quite specific “subject headings”. Printed secondary texts have
been the least distributed in this sense; so that where normal practice might find
theses, monographs, articles, reviews andjoumalism as separate sets of entries,
in section 2 they are all listed together. Effectively this presents the work of
several scholars in one section, demonstrating not only the quantity but the
breadth of writing styles, genres and so on, in which they have worked.
Additionallyasremarked in the introductory comments, suchalistingfunctions
methodologically—demonstrating the strengths, weaknesses, and the wider
contexts of its production of any single example of Australian writing on the
Vietnam War and its aftermath.
A Note on the bibliographic practice
In preparing this material for an American audience it seemed sensible
to identify the origin of publication as the city in Australia, rather than the
sometimes specific, but to a general US audience often more obscure, suburb
which the strict bibliographic practice oftaking the location from the catalogu ingin-publication information, or the title-page, would require. Thus, in the
following lists, and especially in section l.e, and section 2, for example, a text
published in Gladesville, 1965, will be listed as Sydney, 1965. There are two
exceptions. Penguin books will be listed as published in Ringwood. and not as
Melbourne, and University of Queensland Press at St. Lucia, as these are the
common and well known points of origin of these major publishers.1
1. Primary Sources
Prim ary Source: a ) Archive.e

All recordsgeneratedby the Australian Federal Government are subject
to the Archives Act (1983) which provides for material to be released to public
access thirty years after its creation, the so-called “thirty years rule”. Australia
also possesses a Freedom of Information Act (1982), but unlike in the United
States the provisions of this legislation do not cover records generated before its
enactment.
In consequence, records relating to Australia's war effort remain closed
to public researchers; the current official historian of Australia’s involvement in
southeast Asian conflicts. Dr Peter Edwards (whose paper opens this Vietnam
Generation Special No.) and hisstaff, have full and unhindered access to all such
material for the writing of the history, but non-official historians will have to wait
until 1993, when the first records related directly to Australian involvement in
Vietnam will be due for release.
There is one significant exception to this state of affairs, and that
involves material used in evidence before the Evatt Royal Commission on the use
of herbicides, pesticides and other chemicals by the Australian Army. These
records, all operational in nature, were released to public access in 1982, and
are located at the Australian War Memorial in Canberra in a temporary record
series, AWM 181. This series comprises some thirty shelf metres (approx. 93
shelf feet) of documents and contains important runs of operational records
generatedby Headquarters 1AustralianTaskForce, MACVcombined campaign
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plans 1966-1972, intelligence summaries and some unit records, as well as
some administrative files. The unifying principle lies in the observation that all
this material contains references to the use of chemical agents in Phuoc Tuy
province. The total run of operational records, some 500 shelf metres (approx.
1600 shelf feet) of material, is contained in AWM 95 and is subject to the thirty
year rule. This is the case for all other Australian Government records relating
to Australia’s Vietnam War, such as those generated by the Departments of
External Affairs or Labour and National Service.1
Private records and those created by non-Govemment agencies are
subject to no such restrictions (unless private embargoes, or normal copyright
rules are applied); there are important collections relating to the various anti
war, anti-conscription movements held in State and university libraries around
Australia. To give but two examples: the records of the Campaign for Peace in
Vietnam, a pressure group formed in 1967 and based in the state o f South
Australia, are held in the State Library of South Australia in Adelaide (the state
capital) as record Group 124; they occupy nearly nine shelfmetres.2 Most states
spawned a branch of the Vietnam Moratorium Campaign, formed in 1970, and
these records are held in the State Library in South Australia's case, but in the
University of Melbourne Library in the case of the state of Victoria.
The National Library of Australia in Canberra holds a number of
important collections ofanti-Vietnam W ar material; prominent among these are
the records of the Save Our Sons group (MS 3821), the Vietnam Moratorium
Committee (MS 4969), and the Women’s International League for Peace and
Freedom (MS 7755). The papers o f significant individuals in the protest
movements are often valuable sources o f material; at the National Library, to give
but two examples, the papers o f Ian Turner (MS 6206), radical Melbourne
academic, contains three boxes o f anti-Vietnam W ar records, while the
collection donated by Andrew Reeves (MS 8076) concentrates particularly on
student radicalism and anti-war agitation. A further source of anti-war material
is to be found in trade union records, many of which are held by the Archive of
Business and Labour based at the Australian National University in Canberra.
Private groups which supported Government policy in Vietnam are
much less well documented. Perhaps the principal organisation with relevant
papers in the public domain is the Returned Services League (the equivalent of
the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars), the records o f whose
federal body likewise are held by the National Library (MS 6609).
As Terry Burstall’s paper demonstrates, there are considerable though
as yet relatively untapped US sources for the Australian participation in the
Vietnam War. As well as operational records, held by the National Archives and
Records Service, Washington, D.C., and the papers of senior military figures
held, for example, by the United States Army Military History Institute, Carlisle,
Pennsylvania, there are numerous items relating to foreign policy and
governmental relations in the papers of the State Department. There are in all
likelihood more references scattered through other American resources.1
1 There is a lengthy, unpublished series guide to AWM 181, held at the Australian War
Memorial. See also Helen Creagh. “Search and Re-search: Operation Mitchell: Information
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collected in the search to compile the Report on the Use of Herbicides and Insecticides
and other chemicals by the Australian Army in South Vietnam**, Archives and
Manuscripts, 11, May 1983: 7-13.
2MalcolmJ. Saunders. “ANote on the Files ofthe Campaign for Peace inVietnam”, South
Australians 21, September 1982: 105-10.

Prim ary Sources: b ) printed texts— Government and government institutional documents

As well as the following short list, one of the most essential resources
for Australian Parliamentary matters are in the daily Hansard transcripts of all
matters before the two houses (Representatives and Senate) o f the Australian
Parliament, for example in CtimmmweallhParl^
Debates, vol. H[ouse]of
Representatives! 43, 1964. A specific speech or report will be listed under the
date it was given.
Ajler the March. Strengthening Support for the Veterans, Report of the House of
Representatives Standing Committee on CommunityAffairs, Canberra, 1988.
Australian Naval History, Department of Defence, Australian Government Publishing
Service, Canberra, 1977.
Australian Veterans Health Studies. The Mortality Report. Part l. A Retrospective Cohort
Study o f Mortality Among Australian National Servicemen o f the Vietnam
Conflict Era and an Executive Summary o f the Mortality Report, Australian
Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1984.
Australian Veterans Health Studies. The Mortality Report, Pan HI. The Relationship
BetweenAspectsoJVietnamServiceandSubsequent MortalityAmongAustralian
National Servicemen of the Vietnam Conflict Era, Australian Government
Publishing Service, Canberra, 1984.
Australia's Military Commitment to Vietnam, Paper tabled in accordance with the Prime
Minister's Statement totheHouseofRepresentativesl3May 1975, Department
of Foreign Affairs.
“Brief History: Australian Force in Vietnam 1962-1970**, Legislative Research Service,
Parliamentary Library, Defence, Science and Technology Group, Canberra,
1970.
Case Control Study o f Congenital Anomalies and Vietnam Service, Australian
Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1983.
TheDivision inBattle Pamphlet, N o ll: CounterRevolutionary Warfare 1965, The Military
Board, Canberra, 1965.
Fitzgerald, Stephen, et aL The Committee to Advise on Australia’s Immigration Policies,
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1988.
Giblett, Noel (ed). Homecomings: Stories from Australian Vietnam Veterans and their
Wives, 2nd ed. Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1990;
1st ed. Vietnam Veterans’ Counselling Service, [Sydney], 1987.
Harries, Owen. Australia and the Third World, Australian Government Publishing
Service, Canberra, 1979.
Holt, E.S. & Lugg, George. “A Report on the spraying of herbicides at the First Australian
Task Force, Vietnam”, Australian Army Operational Research Group Report,
2/68, May 1968.
Lugg, George. “Herbicide Spraying at the First Australian Task Force Nui Dat, Vietnam”,
August 1970, Department of Supply Report 397.
[McGibbon, I.C.] TheNew ZealandArmy inVietnam 1964-1972, [New Zealand] Ministry
of Defence, Wellington, 1973.
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[Menzies, Sir Robert & Moyes, Rt Rev J.S., et al]. Vietnam ExchangeofLetters between
the Prime Minister, theRL How Sir Robert Menzies, K.T., C.H., M.P., and theRL
Rev. J.S. Moyes, C.M.G., and certain Archbishops and Bishops, Prime
Minister’s Department, Canberra, 20 April 1965.
[Neale, R.G.] “Australia’s Military Commitment to Vietnam”, Commonwealth
Parliamentary Paper, 13 May 1975.
Odgers, George. Mission Vietnam: Royal Australian Air Force Operations, 1964-1972,
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1974.
-------Australian Experience inJoint Armed ServiceActivities, Historical Monograph 10,
Directorate of Instructions, Orders and Manuals, Administrative Services
Branch, Canberra, 1979.
Owens, Lt Col. A- G. Attitude of National Servicemen to Enlistment in the RegularArmy,
Research Report 3/67, 1 Psychology Research Unit, Australian Militaiy
Forces, Albert Park Barracks, Melbourne, July 1967.
------- Satisfactions and Dissatisfactions of National Servicemen with the Army,
Research Report 5/67, 1 Psychology Research Unit, Australian Military
Forces, Albert Park Barracks, Melbourne, July 1967.
“Repatriation Benefits for Special Overseas Service", Pamphlets from Repatriation
Department.
“Report of the Consultative Council on Congenital Abnormalities in the Yarran District"
Victorian Government, Legislative Assembly, 26 September 1978.
“Report on the Uses of Herbicides and Insecticides and other Chemicals by the
Australian Army in South Vietnam", Department of Defence, November 1982.
Royal Commission on the Use and Effects of Chemical Agents on Australian Personnel in
Vietnam, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1985, 9 vols.
South Vietnam:AustralianMHilaryForces: Dept DefencePocketbook, Canberra, June 1967.
Studies on Viet Nam, Information Handbook 1, [Australian Government) Department
of External Affairs, 1965.
Viet Nam First Halfo f 1965, [Australian Government] Department of External Affairs,
2, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1965.
Viet Nam Since the 1954 Geneva Agreements, [Australian Government] Department of
External Affairs, 1, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1964.
Viet Nam Questions ancLAnswers, [Australian Government] Minister ofExtemal Affairs,
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, May 1966.
Viet Nanv Documents on Communist Aggression, [Australian Government] Department
of External Affairs, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, n.d.
Wardlaw, G.R. Major. Proposal for the Management o f Combat Stress Reaction in the
Australian Army, Research Note 7/88, Directorate of Psychology Publication,
[Canberra], July 1988.
Prim ary Source: c ) newspapers, magazines, journals

Researchers of the printed news media’s reporting of the Vietnam W ar
have produced a wealth of material in the US, particularly in search of the
answers as to how influential (or otherwise) that media, in concert with the
electronic media, were in bringing the war to an end. The relatively few studies
ofAustralia’s print media (which are listed below in .sect ion 2) have concentrated
on its influence and other aspects, notably the political allegiances o f the media,
but there is yet to be any overarching study, partly no doubt due to the daunting
task o f collecting the data. The news media archives are easily available in the
case of the major newspapers, the city dailies and weeklies, but the material is
on the whole insufficently indexed to allow effective access, other than reading
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through each text in toto. Anumber ofgroups are collecting, however, either with
specific subject criteria in train or more generally. Two examples: first, the
Politics Department of the Australian National University has a large clipping
collection, devoted as one might expect primarily to governmental and policy
references, and less to operational or “social” material; secondly, the
“Representation of the Vietnam W ar in Australia” Project at University College,
ADFA has for three years been collecting all references from all the major dailies
(such as the Sydney Morning Herald, Australian, Age, and Brisbane Courier),
and the periodicals (Quadrant, Nation, and so on), beginning in 1962 and
progressing to the present, but the task is daunting, and requires significantly
more funds and research time.
The following list provides the titles and in some cases the affiliations of
a laige selection of such organs, together with a selection of professional
(military) journals, and the often short-livedjournals of the various groups of the
anti-war, draft resister's, Moratorium, and other peace movements/ Most of the
issues o f the major newspapers will be held in hard copy or micro-form (fiche
or film) in the various state and university libraries as appropriate. In some cases
the publishers will also provide access (and more substantial indexing) of their
publications. The more ephemeral material is often hard to find, some of it will
be found in collections such as those listed under section 1. a, above.
The Advertiser [daily Adelaide newspaper!
The Age [daily Melbourne newspaper]
Army
The Army Journal
Australian [daily national newspaper]
The Australian Women’s Weekly [weekly national magazine focussed on pre-feminist
notions of women’s issues]
The Bulletin [weekly national journal]
The Canberra Times [daily regional newspaper]
The Cathdic Weekly 1963-1968
The Catholic Worker [Melbourne religious journal]
The Courier Mail [daily Queensland newspaper]
The Daily Bulletin [Townsville newspaper]
Debrief [Official Quarterly Journal of the Vietnam Veterans Association of Australia
(WAA) PO Box 369, Parramatta, NSW, 2150, Australia]
Department of Veterans* Affairs Pamphlets
Despatch
Dissent
Farrago [Melbourne University, Students’ Representative Council newspaper]
Herald
Honi Soil [University of Sydney Student paper]
International: A Revolutionary Socialist Magazine
The Listening Post
Lots Wife [Monash University. Students’ Representative Council newspaper]
The Mercury [daily Hobart Tasmania]
The Mirror [daily Sydney newspaper]
Moratorium News [Official organ of the Vietnam Moratorium Campaign, Melbourne]
Mufti
Nation [periodical newsmagazine]
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National Times [weekly national newsmagazine]
New Basis
Old Mole [Sydney University paper]
Outlook
Partisan
Peacemaker
Print [Monash Labour Club Newsletter]
Quadrant [monthly periodical current ailairs and intellectual life journal]
Rabelais [La lYobe University, Students’ Representative Council newspaper]
Resist and Resistance Notes [Students for a Democratic Society Anti-Conscription
Committee Newsletter, Melbourne University committee]
Reveille [Journal of the New South Wales Branch of the RSL]
TheRIetumed] Sfervicesl UeagueJ Newsletter
The Sun Herald [Sydney Sunday newspaper]
The Sunday Observer [weekend newspaper]
The Sunday Telegraph [Sydney Sunday newspaper]
The Sydney Morning Herald [daily Sydney newspaper]
Tharunka [University of New South Wales Student paper]
Tribune [weekly national political newspaper]
VeRBosity [Repatriation Commission: Veterans’ Review Board publication]
Vietnam Action [journal from the Vietnam Action Campaign group]
The Vietnam Digest, December 1968-July 1970 [7 no.s (eel). Peter Samuel for The
Friends of Viet Nam]
Vietnam Today [Newsletter of the Australian Vietnam Society]
Woroni [Australian National University Student newspaper]
YCAC Newsletter [Youth Campaign Against Conscription]
1 For a larger list of Victorian student and anti-war journals see Bariy York, Student
Revolt: La Trobe University 1967-1973, Nicholas Press, Canberra, 1989: 171-2.
Prim ary S ource: d) printed texU— unit histaries

Battle, Capt. M.R The Year of the Tigers: The Second Tour of 5th Battalion, the Royal
Australian Regiment in South Vietnam, 1969-1970, 5RAR Sydney, 1970.
Beck, G.J.J. (ed). No 2 Squadron Royal Australian Air Force Vietnam 1968, No 2
Squadron RAAF, Asian Printers, Penang, n.d.
Channon, James B. The First Three years: A Pictorial History of the 173rd Airborne
Brigade (Separate), Brigade Information Office, 1966.
Clarke, C.J . (ed). Yours Faithfully: Second Tour of 3rd Battalion the Royal Australian
Regiment in South Vietnam, 1969-71, 3RAR Sydney, 1972.
Clunies-Ross, Major A. The Grey Eight in Vietnam: The History of the Eighth Battalion,
The Royal Australian Regiment, November 1969—November 1970, 8RAR
Brisbane, 1971.
Johnson, L.D. Major (ed). The History of 6 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Battalion: Volume Two,
1967- 1970, 6RAR, Townsville, 1972.
Newman, K.E. Major. The ANZAC Battalion: a Record of the Tour of 2nd Battalion The
Royal Australian Regiment, 1st Battalion, The RNZIR. In South Vietnam 196768, 2RAR& 1RNZIR, Sydney, 1968.
O'Neill Robert. Vietnam Task. The 5th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, 1966-67,
Cassell, Australia Ltd., Melbourne, 1968.
Rickards, G.F.B. (ed). Twelve in Focus: 12th Field Regiment in South Vietnam 1971,
12th Field Regiment, %dney, 1971.
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Roberts, A.R The ANZAC Battalion, 1970-71, Second Tour of the 2nd Battalion, the
Royal Australian Regiment in South Vietnam, 2RAR Sydney, 1972.
Sayce, RL. & O’Neill, M.D. (eds). The Fighting Fourth: 4 RAR/NZ 1970-72: A Pictorial
Record of the Second Tour in South Vietnam, 4RAR Sydney, 1972.
Seven in Seventy: Second Tour of 7th Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment: Notes
on Operations, Vietnam, 1970-1971, 7RAR [Sydney, 1971].
Stuart, RF. (ed). 3 RAR in South Vietnam, 1967-1968: A Record of the Operational
Service of the Third Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment in South
Vietnam, 12th December 1967-20th November 1968, 3RAR Sydney, [1968].
Webb, J.R Mission in Vietnam: First Tour of 4th Battalion, the Royal Australian
Regiment in South Vietnam, 4 RAR Townsville, 1969.
Williams, Ian McLean. Vietnam: A Pictorial History of the Sixth Battalion, the Rcyal
Australian Regiment, 1966-1967, 6RAR Sydney, 1967.

)

Prim ary Sources: c printed texts

—

fiction, memoirs, poetry c? drama

A number of texts in this section m ay appear initially as dubiously
related to the Vietnam War. But as will be clear following the arguments put
forward throughout the articles o f this special number, Australia’s response to
the Vietnam W ar is tied intimately to its long and continuing relationships with
the whole of the southeast Asian-Pacific region, and moreover to its own
conceptions of its place within the myths and legends of a western tradition of
warfare and colonialism. Focus of the texts below on occasion m ay fall less
specifically upon Vietnam than on the wider region; as often on Vietnam, as on
Indonesia, New Guinea, Japan, and Kampuchea/Cambodia, among others.
‘Alexander, David’ [McAulay, Lex]. When theBuffaloFighl Hutchinson, Melbourne, 1980.
Allen, Robert Saigon: South o f Beyond, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1990.
Astley, Thea. Beachmasters, Penguin, Ringwood, 1985.
Atkinson, Hugh. The Most Savage Animal Simon and Schuster, Sydney, 1972.
Auchterlonie, Dorothy. The Dolphin, Australian National University Press, Canberra,
1967.
Baillie, Allan. Little Brother, Collins Educational, Sydney, 1987.
Bartlett, Norman. Island Victory, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1955.
Beilby, Richard. The Bitter Lotus. Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1978.
Bich, Nguyen Ngoc (ed). “From an Antholoqu o f Vietnamese Poetry “, Quadrant 14:3,
(No.65), May-June 1970: 93-96.
Boddy, Michael & Ellis, Robert. “The Legend of King O’Malley’, Jane Street Theatre,
Sydney, 1970, and subsequently published by Angus & Robertson, Sydney,
1974.
Bojtschuck, R.H. Operation Sea Dragon, Ryebuck Publications, Nerang,
Queensland, 1986.
Brand, Mona. Daughters of Vietnam, Foreign Language Publishers, Hanoi, 1958.
------- "On Stage Vietnam”, New Theatre Sydney, 10 June 1967.
------- “Going, Going, Gone", [New Theatre Sydney], 1968.
Brass, Alister. Bleeding Earth, Alpha Books, Sydney, 1967.
Burstall, Terry. The Soldiers’Story. The Ekittle ofXa Long Tan, Vietnam, 18August 1966,
University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, 1986.
------- A Soldier Returns: A Long Tan veteran discovers the other side o f Vietnam,
University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, 1990.
Cairncross, C.J. The Unforgiven, Sun Books, Melbourne, 1977.
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Cameron, Martin. Australia's Longest War, author, 1087.
-------A Look On the Bright Side, author, 1988.
Campbell, David. The Branch o f Dodona, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1970.
Carroll, John. Token Soldiers, Wildgrass Books, Melbourne, 1983.
Cass,Shirley, Wilding, Michael, etal(eds). WeTookTheirOrdersandAreDead, UreSmith,
Sidney, 1971.
Clanchy, John. “Homecoming" in Homecoming, University of Queensland Press, St.
Lucia, 1989: 1-90.
Coe, John N. (ed). Desperate Praise. The Australians in Vietnam, Artlook, Perth, 1982.
Cole, Tom. “Medal of Honour Rag", Ensemble Theatre, Sydney, 31 March 1977.
Cook, Kenneth. The Wine o f God’s Anger, Cheshire-Lansdowne, Melbourne, 1968.
Connell, R Firewiryds, Wentworth Press, Sydney, 1968.
D’Alpuget, Blanche. Monkeys in the Dark, Aurora Press, Sydney & London, 1980.
------- TurtleBeach, Penguin, Ringwood, 1981.
Dawe, Bruce. Condolences of the Season, Cheshire, Melbourne. 1971.
Dowse, Sara. Schemetime, Penguin, Ringwood, 1990.
The Draff Resisters’Union. Downdraft:ADraftResisters'ManuaLHighat,Victoria, [1971].
Drewe, Robert. A Cry in the Jungle Bar, Collins, London-Sydney, 1979.
Duke, Jas H. Poems o f Peace and War, Collective Effort Press, Melbourne, n.d.
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P rim ary S o u rce: f ) cinem a, and television and radio programme**

For Australia, Vietnam was by no means the media war it is commonly
held to have been (and seemingly remains) for the US, but there was a moderate,
and as the war progressed increasing, electronic media response. Little o f this
has been touched on in any detail, nor listed in any comprehensive manner, with
the exception o f the work of Ann Mari Jordens in a paper delivered at the
Macquarie University Conference in 1987.1 It would be impossible, however, to
list every reference to Vietnam made in the television and radio media during the
period o f the war, and subsequently as it came to feature weekly, if not nightly
(as it seems in the US), in the various network news and current affairs
programmes. There are other complexities: in the case of the numerous short
films made by the Commonwealth and State bodies, a number o f these m ay exist
invariant prints, and occasionally differing dating and production details appear
within the catalogues; in addition scenes from some of the earlier films reappear
as if contemporary to the later film’s footage; additionally much has been edited
for use within other commercial current affairs material, again without noting
their “file footage" status. The list given below is therefore even more selective and
imperfect than the term “select bibliography" might imply.
Action inVietnam, 1968, short film. Commonwealth Film Commission, forThe Directorate
of Defence Information [restricted access].
ANZACS, 1985, TV miniseries. Burrowes-Dixon Co. P.L., producer Geoff Burruwes,
script John Dixon, et oL
ArmyAdvisers inVietnam, 1970, short film. Directorate of Public Relations, Department
of the Army.
Army Nurses in Vietnam, 1972, short film. Directorate of Public Relations, Department
of the Army.
Army Officers, 1966, short film. Department of Army, Commonwealth Film Unit.
Arts Vietnam: A Protest to Step the War, 1968, short film, Sasha Ivanovich.
Ashes o f Vietnam, 1988, Stuart Rintoul, Australian Broadcasting Corporation Radio
broadcast and audio cassette [after the book of the same title, q.v. section 1.e.
Rintoul, 1987].
AustralianTaskForce. Vietnam, 1967, short film. Commonwealth Film Commission, for
The Directorate of Defence Information [restricted access.
Australians at War, 1976, TV documentaiy series, 11 episodes, TEN Network episode 9.
Australians Remember, 1977, short film. Film Australia Production Co., sponsored by
the Australian War Memorial.
Beginnings, 1970, short film, made by Acme Films for Aquarius Foundation.
“British Broadcasting Commission TVVietnam Documentary", 1966, Michael Charlton,
Impact, Australian Broadcasting Commission TV, current affairs programme.
Callfor Youth 1966, short film, Christopher Productions and Youth Campaign Against
Conscription.
Cambodia Year 10, 1990, John Pilger, IV Documentary.
Changing the Needle, 1981, film, director Martha Ansara, for Jequerity P.L. with
assistance from Creative Development Branch, Australian Film Commission.
Connections, 26 April 1990, Australian Broadcasting Corporation Radio National,
“Phone- in” on the effects of Vietnam, producers Roger Penny & Christian
Peterson.
Deathcheaters, 1976, film, director Brian Trenchard Smith.
Democratic Process, 1979, short film, Jada Films.
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Demonstrator, 1971, feature film, Warwick Freeman.
Diggers in Vietnam 1968, short film. Commonwealth Film Commission, for The
Directorate of Defence Information [restricted access).
Diggers Relaxing, 1969, short film. Department of the Army.
DustoJJVietnam 1970, short film, Directorate ofPublic Relations, Department ofthe Army.
Every Day, Every Night, 1983, short film (originally video), director Kathy Mueller,
Swinburne Film & Television School.
Front Line, 1978, film, David Bradbury, sponsored by the Australian Film Commission,
Tasmanian Film Corporation, and the Australian War Memorial.
Frontline, Neil Davis, 1989, TV documentary and videotape.
GaRipdt 1981, feature film, producers R&R Film, director Peter Weir, script David
Williamson.
Hearts and Minds, 1967, short partly animated film, Petty Film Productions.
Hit the US Aggressors, documentary, [banned from Australian TV May-dune 1966).
It's a New World Fbr Sure, Australian Broadcasting Corporation TV Documentary
Series, including 2 pregrammes on the Sixties radical movements.
Land o f Fire, 1981, film, Martha Ansara.
The Ijast March 1988, television documentary, producers Martyn Goddard, et al
Australian Broadcasting Corporation TV.
Living in the Field, 1968, short film, Department of the Army.
Malaya Hosting, 1962, short film. Department of Army.
Minh: A Vietnamese, 1979, short film. Film Australia.
Mobile Advisory Teams in Vietnam 1971, short film. Directorate ofPublic Relations,
Department of the Army.
“My Lai", 1990, documentary, Australian Broadcasting Corporation TV, Four Comers
[weekly current affairs programme).
NationalServiceCorpsTraining—ArmouredCorps, 1966, short film. Directorate ofPublic
Relations, Department of the Army.
National Service Corps Training—Cooks Corp, 1966, short film, Directorate of Public
Relations, Department of the Army.
Nat ional Service Corps Training—Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, 1966, short film.
Directorate of Public Relations, Department of the Army.
National Service Corps Training—Medical Assistants, 1966, short film. Directorate of
Public Relations, Department of the Army.
National Service Corps Training—Provosts, 1966, short film. Directorate of Public
Relations, Department of the Army.
National Service Corps Training—Survey Regiment (Bendigo), 1966, short film.
Directorate of Public Relations, Department of the Army.
National Service Officer, 1967, short film, Directorate ofPublic Relations, Department
of the Army.
No Trouble, Vivian Walker, 1987, televised stage play, Australian Broadcasting
Corporation TV, Melbourne Theatre Company, Media World, and the
Commonwealth Employment Service.
The Odd Angry Shot, 1979, feature film, Samson Productions, director Tom Jeffrey,
script William Nagle [from his novel, The Odd Angry Shot, 1975).
On the Gunline, 1969, short film, Department of the Navy.
Once Upon a War, 1970, short film, director Patricia Penn.
One Crowded Hour. Neil Davis Combat Cameraman 1934-1985, 1987, presenter Tim
Bowden, Australian Broadcasting Corporation Radio broadcast and audio
cassette [companion to Bowden’s book of the same title, see section 2 : Bowden,
1987.
One Shot, One K ill 1967, British Broadcasting Commission, shown on Inside
Australia Series.
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Or Forever Hold Your Peace, 1970, film, Richard Brennan, et aL
Ordinance Support for Australian Force Vietnam 1970, short film. Army Design
Establishment.
The Quiet Mutiny, 1970, short film, John Pilger.
The Quiet War, 1967, short film, Australian Broadcasting Commission.
“Power to the People", 5 May 1990, documentaiy, Geraldine Doogue, et al for the
Hindsight series, Australian Broadcasting Corporation TV [Australian
Broadcasting Corporation Radio National held a phone-in forum the day
following the broadcast].
The President Visits Brisbane, 1967, lYemier’s Department Queensland, Queensland
Government Film Unit.
Public Enemy Number One, 1980, producers David Bradbury & Steward Young, for the
Creative Development Branch, Australian Film Commission.
RangerAdvisors—Vietnam 1972, short film, Directorate ofPublic Relations, Department
of the Army.
Red Cross Civilian Reliefin Vietnam 1967, short film. Cine Service for the Australian Red
Cross Society.
Rescue Vietnam 1968, short film, Mathais, Kenyan & Merton Pictures, for Australian
Red Cross Society.
“Right as Rain", 17 December 1989, radio drama, David Knox, Australian Broadcasting
Corporation Radio.
Sad Song of Yellow Skin, 1976, film, directed Michael Rubbo (Australian) for the
Canadian National Film Board.
The Siege ofFtie Base Gloria, 1989, feature film, director Brian Trenchard-Smith, script
William Nagle [ostensibly a US film, shot in the Philippines, the director and
script writer are Australians or Australian trained; echnical processing done
in Sydney].
The Soldier, 1967, short film, Australian Broadcasting Commisision IV .
Special Air Service in Vietnam 1971, short film. Directorate of Public Relations,
Department of the Army.
A Street to Die, 1985, film, producer/director Bill Bennett
Sword of Honour, 1987, TV miniseries, ATN7 Network, producersSimpson-LeMesurier,
subsequently released on video.
Task Force Vietnam 1969, short film. Directorate ofPublic Relations, Department
of the Army.
This Day Tonight, Australian Broadcasting Commission TV news and current affairs
programme, active in the Vietnam period.
Three Bridges to Cross, 1966, film, Australian Broadcasting Commission TV & Japan
Broadcasting Corporation.
The Trespassers, 1976, feature film, director John Duigan.
The Unlucky Country, 1967, short film, Australian Commonwealth Film Unit
Vietnam 1987, TV miniseries, TEN Network IV , producers Kennedy-Miller, directors
Chris Noonan &John Duigan, script byTerryHayes, Chris Noonan, John Duigan
and others, [aversion edited from the broadcast time (excludingadvertisements)
of approximately eight-and-a-halfhours to six hours on two cassettes is available
in the United Kingdom from CBS Video, American viewers should contact CBS
US distributors to determine the availablity of this version].
“Vietnam Documentaiy, August 1989, documentary. Special Broadcasting System
TV, producers Reg Boulter & Douglas Mann.
“Vietnam Retrospect", 1988, Australian Broadcasting Corporation audio cassette.
Vietnam Interpreters, 1967, short film, Department of the Army.
Vietnam Scene, 1967, short film. Department of the Army.
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VietnamToday, 6 June—25 July, 1987,6 programmes on 2SER Macquarie University
Radio Station. Selections from the Vietnam Conference, Macquarie University,
27 April-1 May 1987 [see section 2 : Maddock & Wright (eds). 1987).
"Vietnamese gangs in Melbourne", September 1990, news report A Current Affair.
The Vung Tan Ferry, 1971, short film. Department of the Navy.
Warriors, Friends or Foes?, 1988, IV documentary series, episode 2.
White Paper No. 1—Conscription, 23 April, 1966, TV Debate, producers ATN 7 Network,
Sydney University, & Ampol Petroleum Australia
Winter o f Our Dreams, 1981, feature film, director John Duigan.
You Can't See Round Comers, 1968, feature film, David Cahill, based on the TV drama
(soap), 1967-68, in turn an updated version of the novel by Jon Cleaiy. You
Can't See Round Comers, 1947 [the novel deals with draft resistance and
absenteeism in the Second World War, the TV and film updates presents the
hero as a Vietnam drafi resister].
In addition single episodes of various serial (or soap) dramas and situation
comedies, have been devoted to Vietnam and/or Vietnam veterans; these
include: A Country Practice, 1989: Col’nCarpenter, 1990; TheFlying Doctor, 1990;
and Winners, 1985. Occasional “sketches” in television comedy programmes
have depicted Vietnam film stereotypes (especially Rambo-like crazed killers);
these include: The Comedy Canpany, 1990; Let the Blood Run Free, 1990; and
The Big Gig: Tuesday Night Live, 1989-90.
1See also Ann Mari Jordens. “Cultural Influences: the Vietnam War and Australia",
Journal of the Australian War Memorial 15, October 1989: 3-14.
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A Select Chronology o f
Australian Involvement in the Vietnam W ar
1950

14 January

Ho Chi Minh declares Dem ocratic
Republic o f Vietnam .

7 February

United States and United Kingdom
recognise the French sponsored
governm ent o f the form er E m peror
Bao Dai.

8 February

Australia recognises Bao Dai
Governm ent.

9 M arch

Percy Spender, External Affairs
M inister, speaks o f the Dom ino
Theory in the House of
Representatives.

8 M ay

United States provides $10 m illion
in m ilitary and econom ic aid to the
Bao Dai Governm ent.

1951

ANZUS treaty signed.

1953

Jean Letoum eau, French M inister in
charge o f Indochinese m atters
invited to visit Australia to discuss
aid.

1954

John Foster Dulles, Am erican
Secretary o f State, encourages
"united action" during the Indochina
crisis.

1955

7 M ay

The Battle o f D ien Bien Phu lost by
the French and Bao Dai forces.

8 Septem ber

South East Asia Treaty O rganisation
(SEATO) form ed with initial
signatories United States, United
Kingdom , France, Australia, New
Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand, and the
Philippines.

9 October

France leaves Hanoi.
US aid is provided directly to Saigon.
Australia sends troops to aid in
M alayan Emergency.
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1957

1960

M ay

Ngo Dinh Diem, President o f South
Vietnam , visits the USA.

Septem ber

Diem visits Australia.

20 D ecem ber

The National Liberation Front ( NLF)
is founded by H anoi for the liberation
o f South Vietnam .

1961

Laos crisis.
Indonesia incorporates
form er Dutch W est N ew
Guinea
colony as Irian Jaya.
17 N ovem ber

1962

United
States
seeks
diplom atic
indications o f A u stralia’s stance on,
and w illingness to assist in. South
Vietnam .

Establishm ent at North W est Cape,
W estern Australia o f a V ery Low
Frequency "joint" US-Australian naval
com m unications station.
13 Jan uary

O peration RANCH HAND (defoliation)
begins.

24 M ay

Athol Townely, M inister o f Defence,
announces that 30 advisers are to be
sent to South Vietnam.

July-August

The first o f the Training Team arrive
in South Vietnam .

1963

M alaysia formed. Indonesia em barks
upon Confrontation.
1 June

W illiam Francis Hacking, an adviser
is the first Australian casualty, killed
40 m iles west o f Hue.
15, 000
A m erican advisers in South Vietnam ,
and $500 m illion aid is given.
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1964

A u stralian advisers increased to 83.
June

Robert M enzies, Australian Prim e
M inister, visits W ashington, D.C..

2 August

USS M addox incident in the G u lf of
Tonkin.

4 August

USS Tu rn er Joy incident.

7 August

US C ongress passes T on k in G u lf
Resolution.

10 N ovem ber

National Service (Conscription) Act
proclaim ed.

Jan uary
1965

Agent Orange first used.
M arch

A m erican m arines land at Da Nang.

29 April

M enzies announces the com m itm ent
o f A ustralian com bat troops.

M ay-June

1RAR (800 m en) arrive in B ien Hoa,
to jo in the U S A 173rd Airborne
Brigade. US troop com m itm ent
reaches 50,000 men.

13 M ay

Save O ur Sons (SOS) founded.

Septem ber

M organ Gallup Poll shows that 56 per
cent o f A ustralians in favou r o f
A ustralian participation, 28 p er cent
in favou r o f withdrawal, ten per cent
undecided.

22 O ctober

First arrests (65 people) for anti-W ar
dem onstration in Sydney.
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1966

26 Jan u ary

H arold Holt succeeds M enzies as
Prim e M inister and leader o f the
Liberal Party.

8 M arch

G overnm ent announces an increase
in troops - two Battalions and
support, and the Special A ir
Services, to be sent to Phuoc T u y
province, a total o f 4500 m en
including 500 conscripts.

16 M arch

2000 people m arch in protest
against the w a r organised b y the SOS
group.

M ay

Seam en s’ U nion refuse to load
supplies for Vietnam on the Boonaroo

24 M ay

Errol W ayne Noach, the first
conscript killed in action.

14 Ju n e

5th and 6th Battalions R A R and
supports in place at Nui Dat, w ith
logistic support base at V u n g Tau, 30
kilom etres (16 m iles) south.

30 Ju n e

Holt visits W ash ington D.C., and in
speech utters the fam ous "all the
w ay" in support o f L.B. Joh n son 's
V ietn am policy.

18 A u gu st

T h e battle ol Lon g Tan, A u stralia
loses 18 KIA, for a claim ed 245
V ietnam ese KIA.

21-22 O ctober

President Joh n son visits Australia.
One m illion Sydneysiders and
500,000 in M elbourne line the
streets to w elcom e him on
successive days.

19 N ovem ber

M organ G allup Poll: 68 per cent in
favou r o f conscription; 37 p er cent
in favou r o f sending conscripts to
Vietnam .
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1967

8 February

E.G. (Gough) W hitlam succeeds
A rthu r Calwell as leader o f the
Federal Opposition, The Australian
Labor Party.

May

M organ Gallup Poll: 62 per cent in
favour o f the W ar; 24 per cent in
favour o f Australian withdrawal; 14
per cent undecided.

2 October

A 'Teach-in" titled "National Forum
on Vietnam " held at Monash
University, Melbourne.

17 Novem ber

Holt m issing presum ed drowned.
John M cEwan (Country Party - the
Liberals' coalition partner) succeeds
to Prim e M inistership on 19
December.

Novem ber Decem ber

Australian com m itm ent rises to a
peak o f 8,300 men.

1968

Australian Draft Resister's Union
established.
10 January

John Grey Gorton, Liberal Party
leader, succeeds to Prime
Ministership.

31 January

Tet Offensive.

12 February

Gorton announces sem i-officially that
there will be no increase in
Australian commitment.

16 March

My Lai occurs but rem ains unknown
until 16 November.

May

National Services Act am ended to
impose two year civil gaol term for
draft evaders.

August

Paris student riots.
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1969

1970

1971

June

President Richard Nixon announces
withdrawal o f 25,000 m en and the
initiation o f "Vietnamization".

August

M organ Gallup Poll: 55 per cent in
favour o f withdrawal; 40 per cent o f
continuing the war; 6 per cent
undecided.

3 Septem ber

Ho Chi Minh dies aged 79.

4 October

US M organ Poll: 58 per cent believe
the w ar is a mistake.

15 October

Massive anti-war dem onstration
occurs in W ashington, D.C..

22 April

Governm ent announces one Battalion
to be withdrawn.

4 M ay

Kent State incident.

8 M ay

Approxim ately 120,000 m arch in the
first M oratorium March in Sydney,
and approxim ately 70, 000 in
Melbourne.

18 Septem ber

Second M oratorium Marches in
Sydney o f 100,000 and M elbourne
50,000. More than 300 arrested.

10 March

W illiam M cM ahon succeeds as Prime
Minister.

30 M arch

1000 m en withdrawn.

30 June

Third and final large anti-w ar m arch,
110,000 people.

18 August

M cM ahon announces that m ost
troops will be home by Christmas.

17 Decem ber

Last m ajor troop withdrawal.
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1972

2 D ecem ber

A u stralian Labor Party w ins
Governm ent. W hitlam becom es
Prim e Minister.

5 D ecem ber

National Service ended; im prisoned
Draft R esisters released.

8 Decem ber

Last Au stralian troops leave Vietnam .

18 D ecem ber

Last advisers leave. N ixon renew s
bom bing o f H anoi and Haiphong.

23 January

Nixon announces "peace with honor".

27 January

Ceasefire.

26 February

W hitlam announces the
establishm ent o f diplom atic relations
w ith Hanoi, but retains diplom atic
recognition o f South Vietnam .

29 March

Last Am erican troops leave Vietnam .

1974

4 Jan uary

South V ietnam 's President N guyen
V an Thieu announces that w ar has
been declared again.

1975

17 April

Phnom Penh falls to K hm er Rouge.

25 April

Australian em bassy in Saigon is
closed.

30 April

Fall o f Saigon.

11 N ovem ber

Sir Joh n Kerr, the G overnor General,
"sacks" the W h itlam Labor
Governm ent, appoints M alcolm
Fraser, Liberal leader as "caretaker"
Prim e Minister.

D ecem ber

Fraser w ins governm ent. 1000
Indochinese refugees resettled.

April

First V ietnam ese Boat people arrive
in Australia.

1973

1976
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1978

Fraser Governm ent introduces
refugee com ponent into im m igration
programme.

1982

Arrival o f the first Vietnam ese
m igrants under the Orderly
Departure Programme. Vietnam
Veterans Counselling Service
established.

1983

June

1984

4000 Am erican veterans begin class
action in New Y ork State against the
m anufacturer o f Agent Orange.
Justice John Phillip Evatt charged
with the Royal Com m ission into the
m ortality o f veterans.
The AVHS m ortality report published.

1985

Ju ly

Evatt Royal Com m ission published
finding Agent Orange "Not Guilty".
Vietnam Veterans Association rejects
findings.

1987

4 October

25,000 March in Sydney W elcom e
Home March.

1989

Ju ly

A t the Geneva Conference on
refugees, Australia votes with ASEAN
nations for the m andatory
repatriation o f Vietnam ese refugees.
Australia is com m itted to resettle
11,000 people during 1989-1992.

June-July

First Cam bodian boat people arrive in
Australia.

1990

Tw o m ore Cam bodian boats arrive.
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